

## 王正廷博士從日本帝國收回青島主權

Dr. Chengting T. Wang Restored Tsingtao to Chinese Sovereignty

By Herbert K. Lau (劉敬恒) (Rotary China Historian)

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Dr. Chengting Thomas Wang (王正廷博士), *HonLLD (Peking)*, *HonLLD (St. John's)*, BA (Yale) (7 September 1882 – 21 May 1961), joined the Rotary Club of Shanghai (上海扶輪社) as Active Member on 20 August 1920, serving as the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Republic of China (中華民國外交總長).

A century ago this date, 10 December 1922, the restoration of Tsingtao (*Qingdao*) (青島) to Chinese sovereignty from the Imperial Japan was jointly executed by two principal Chinese officials appointed by the Beiyang (Peking) Government (北洋政府):

- (1) Dr. Chengting T. Wang: The Foreign Affairs Minister who served as the Chairman of the Sino-Japanese Joint Committee on the Shantung Question. He was the chief diplomatic official (魯案善後督辦) responsible for negotiating the detailed terms of the handover and resolving the complex administrative and economic transitions with the Japanese military.
- (2) Lieutenant General Hsiung Ping-Ch'i (熊炳琦中將): The Governor of Shantung Province (山東省省長) who was concurrently appointed as the Superintendent of the Kiaochow Port (膠澳商埠督辦). He was the chief administrative and security officer on the ground. Hsiung was responsible for managing the local law enforcement, stationing Chinese police, absorbing or neutralizing local banditry, and ensuring an orderly, peaceful physical transition as Japanese forces withdrew.

On 10 December 1922 the Handover Ceremony, Wang and Hsiung met with the Japanese military commander, General Yui Mitsue (由比光衛陸軍大將), at the Japanese Defense Headquarters (the former German Governor's Office). At noon, the Japanese national flag was lowered, and the Beiyang Government's China national five-colored flag was raised, officially ending 25 years of foreign colonial rule of Tsingtao (German occupation from 1898 to 1914, followed by Japanese military occupation during World War I).



## Tsingtao in the Shantung Problem

The Shantung Problem refers to the diplomatic dispute at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference over the allocation of former German economic and territorial concessions in China's Shantung Province to Japan rather than their direct return to Chinese sovereignty. These concessions, including the Kiaochow Bay Leasehold (膠州灣租借地) around Tsingtao and associated railway and mining rights, had been seized by Imperial Germany in 1898 but occupied by Japanese forces in September 1914 following Imperial Japan's declaration of war on Germany as an Allied power. Japan had extracted prior recognition of its claims through the 《1915 Twenty-One Demands》 imposed on the Chinese government amid World War I, which included demands for expanded influence in Shantung, though public disclosure of these demands fueled domestic Chinese opposition.

At the Conference, despite U.S. President Thomas Woodrow Wilson's (美國總統威爾遜) advocacy for self-determination and opposition to secret treaties, the prevailing Allied consensus---rooted in Japan's prior secret agreements with Britain, France, and others---resulted in Articles 156–158 of the 《Treaty of Versailles》 transferring Germany's Shantung rights to Japan, with the stipulation that Japan would eventually restore Shantung's sovereignty to China while retaining economic privileges. China, having declared war on Germany in 1917 in hopes of recovering the territories and contributed over 140,000 labourers to the Allied effort, refused to sign the Treaty, viewing the decision as a betrayal of national aspirations and a continuation of imperialist encroachments. The ruling ignited widespread protests in China, culminating in the May Fourth Movement (五四運動), where students and intellectuals rallied against foreign interference, demanded government reform, and promoted vernacular language and scientific thought, marking a pivotal shift toward modern Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism.

The controversy underscored tensions between Wilson's idealistic principles and the realpolitik of wartime alliances, contributing to the U.S. Senate's rejection of the 《Versailles Treaty》 and influencing subsequent diplomacy, including the 1922 Washington Naval Conference where Japan agreed to relinquish most Shantung concessions to China under multilateral pressure. Long-term, the Shantung Problem eroded faith in Western powers among Chinese elites, accelerated the decline of the Beiyang Government, and fertilized ideological soils for both the Chinese Communist Party (中國共產黨) and the Kuomintang's (中國國民黨) revolutionary agendas, though direct causal links to communism remain debated amid broader domestic chaos.

### German Imperial Concessions in Shandong

In November 1897, two German Catholic missionaries, Georg Stenz and Richard Henle, were murdered in Juye County, Shantung Province (山東省鉅野縣), by members of the Big Sword Society (大刀會) amid anti-foreign tensions. The German Empire, under Kaiser

Wilhelm II, used the incident as a pretext for intervention, dispatching the East Asia Squadron to Kiaochow Bay. On November 13, three warships entered the Bay, and marines landed the following day to occupy Tsingtao without resistance from Chinese forces. This action initiated the establishment of a German sphere of influence in Shantung, part of the broader “scramble for concessions” among European powers during the late Ch’ing Empire’s weakening sovereignty.

Negotiations between German envoy Hermann Detzner and Ch’ing officials culminated in the 《Sino-German Treaty 膠澳租借條約》 of 6 March 1898 whereby Imperial Ch’ing leased the Kiaochow Bay area---encompassing approximately 552 square kilometers---to Germany for 99 years, granting administrative control, fortification rights, and exclusive use of the ports of Tsingtao and Kiaochow. The agreement, an unequal treaty imposed under duress, also permitted Germany to construct railways connecting the leased territory to interior Shantung, initially a line from Tsingtao to Tsinan (*Jinan*) (濟南), along with associated mining concessions in the province to exploit coal and other resources. German authorities developed Tsingtao into a modern colonial outpost, investing in infrastructure such as a deep-water harbour, breweries, railroads, and urban planning modeled on German cities, while extending economic influence beyond the leasehold through trade and missionary activities.

These concessions solidified Germany’s foothold in China, serving strategic naval interests in the East Asia Squadron and commercial ambitions, but they exacerbated Imperial Ch’ing vulnerabilities, prompting similar demands from other powers like Russia, Britain, and France. By 1914, the Shantung Railway---under German control---spanned over 400 kilometers, linking coastal ports to inland markets and symbolizing the economic penetration that extended German dominance across much of Shantung Province.

### Japanese Expansion and World War I Entry

Japan’s imperial ambitions in East Asia intensified following its Meiji-era modernization, with victories in the First Sino-Japanese War (甲午戰爭) (1894–1895), which yielded Taiwan (臺灣) and recognition of influence in Korea, and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), securing southern Sakhalin, the Liaotung (*Liaodong*) Peninsula (遼東半島) lease, and South Manchurian Railway rights. These successes fueled Japan’s drive for continental expansion to access resources like coal and iron, countering its island-nation vulnerabilities, while viewing weaker neighbours like Imperial Ch’ing as opportunities for dominance. Shantung Province, strategically located near Japan and hosting lucrative ports, emerged as a target due to its economic potential and as a buffer against Russian influence, though German concessions there since 1898 initially limited direct access. Japanese strategists, prioritizing naval and economic security, saw European distractions as a chance to supplant foreign spheres in China without major opposition.

The outbreak of World War I in July 1914 presented Japan with what military leaders termed a “god-given opportunity” to expand at low cost, as European powers focused on the

Western Front. Under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902---renewed in 1905 and 1911---which committed Britain and Japan to defend each other's possessions in Asia and the Pacific against aggression by one or more powers, Japan leveraged its ally's involvement against Germany to justify entry. On 15 August 1914, Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of all military forces from Kiaochow Bay (including Tsingtao) within one week. Receiving no response, Japan declared war on 23 August 1914 formally aligning with the Allies while limiting its European commitments to naval patrols in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This entry was opportunistic rather than ideological, aimed primarily at seizing German Pacific islands (like the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls) and the Shantung concession, with Japanese leaders calculating minimal risk against isolated German forces.

Military operations in Shantung commenced swiftly to exploit Germany's isolation. On 27 August 1914, Japanese naval forces under Vice Admiral Sadakichi Kato (加藤定吉海軍中將) began blockading Tsingtao, supported by a small British contingent of about 1,000 troops from India, fulfilling alliance obligations but under Japanese command. On September 2, approximately 23,000 Japanese troops under General Mitsuomi Kamio (神尾光臣陸軍大將) landed at Longkou (龍口) in northern Shantung, advancing southward to encircle the German defenses. A secondary landing occurred near Tsingtao on September 18. The German garrison, numbering around 3,300 regulars and volunteers under Alfred Meyer-Waldeck, mounted a stout defense with fortified positions, artillery, and a small naval squadron, prolonging the siege until 7 November 1914 when Tsingtao fell after heavy bombardment and infantry assaults. Casualties were asymmetric: Japan and Britain suffered about 2,000 killed or wounded, versus Germany's 200 dead and 500 wounded before surrender.

Following the victory, Japan occupied not only the former German leasehold of Kiaochow Bay---spanning 552 square kilometers with Tsingtao's port and rail links---but extended control over 100 kilometers of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway (膠濟鐵路) and surrounding hinterlands in Shantung Province, deploying up to 50,000 troops by 1915. Although the Republic of China, under the Beiyang Government, had maintained neutrality and granted Japan limited permission to combat German forces in the leasehold---expecting restoration to Chinese sovereignty post-war---Japanese authorities ignored these boundaries, citing security needs and issuing ultimatums to Chinese officials for acquiescence. This *de facto* annexation sowed seeds of resentment, as Japan's actions prioritized territorial gains over prior diplomatic assurances, setting the stage for postwar disputes at Versailles where Japan sought formal transfer of the concessions.

### Diplomatic Maneuvers Leading to Versailles Secret Treaties and Allied Commitments

In early 1917, as Allied naval resources strained against German U-boat threats, Japan leveraged its position to extract formal commitments from European powers regarding its

wartime seizures in China and the Pacific. On 16 February 1917, Britain exchanged diplomatic notes with Japan, agreeing to support the transfer to Japan of Germany's economic privileges and territorial rights in Shantung Province, as well as German-held islands north of the equator, in exchange for Japan dispatching a flotilla of destroyers to the Mediterranean for anti-submarine operations. France followed suit on 19 February 1917, with a parallel secret agreement endorsing Japan's claims to the Shantung concessions and Pacific territories, contingent on similar naval aid to bolster Allied shipping protection. These pacts built on Japan's de facto control of Shantung since its 1914 capture of Tsingtao but formalized Allied backing for Japanese succession at the postwar settlement.

Italy acceded to comparable terms later in 1917, recognizing Japan's rights to the German Shantung leasehold and equatorial Pacific islands in return for naval reinforcements, thereby aligning the primary Entente powers behind Japan's territorial demands. Russia had earlier, in March 1916, signed a secret treaty with Japan affirming these claims, though the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 led to its publication and repudiation. Collectively, these agreements---kept confidential from China and the United States---obligated Britain, France, Italy, and initially Russia to advocate for Article 156 of the 《Treaty of Versailles》, which would cede Germany's Shantung interests directly to Japan rather than restoring them to Chinese sovereignty.

The United States, having entered the war in April 1917 without participating in these arrangements, viewed them as incompatible with President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, particularly the principles of self-determination and open diplomacy, setting the stage for friction at the Paris Peace Conference. Japanese diplomats cited these prior commitments to pressure European counterparts, arguing that reneging would undermine wartime solidarity, though the pacts' secrecy fueled later accusations of imperial betrayal when revealed post-armistice.

### Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China

In January 1915, as World War I distracted European powers, Japan presented China with a series of ultimatums known as the 《Twenty-One Demands》, seeking to consolidate control over key economic and territorial interests, particularly in Shantung Province where Japan had seized German concessions earlier that year. The demands were formally communicated to Chinese Grand President Yuan Shi-Kai (大總統袁世凱) on 18 January 1915 by Japanese Minister to China Hioki Eki (日本駐華公使日置益), building on Japan's declaration of war against Germany in August 1914 and its subsequent occupation of the Kiaochow Bay leasehold, including the city of Tsingtao, by November 1914. These demands were divided into five groups totaling 21 articles, with Group I directly targeting Shantung by requiring China to consent to the transfer of German-owned railways, mining rights, and coastal territories to Japan, alongside extending the South Manchuria Railway lease to 99 years and granting Japan preferential economic access in the region.

Groups II and III further entrenched Japanese economic dominance by demanding expanded railway, mining, and forestry concessions in eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, as well as Chinese reliance on Japanese financing for future loans, infrastructure, and arms purchases, effectively sidelining Western competitors. Group IV prohibited China from granting coastal or island territories to any foreign power without Japanese consent, while the secretive Group V---initially withheld from Allied knowledge---sought unprecedented political influence, including Japanese advisors in China's central government, police oversight, and joint management of key arsenals, which would have rendered China a de facto Japanese protectorate. Japan's aggressive posture stemmed from its wartime gains and Yuan Shi-Kai's internal vulnerabilities, including his suppression of republican opposition and failed monarchist bid, which weakened China's bargaining position.

Negotiations dragged into May 1915, with Japan issuing an ultimatum on May 7 demanding acceptance within 48 hours, prompting Yuan to convene advisors and leak the full demands to stir domestic and international opposition. China ultimately agreed to 13 of the 21 demands in the 《Sino-Japanese Treaty 中日民四條約》 of 25 May 1915, accepting most economic provisions but rejecting Group V after protests from Britain and the United States, who viewed the political clauses as violating the Open Door Policy and territorial integrity principles. The concessions formalized Japan's hold on Shantung's infrastructure, including the Tsingtao–Tsinanfu Railway and mining operations, yielding significant economic benefits---Japanese enterprises extracted over 1 million tons of coal and iron ore annually from the region by 1918---while fueling Chinese nationalist resentment and anti-Japanese boycotts that disrupted trade. This episode presaged the Shantung Problem at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where Japan pressed for 《Versailles Treaty》 confirmation of these gains, highlighting the limits of Allied wartime promises to Japan under the 《1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement》.

### The Paris Peace Conference Negotiations

#### Initial Positions and Wilson's Self-Determination Principle

At the outset of the Paris Peace Conference on 18 January 1919, Japan's delegation, led by Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya (外務大臣内田康哉), formally demanded the transfer of all German rights and interests in Shantung Province---including the Kiaochow Bay Leasehold, railways, mines, and cable concessions---directly to Japanese administration under what became Article 156 of the 《Treaty of Versailles》. This claim rested on Japan's unopposed occupation of Tsingtao on 7 November 1914, following its declaration of war against Germany on 23 August 1914, and on wartime pacts such as the February 1917 Franco-Japanese agreement and the concurrent Anglo-Japanese naval accord, which obligated Britain and France to advocate for Japan's Shantung interests to secure its military commitment against Germany. Japan viewed these as non-negotiable.

China's representatives, including V. K. Wellington Koo (顧維鈞), Lou Tseng-Tsiang (陸徵祥) and Chengting T. Wang (王正廷), countered with an unequivocal demand for the unconditional restoration of Shantung to direct Chinese sovereignty, arguing that China's declaration of war on Germany---effective 14 August 1917 after prolonged internal debate---nullified German titles and entitled Peking to recover the territory without cession to a third power. The Chinese position invoked international law principles of subrogation, whereby the Allied victor (China, as a belligerent) inherited enemy alienations, and highlighted Japan's prior Twenty-One Demands of 18 January 1915 as evidence of expansionist overreach already tacitly accepted by Yuan Shi-Kai's government under duress. China's claims gained initial rhetorical support from the United States, though domestic instability under the Beiyang Government weakened Peking's leverage, as Japan had extracted further concessions via the Nishihara Loans (西原借款) of 1917-1918 in exchange for financial aid.

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson initially aligned with China's aspirations, expressing in Council of Ten meetings as early as 28 January 1919, a personal interest in a Kiaochow-Shantung settlement that preserved Chinese territorial integrity while accommodating economic equities, and privately urging Japanese restraint to avoid secret diplomacy's taint. Wilson's Fourteen Points, announced 8 January 1918, emphasized "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" (Point 1) and "a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" (Point 5), which he extended to Shantung as a test of self-determination for sovereign peoples rather than mere ethnic minorities. Yet this principle, designed primarily for European nationalities like Poles or Czechs seeking autonomy from empires, encountered causal limits in Asia: Shantung's population was ethnically Han Chinese under nominal Manchu Ch'ing sovereignty, rendering self-determination inapplicable as independence rhetoric, while Allied secret treaties---contradicting Point 1---bound Britain and France to Japan, forcing Wilson to weigh abstract ideals against the pragmatic risk of Japanese defection from the League of Nations covenant. By February 1919, Wilson acknowledged the concessions' economic character over political sovereignty, proposing a compromise of Japanese administrative oversight with eventual Chinese repatriation, though this diluted self-determination into bilateral negotiation amid great-power realpolitik.

### Compromise on Article 156 and Treaty Provisions

During deliberations in the Council of Four in mid-April 1919, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson initially opposed awarding Japan the former German concessions in Shantung, arguing for their direct return to Chinese sovereignty in line with self-determination principles. However, Britain and France, bound by prior secret agreements such as the 1917 Anglo-French-Japanese understandings and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, insisted on honoring commitments to support Japan's claims, which stemmed from its 1914 occupation of the territory during World War I.

Japanese delegates, led by Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai (外務大臣内田康哉), intensified pressure by linking the Shantung issue to broader conference outcomes, including Japan's proposed racial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant and its potential withdrawal from the proceedings if denied the concessions. Wilson, prioritizing the League's formation and fearing Japanese alienation could derail the postwar order, negotiated a compromise during the last week of April 1919, conceding the transfer while securing Japan's public pledge on 15 April 1919 to restore administrative control of the Kiaochow leased territory to China after concluding bilateral arrangements.

The Council of Four approved this framework on 30 April 1919 leading to Section VIII of the 《Treaty of Versailles》. Article 156 stipulated that “Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, title and privileges, particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways and mining rights, which she acquired by virtue of the Treaty concluded with her on 6 March 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the province of Shantung”. Articles 157 and 158 further required Japan to negotiate with China for the disposition of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway and associated economic properties, preserving Japanese operational rights while nominally advancing toward restitution.

This arrangement prioritized Allied diplomatic cohesion and Japan's wartime contributions over China's claims, despite the latter's entry into the war on the Allied side in 1917 expecting territorial recovery. Chinese delegates rejected the provisions as infringing on sovereignty, viewing the indirect transfer via Japan as a betrayal, though the compromise averted an immediate Japanese walkout.

### Chinese Domestic Response

#### Outbreak of the May Fourth Movement

The outbreak of the May Fourth Movement occurred on 4 May 1919 when news of the Paris Peace Conference's decision to transfer Germany's pre-war concessions in Shantung Province to Japan---rather than restoring them to Chinese sovereignty---provoked immediate public outrage Peking. Approximately 3,000 students from 13 local universities, led by those from Peking University (北京大學), converged on Tiananmen Square (天安門) for a mass demonstration protesting Article 156 of the 《Treaty of Versailles》 draft, which formalized this transfer.

Organizers drafted five key resolutions prior to the rally, demanding that the Chinese government reject the Treaty, hold accountable officials who had negotiated secret pro-Japanese agreements, and mobilize national resistance against foreign encroachment. The protesters chanted slogans such as “Return Shantung to China” and “Boycott Japanese goods”, while marching from the square to the residences of three cabinet ministers perceived as traitors for their acquiescence to Japanese influence: Tsao Ju-Lin (曹汝霖), Chang Tsung-Hsiang (章宗祥), and Lu Tsung-Yu (陸宗輿).

Tensions escalated when demonstrators stormed Tsao's residence, destroying property and assaulting him, which prompted police intervention and the arrest of 32 students by evening. These events, occurring amid broader frustrations with the Beiyang Government's weakness and corruption, catalyzed student-led strikes across Peking universities the following day and ignited sympathy protests in cities like Shanghai (上海) and Tientsin (*Tianjin*) (天津), transforming the initial demonstration into a nationwide anti-imperialist surge.

### Government and Societal Protests

Following the initial student demonstrations on 4 May 1919, societal protests expanded to encompass merchants and industrial workers in major urban centers, amplifying economic pressure against the government's handling of the Shantung concessions. Merchants in cities including Shanghai and Tientsin initiated shop closures and boycotts of Japanese goods, disrupting trade and signaling widespread commercial opposition to perceived national humiliation at Versailles. Industrial workers joined with coordinated strikes, particularly in Shanghai where labour actions halted production in factories and contributed to a broader paralysis of economic activity, marking one of the first instances of mass worker mobilization in modern Chinese history.

The Beiyang Government initially responded to the unrest with suppression, deploying police to arrest demonstrators and quell gatherings, including the detention of 32 students in Peking on May 4. Public outrage and escalating strikes forced concessions, leading to the release of arrested protesters by late May and the resignation of three pro-Japanese cabinet ministers---Tsao Ju-Lin (communications), Lu Tsung-Yu (finance), and Chang Tsung-Hsiang (foreign affairs)---on May 9 amid accusations of treasonous dealings with Japan. Premier Tuan Ch'i-Jui (國務總理段祺瑞) offered his resignation, though it was not accepted, highlighting internal divisions within the warlord-dominated administration over foreign policy.

These protests underscored societal rejection of elite compromises, such as secret agreements with Japan, and pressured the government toward defiance at the international level, culminating in China's refusal to sign the 《Treaty of Versailles》 on 28 June 1919, despite Allied expectations. The Movement's breadth---encompassing over a dozen cities by mid-June---demonstrated unprecedented cross-class unity against foreign encroachment, though it also exposed the central government's fragility amid warlord factions favoring Japanese loans and territorial deals.

### Resolution and Immediate Aftermath

#### China's Refusal to Sign the Treaty

The Chinese delegation, led by diplomat V. K. Wellington Koo, refused to sign the 《Treaty of Versailles》 during the ceremony on 28 June 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, Paris, France, marking China as the only Allied participant to withhold

endorsement. This decision stemmed directly from Articles 156–158, which transferred Germany’s pre-war economic and territorial rights in Shantung Province—including the Kiaochow Bay leasehold and railway concessions—to Japan, rather than restoring them to Chinese sovereignty as the delegation had demanded. The delegation had repeatedly protested the arrangement, arguing it contravened principles of self-determination and rewarded Japan’s wartime seizures, but Allied leaders prioritized honoring prior Anglo-Japanese agreements and Japan’s military contributions.

Initially, the delegation explored signing with reservations specifically excluding the Shantung clauses, but French and Allied authorities denied this option, viewing the Treaty as indivisible. Peking’s provisional government, facing escalating domestic unrest, dispatched cables instructing non-signature to avoid political collapse, as acceptance would legitimize the perceived diplomatic humiliation. Koo’s stance reflected both diplomatic principle and pragmatic recognition that ratification would undermine China’s negotiating position in subsequent talks.

The refusal amplified nationalist fervour but isolated China internationally, as the Treaty’s entry into force on 10 January 1920, proceeded without Chinese participation, leaving Shantung under Japanese administration until later bilateral resolutions. This act underscored the limits of China’s agency at the Conference, where its status as a belligerent—despite minimal combat involvement—was overshadowed by great-power realpolitik.


### Washington Naval Conference Settlement


The Washington Naval Conference, convened from 12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922 in the United States, addressed the Shantung question amid broader efforts to stabilize Pacific relations and limit naval armaments. Under United States mediation, which applied diplomatic pressure on Japan while advocating for Chinese sovereignty, the conferees prioritized resolving the territorial and economic disputes stemming from the 《Treaty of Versailles》. This led to direct bilateral negotiations between Japan and China, culminating in a compromise that formally restored Chinese control over the province but preserved Japanese economic footholds.

On 4 February 1922, Japan and China signed the 《Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung 中日解決山東懸案條約》, a bilateral agreement that outlined the phased return of key assets. Japan committed to restoring the former German-leased territory of Kiaochow, including the port of Tsingtao, to China through a joint commission, with the transfer completed within six months of the Treaty’s enforcement. Military withdrawal followed: Japanese garrisons in Tsingtao were to evacuate within 30 days of the territorial handover, while troops stationed along the railway zone would depart in stages over three to six months as Chinese forces took over security responsibilities. By 31 December 1922, all Japanese military presence in Shantung was required to end, marking the cessation of occupation forces established during World War I.

Central to the settlement was the disposition of the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, a strategic asset originally built by Germany and seized by Japan in 1914. Japan agreed to transfer the railway, its branches, wharves, and related properties to China within nine months of treaty ratification, with China reimbursing Japan approximately 53,406,141 gold marks for the original investment, plus adjustments for post-war improvements minus depreciation. However, the agreement stipulated Chinese concessions to Japanese interests: a 99-year lease on land necessary for railway operations. Appointment of Japanese nationals as traffic manager and chief accountant for at least 15 years (or until certain treasury notes were redeemed), subject to Chinese oversight; and Japanese retention of branch line construction rights along specified routes. Additional economic privileges included Japan's continued use of properties for consulates, schools, hospitals, and cemeteries, as well as allowances for Japanese-language usage in Tsingtao customs procedures.

These terms represented a pragmatic balance rather than unqualified Chinese sovereignty restoration, as Japanese economic leverage---rooted in prior wartime captures and the unratified 《Twenty-One Demands》 ---persisted through management roles and concessions, potentially enabling future influence. The bilateral treaty was reinforced by the conference's 《Nine-Power Treaty 九國公約》, signed on 6 February 1922, by the United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Republic of China, Japanese Empire, French Republic, Kingdom of Italy, Kingdom of The Netherlands, Portuguese Republic, and Kingdom of Belgium, which reaffirmed China's territorial integrity, administrative independence, and the Open Door policy for equal commercial opportunity, providing multilateral endorsement without direct enforcement mechanisms. Ratifications for the Shantung Treaty were exchanged in Peking within four months, with joint commissions overseeing implementation details, including public property inventories and dispute arbitration. While the settlement averted immediate crisis and aligned with United States goals of regional stability, it drew criticism in China for compromising full autonomy, as the retained Japanese privileges undermined the nationalist push ignited by the May Fourth Movement.





1922年12月10日，青島主權回歸中國儀式。

10 December 1922 -- The ceremony marking the restoration of Tsingtao's sovereignty to China took place.

## 王正廷博士從日本帝國收回青島主權



王正廷博士(Dr. Chengting Thomas Wang, *HonLLD (Peking), HonLLD (St. John's), BA (Yale)*) (1882年9月7日-1961年5月21日)，中華民國外交總長，於1920年8月20日加入上海扶輪社(Shanghai Rotary Club)為現職社員。

一個世紀前的今天，即1922年12月10日，山東省青島從日本帝國回歸中國主權，由北洋政府任命的兩名中國主要官員聯合執行：

(1) 王正廷博士：外交總長，任中日山東問題聯合委員會委員長、魯案善後督辦。他是負責與日本軍方談判詳細移交條款，並解決複雜行政和經濟過渡問題的首席執行官。

(2) 熊炳琦中將：山東省省長，兼任膠澳商埠督辦。他是當地首席行政和安全官員，負責管理當地執法、部署中國警察、收復或剿滅當地土匪，並確保日本軍方撤離時有序、和平地完成過渡。

1922年12月10日移交儀式上，王正廷和熊炳琦在日本防衛本部（原德國總督府）會見了日軍指揮官由比光衛陸軍大將。中午時分，日本國旗降下，北洋政府的中國五色旗升起，正式結束了青島長達25年的外國殖民統治（1898年至1914年德國佔領，1914年至1922年期間日本軍事佔領）。這是中國近代外交史上的一項重要成就，以下為王正廷收回青島主權的歷史脈絡與關鍵過程：

- 歷史背景與懸案德日侵佔：青島（膠州租借地）最初於1898年被德國強租。1914年第一次世界大戰爆發後，日本擊敗德軍並侵佔青島及山東權益。
- 巴黎和會的抗爭：1919年巴黎和會上，英美法等國將山東權益判給日本，引發中國國內的「五四運動」。王正廷當時作為中華民國代表團成員（代表南方軍政府），與顧維鈞等人堅決拒絕在《凡爾賽條約》上簽字，成功使山東問題成為國際「懸案」，為日後收回主權留下了法律契機。
- 華盛頓會議與「魯案談判」轉機出現：1921年底至1922年初的華盛頓會議期間，在中美英等國的調停下，中日兩國簽署了《解決山東懸案條約》，規定日本必須將青島及膠濟鐵路交還中國。
- 臨危受命：1922年3月，中華民國北京政府任命王正廷為魯案善後督辦（山東懸案善後督辦），全權負責與日本進行具體的移交談判，包含公產、鐵路及礦產的清算與接收。
- 主權交接與正式接收：經過數月的艱苦談判，1922年12月10日正午12時，青島主權交接儀式在青島總督府大樓舉行。王正廷代表中華民國政府正式接收行政權，日本守備隊撤離，中國軍警進駐。

雖然當時的條約迫於無奈，仍保留了部分日本在青島的經濟特權（如膠濟鐵路的贖路款項與部分公產處置），使得談判在當時遭到部分輿論的爭議。但王正廷憑藉出色的外交手腕，在國力積弱不振的局勢下，成功廢除了部分不平等條約，收回國家領土，依然是辛亥革命與近代中國外交史上不可磨滅的功臣。



1922年12月10日，對於青島來說，是一個不平凡的日子。就是在這一天，中日雙方在青島舉行了交接儀式，中華民國正式收回青島主權；也就是在這一天，遭受德、日帝國主義25年殖民統治的青島回到了祖國的懷抱，掀開了新的歷史一頁。所以，這一天到來，值得永遠銘記。它是青島走過25年風雨飄搖路後邁向新生活的節點，更是中國人爭取主權與自由並最終取得勝利的凱歌。自1840年鴉片戰爭以來，帝國主義在中國割地、租地，強行在城市中劃占租界。1922年青島主權的回歸，使得青島成為中國近代史上第一個被收回的城市。這不僅僅是外交的勝利，更具有深遠的歷史意義。而對於青島的百姓來說，這更是一個永難忘記的日子，人們無不歡欣鼓舞。

接收慶典定於當天中午12時舉行。但是，上午10時不到，市民們便成群結隊簇擁著朝總督府走去。「膠澳自治籌備委員會」和「青島總商會」早早就把會旗、會標亮開，很快商界的人們便會聚了一大片。禮賢、明德、文德學校的學生隊伍整齊地坐在廣場空地上。自帶鑼鼓的團體則圍成圈兒，趁慶典前的這段空隙敲起了歡樂的音樂。還有人早早地把通紅的鞭炮掛到高處……

11時，青島行政交接儀式在總督府三樓會議廳舉行。中國方面出席的有王正廷、熊丙琦，以及行政接收委員會各委員會和青島地方軍委政官員計60多人。出席交接儀式的日方人員，以日本駐青島地方民政署長官秋山雅之介為首約有10人。

緊接著，總督府樓前舉行中日員警的交替儀式。24名全副武裝的中國員警並列兩排邁上12級臺階，分左右站在行車道相連的平臺上。隨後4名日本員警從總督府正門兩側的崗亭裡撤到平臺上，互致持槍禮。有4名中國員警跨上12級臺階，站在正門兩側的崗亭旁，返身向廣場圍觀的市民立正持槍行禮一周，然後站入哨位。頓時，廣場上響起一陣歡呼喝彩聲。這不僅是誰來站哨位的變化，更是誰掌主權的更迭，青島又變成中國人自己的城市了。這樣簡單卻意味深長的儀式，足以讓人激動不已。

時針移向12時。以前人們手錶不準確，都是靠午炮來對時。那天，人們不由向總督府背倚的觀象山引頸翹望，等待報時午炮鳴響。但這次不是為了對手錶，而是在為了迎接一個新時代，迎接一個新開始和一個嶄新的未來。

正午12時，午炮轟然鳴響，一響，兩響，三響……廣場上的人們齊聲喊數，當第12響午炮響過之後，在總督府樓頂上懸掛了8年的日本國旗頃刻落下。佇立在24級臺階下的兩名中國警官，手持佩劍。劍上的毫光左右揮動兩下，倏然垂向地面，身後的衛隊立即雙手持槍敬禮。偌大的廣場頓如課堂般寂靜，兩萬市民和佇立在平臺上的中日交接收官兵，仰首注目著中華民國五色國旗在軍樂聲中冉冉升空。廣場上頓時鑼鼓齊響，鞭炮震耳，秧歌如潮，歡呼聲推起一陣陣巨大的聲浪，在碧海藍天之間回蕩……。

按約定，1922年12月10日正午12時為青島主權回歸時間。日本在最後時刻也想製造事端和混亂，他們買通了孫百萬土匪幫，想利用一群土匪來表明中國沒有能力治理青島。

孫百萬是當時膠東地區的土匪頭目，有匪徒兩千餘人，經常在膠東各縣打家劫舍，為非作歹。日本人把他們引到嶗山、小珠山，發給他們槍支彈藥。把司令部公然設在山東路(今中山路)上的新商旅社，準備在12月10日上午全部進入青島。在日本人唆使下，孫百萬綁架了商會會長、山東督軍辦代表。

為此，中方由陳幹為代表深入虎穴面見孫百萬。對他動之以情，曉之以理，恩威並施。最終說服孫百萬放回了商會會長，並收編孫百萬部隊為膠東遊擊支隊。任命孫百萬為司令，讓他們駐守濰縣，由此粉碎了日本的陰謀。

根據協定，中國士兵要在青島主權回歸之後，也就是12月10日中午12時以後才能進入青島。但正午12時，日本兵就已經沒有了管轄青島的義務。在中國士兵與日本士兵交接的過程中，會有一段時間沒有軍隊保證青島安全。於是，王正廷想了個辦法，雖然中國軍隊不能進入青島，但員警是可以的。於是，在接收前一天，他讓五百名士兵穿上員警制服進入了青島。

王正廷是北洋政府的外交總長，他對青島是很有感情的。青島後來能夠成為中央直轄市，也跟他有千絲萬縷的關係。

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## 收回青島主權與山東問題

山東問題是指第一次世界大戰期間，日本對德國宣戰後，1914年出兵中國山東，而產生的主權爭議。在戰後的巴黎和會上，中華民國主張在1917年對德宣戰後，戰敗國德國在山東的權益應歸還中國。日本政府則主張日本取得德國在山東的權益，因為在1915年，大總統袁世凱與日本簽署二十一條密約。五大項其中的第一項為日本繼承德國在山東的權益，所以日本主張收歸山東。由於中華民國北洋政府未能維護中國領土和主權的完整，從而直接引發了1919年的五四運動，對中國近代史產生了巨大的影響。山東問題直到1922年華盛頓會議，才在美國的調停下得以解決。

### 膠州灣租借地

1896年12月14日德意志帝國駐華公使海靖(Edmund Friedrich Gustav von Heyking)向大清國總理各國事務衙門提出要租借膠澳地區五十年，被總理衙門婉拒。1897年11月1日曹州教案中，兩名德國傳教士在山東鉅野被殺，德國趁機派軍艦於同年11月14日佔領膠澳。1898年3月6日清政府代表大學士李鴻章和軍機大臣翁同龢在北京與德國駐華公使海靖簽署《中德膠澳租界條約 Vertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reiche und China wegen Ueberlassung von Kiautschou》。條約內容包括：德國租借膠澳地區99年，租期內膠州灣由德國管轄；清政府允許德國修築青島到濟南的兩條鐵路，並允許德國在鐵路兩旁30華里內開礦；德國可以優先承辦山東的任何事業等。此後，清政府和德國又陸續簽訂《膠澳租地合同》、《膠澳潮平合同》和《膠澳邊界合同》等文件，確定了德國租借區域的範圍。1899年德意志皇帝威廉二世(Wilhelm II von Deutschland)下令租借地的新市區改名為青島，並只許歐洲人居住。膠澳從此成為德國的殖民地，而山東則成為德國的勢力範圍。

## 日軍在青島登陸

1914年7月28日第一次世界大戰爆發，日本帝國於8月23日對德國宣戰，出兵山東。1914年11月，日本、英國聯軍發動青島戰役。經兩月激戰，擊敗德軍，占領青島。1915年1月7日，中華民國北洋政府要求日軍撤退回國，或暫照德國租借辦法留駐膠州灣租借地。日本為了讓軍事占領合法化，並進一步在山東攫取更多的特權，向中華民國大總統袁世凱提出「二十一條」。其中四條內容中的一條就是關於山東問題的，要求中華民國政府承認日本繼承德國在山東的一切權利，還增加築路通商的特權。1915年5月25日，中日簽訂《關於山東省之條約》、《關於山東省事項之換文》、《關於山東開埠事項之換文》等文件，承認日本在山東的特權，山東正式成為日本的勢力範圍。

1917年初，日本同英、法、俄、意四國達成秘密諒解的協議：四國承認日本繼承德國在山東的權益，日本負責使中國對德宣戰。1917年8月14日，中華民國國務總理段祺瑞向德國宣戰，成為第一次世界大戰的參戰國。1918年初，日本向北洋政府提供了大量貸款，並協助組建和裝備一支中國參戰軍。其貸款還被用於中華民國第二屆國會（安福國會）龐大的賄選開支，由時任中華民國財政總長的曹汝霖經辦。1918年9月24日，駐日公使章宗祥和日本外務大臣後藤新平交換了《中日參戰借款合同》，作為借款的交換條件之一；又簽署了《山東問題換文》（又稱「中日密約」），其主要內容為：「膠濟鐵路沿線之日本國軍隊，除濟南留一部隊外，全部均調集於青島。日軍撤走膠濟鐵路沿線的警備，由日本人指揮的巡警隊代替。膠濟鐵路將由中日兩國合辦經營。」中國換文中的一句「中國政府對於日本政府右列之提議，欣然予以同意」成為後來日本在巴黎和會上強占山東的藉口。

1918年11月11日一戰結束。作為戰勝國之一的中華民國在1919年1月18日派代表團參加巴黎和會，並提出德國應返還侵占的青島以及山東權益，但這一要求遭到日本拒絕。日本政府要求以戰勝國的身份，接管戰敗國德國在中國山東的一切權益。中國代表團靈魂人物顧維鈞為此準備了《山東問題說帖》，力陳中國不能放棄孔夫子的誕生地山東，猶如基督徒不能放棄聖地耶路撒冷；這份說帖震撼歐美代表，扭轉了輿論形勢並搏取到了列強的同情。但後來由於義大利退出和會，英國、法國與美國害怕日本的退出威脅成為事實，而導致巴黎和會流產。於是依日本要求，在1919年4月30日將德國在山東的全部權益轉讓給了日本，並將有關條款列為對德《凡爾賽和約》的第156、157、158三條。

中國外交失敗的消息傳到北京後，引發了中國人極度不滿。認為北洋政府未能捍衛國家利益，從而在1919年5月4日上街遊行抗議，是為「五四運動」。當時五四運動最著名的口號之一是「外爭國權，內除國賊」。1919年6月28日，北洋政府代表在中國留學生和華僑的強烈要求下，拒簽和約。此時中國代表團團長陸徵祥離開巴黎，因此顧維鈞實際上暫攝團長職權；在顧維鈞的主持下，中國代表團拒絕在《凡爾賽和約 Treaty of Versailles》上簽字，山東問題成了懸案。

## 解決

山東問題一直拖到1921年底至1922年初舉行的華盛頓會議，中日才在美國調停下於1922年2月4日簽訂《解決山東懸案條約 Treaty for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung》。1922年12月10日，中國政府正式收回青島，同時日本從山東撤出所有軍隊。1923年1月1日，中國以4,000萬日元贖回膠濟鐵路及支線並一切附屬財產。3月12

日，中國以 600 萬元贖回膠州灣沿岸日本人所占鹽田及鹽業公司。此外，青島海關、青島—濟南無線電台、青島沿線電報、電話的全部權益、青島—佐世保海底電線的一半權益以及煤、鐵礦山的部分開採權等，相繼在規定期限內由中華民國北洋政府收回。

但日本在山東仍保留許多經濟和政治特權，為 1928 年國民革命軍北伐期間發生的五三慘案埋下了隱患。

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## 回到 1922，看 100 年前的青島在世界變局中經歷了什麼

《青島日報》觀海新聞記者 李魏 / 2022 年 12 月 9 日

1922 年 12 月 10 日，中國政府收回青島行政權，結束長達八年的日本對青島第一次統治時期。八年，這座城市都經歷了什麼——

### 1922：百年前的青島在世界變局中

1914 年被看作是世界近現代史上一道重要分水嶺——「世界終結之年」，20 世紀諸多重大事件肇始於此。回望那個世界走向撕裂與瓦解的波譎雲詭的年代，中國東部沿海「鴻蒙初開」的城市青島的命運也在這場世界歷史變局中遭遇又一次身不由己的轉折。

這一年，改寫青島命運的既不是這方土地的主人中國，也不是聲稱租借膠州灣 99 年的德國，而是野心「雄飛海外」的日本。彼時結束德國十七年殖民史的青島，依然擺脫不了屈辱的命運：1914 年 11 月，日本擊敗德國，佔領膠澳租借地，使青島及膠濟鐵路沿線地區均淪為其殖民地。在中國人民堅持抗爭之下，1922 年 12 月 10 日，中國政府收回行政權，青島回歸方得以實現。

這次並不徹底的回歸作為一個重要的時間點，是日本在青島第一次統治時期的終結，也成為青島城市發展路徑再度轉向的見證。全國檔案領軍人才、青島市政協文史研究會副會長楊來青在其所著《圖說老青島：日本第一次統治時期》中提出：至 1922 年青島回歸，作為日本經濟殖民地長達八年的青島，「工業化程度畸形提高，已成為中國特別是華北新興的工業城市，初步實現了由商貿經濟向工商經濟的轉型。」

楊來青從全國乃至世界的格局和視野出發，梳理 1922 年之前城市在政治、經濟、社會生活領域發生的嬗變，在圖文並茂的基礎性史料的展開中，引領讀者重回百年前的城市歷史現場，厘清基本史實，更加清晰、客觀而深入地瞭解與思考這段歷史。

### 置青島於世界歷史格局與版圖中

「日本第一次統治時期，青島在改變世界歷史進程中發揮了非常重要的作用。」

在楊來青看來，青島的城市歷史研究，不能孤立地就事論事，僅僅停留於某一條街道或某一座建築，而必須置於紛繁的世界歷史格局與版圖中，用國際視野來觀察青島，從世界意義去解讀城市。

而看青島問題的國際影響，沒有什麼比高層親歷者的自白與陳述更為直接的了。在《圖說老青島：日本第一次統治時期》中，楊來青援引了刊發於日本影響力頗大的綜合性刊物《文藝春秋》1990年12月號上的日本昭和天皇《獨白錄》中的一段表述。《獨白錄》的主題是日本與「二戰」。在談及太平洋戰爭的起因時，日本昭和天皇直言不諱地稱：「究其原因，實已潛伏於遠在第一次世界大戰之後的和平條約內容之中。日本所主張的人種平等方案為列強所不容，黃白種族差別感依然殘存，如拒絕日本向加州移民等已足夠激怒日本國民，而強迫歸還青島亦是如此。」

日本昭和天皇所謂的「強迫歸還青島」，指的就是日本在壓力之下被迫放棄通過日德戰爭及《凡爾賽和約》攫取的山東權益，於1922年華盛頓會議期間被迫同意歸還青島一事。1921年11月25日，華盛頓會議召開僅半個月，裕仁攝政，不久日本便不得不答應歸還青島，這無疑給這位日後的昭和天皇當頭一棒。以至於他在二戰失敗後將青島問題與激化日美矛盾且引發太平洋戰爭直接聯繫在一起，將日本被迫歸還青島這一事件作為發動太平洋戰爭的原因，可見青島的「回歸」，對他以及日本刺激之大、影響之深。

「獨白」不僅再次印證了「二戰是一戰的延續」，也讓我們對彼時的青島有了一個新鮮的視角，那就是：「日本第一次統治時期的青島在改變世界歷史進程中發揮了非常重要的作用。」

另一份來自日本亞洲歷史資料中心的史料，則進一步讓我們看到1914年至1922年的青島所處的歷史位置。這是1915年1月日本外務省配屬青島守備軍的參事官船越給加藤高明外相的一份報告，報告提出，日本統治青島有兩大目的：「第一，軍政施行時期，從青島驅逐德國人勢力並根絕之；第二，軍政施行時期，在青島扶植日本人勢力，使青島成為日本在北支那一帶經濟雄飛的出發點。」另外，在日本提出的臭名昭著的「二十一條」及中日《民四條約》談判中，日本逼迫「中國政府允諾，凡山東省內並沿海一帶之地及島嶼地區，概不讓與或租與別國」。這一排他性的條文也充分暴露了日本獨霸山東並防範歐美列強染指山東的真實意圖。

楊來青認為：雖然交還青島是日本必須履行的國家承諾，但在中國追求日本利益最大化和在山東排斥英、美等戰略競爭對手勢力，成為日本以退為進的政治外交戰略，在其第一次統治青島的八年間，這一戰略從未改變。

### 經濟地理視角中的青島價值

「對日本而言，膠濟鐵路是其侵略山東乃至中國的政治工具。」

在一張日本青島守備軍民政部鐵道部發佈的圖片中，特別圖示了從東京到北京間最短的路線，而這條路線的海陸連接起點，就是青島。這張一百多年前的山東鐵道海報，是在呈示青島在地理交通上的獨特優勢，也暗自昭示了日本以青島為起點，對整個華北地區實施侵略擴張圖謀的野心。

在日本軍事侵佔膠澳及膠濟鐵路佔領區後，其官方和民間機構對青島、山東以及華北進行了多次深入調查研究，最終形成了「將青島建成日本對華北經濟侵略的商業橋頭堡和工業基地」的基本思想。

當時的日本學界普遍認為：中國之全國性經濟中心點為湖北漢口，青島在其偏北方，距離該中心點的直線距離約200日本里（1日本里約等於3.924公里），「難以說是有利的」。但是，從黃河、長江兩大經濟流域的統一經濟區域中心點考慮，青島與黃河流域經濟中心點河南省鄭

州直線距離不過 140 日本里，這與距離鄭州 135 日本里的天津、120 日本里的海州比沒有太大差別；從青島與中國政治中心的關係分析，青島距離北京的直線距離約為 137 日本里，這比海州、上海等諸港遠為有利；再從青島海上交通的價值分析，青島位於中國中部地區以北區域沿海的岸線上，可以毋庸置疑地斷言佔據無可企及的絕佳地位……

最終的結論是：「從地理及交通方面看，青島的價值頗為巨大，青島的前途頗有希望。」

還是那位日本外務省派駐青島守備軍的參事官船越，在到任前提交的另一份報告中，把青島定位於「華北通商交流樞紐之地、對日及對歐貿易的據點和工業基地」。他認為，在青島發展貿易勢力，應採取「低運費鐵道政策，……構建與支那中原地區的聯絡，使青島成為北部支那通商一大樞紐地，這是最緊要關鍵之處」。同一年，就在船越的報告提交前一個月，日本駐中國大使館三等書記官矢田七太郎在《山東省視察備忘錄》中也強調：青島辟處山東一角，如果沒有鐵道的聯絡，是經濟上「無意味的場所」。這些觀點態度都促使日本採取措施恢復膠濟鐵路運輸能力。

一張 1916 年的日本明信片，記錄下了當年膠濟鐵路客貨運輸情況：那時通過膠濟鐵路運往青島的貨物多為煤炭、焦炭、小麥、高粱、花生及花生油、大豆及豆粕和豆油，還有烤煙、牛及牛肉、雞蛋、桐材、草帽編等，幾乎都是生產和生活所用的資源性物資；同時，運往山東腹地的物資則多為棉紗、棉布、火柴、石油製品、木材、大米、砂糖、捲煙等，大多為工業產品及少量半成品，進口貨物的價格較出口貨物高出 10 倍甚至 100 倍。帝國主義國家在山東地區掠奪資源和傾銷工業產品的概況，一圖可知。

這一資源掠奪與產品傾銷並存、低價購買物資和高價推銷成品並存的現象說明，山東區域經濟已經成為世界資本主義殖民經濟體系的組成部分。對日本而言，膠濟鐵路絕非經濟機器，而是其侵略山東乃至中國的政治工具。

楊來青在書中還公佈了一張 1920 年日本在華北地區擴張鐵路網的地圖，圖中顯示了其妄圖修築的高密至徐州和濟南至順德兩條膠濟鐵路延長線的構想。其中，修建高密至徐州的延長線，目的是將膠濟鐵路與海蘭線（海州至蘭州，即隴海鐵路）連接起來，使沿線地區成為青島港腹地，將青島的經濟影響力延伸到內陸黃河流域地區。

而由於 1922 年青島回歸，上述兩條鐵路終未動工。

### 超越德佔時期的「繁榮」

「日本第一次統治時期，青島由德佔時期的商業城市轉型為工商城市。」

據說，日本侵佔膠澳及膠濟鐵路沿線地區後，對德國人投入鉅資修建鐵路但未充分開發其價值感到吃驚。隨著膠濟鐵路全線恢復通車，日本當局大力扶持日商深入山東內地開發貨源，大量貿易分支機構在各地開設，青島港貿易額也在 1916 年超過了德佔時期的最高水準……但單純沿著這一路徑發展，青島城市的經濟功能並不會發生質的改變。

發展工業，始終是一條必由之路。楊來青告訴記者，日本第一次統治青島時期，是城市經濟發展的一個高速增長期，最直接的體現是城市工業的爆發式發展。當然，這一增長的本質依然是日本在青島實施的經濟侵略。

侵佔青島之初，日本各界並非沒有考慮發展青島工業問題。但對青島發展工業的前景曾持懷疑態度，主要顧慮一是本地缺乏能源、工業原料；二是水資源的緊缺。但是很快，日本在促進青島工業發展方面採取了諸多針對性舉措：在台東鎮西側劃出專門區域作為工廠地；在四方、

滄口等地為日本紡織企業提供大量土地，投入鉅資開發白沙河水源地，增加發電能力，並在土地、稅收等方面採取獎勵政策，吸引大批日商投資設廠……

城市工業化加速發展的首要因素是政治。正是狂熱的軍國主義和殖民思想，讓日本官方和民間對長期殖民青島抱有信心，也迫切希望通過壯大工業來鞏固和擴大其在青島的統治。而彼時在「一戰」中大發戰爭財，也為日本資本輸出、在青島發展工業經濟提供了支撐。

1915年後，青島開辦了大批日資棉紡、榨油、蛋粉、精製鹽、麵粉、火柴等工廠，青島日企的產品以成本優勢迅速搶佔山東市場，並吸引更多日商前來青島開工廠。青島很快發展成為東北地區以外中國北方僅次於天津的第二大工業城市，實現了由商貿城市向工商城市的轉型。根據當時的統計，到1922年青島「回歸」時，青島棉紡企業紗錠數已超過8萬錠，在全國占比超過5%，開始躋身中國主要紡織工業城市行列。

### 「日化」城市的「洋氣」

「日本第一次統治時期，青島城市規模何以倍增。」

在1914年佔領青島之後，日本出現了「青島熱」，在青島的日僑呈現井噴式增長。一項統計顯示：在青島的日本人數量1913年為316人，1914年為2,384人，到1922年青島「回歸」之年，爆增到24,112人，佔到當年在中國的日本人總數的三分之一以上。外來日本人激增導致房租費用飛漲，有史料統計：當時日本人每月在青島的租房費用達4萬多日元。為日本人長期殖民青島提供經營、生活保障，冠以「大青島」、「新市街」等名目的城市建設規劃應運而生，帶來了城市規模的迅速擴大。

相關史料表明：所謂的「大青島」「新市街」，首先是設想將城市中心由靜岡町（今中山路南段）和山東路引向「大港」方向；其次是擴大城市範圍，將台東鎮和四方附近地區納入市街範圍，其目的是為日本移民和經濟特別是工業經濟提供發展空間。

葉春墀所著1922年的《青島概要》中提到：日本第一次統治時期，青島市區住宅大致分三種，即：青島區和別墅區的德國式、大包島區的華洋折中式、新市街及若鶴山（今貯水山）附近的和洋折中式。為儘快容納約2萬日本移民，房屋建築進度很快，故其品質「較之德人時代堅牢遠遜」，「然所澤町（今堂邑路）一帶，如太古（洋行）、鈴木、三井、正金（銀行）、郵局及將來之取引所、信託會社之建築，亦為青島有數之建築」。

楊來青表示，要特別糾正青島人對於本土歷史的習慣性認知：談及青島城市歷史街區規劃時，習慣將青島城市與德國人聯繫在一起。實際上在日本第一次統治時期，青島城市不僅實現了規模倍增，而且在「洋」式風格上也有新的變化。彼時的日本，急於徹底脫亞入歐以比肩歐美列強，非常看重在青島展現其「先進」與「文明」的國家形象。這可以解釋為什麼青島在這一時期會出現規劃有序、功能完備的新市街等日本街區；日本中學校舍、公立市場大樓等西式建築成批建成；「和洋折中式」住宅、商鋪而不是其本土簡陋的木質民宅遍佈青島。同樣，為什麼妓院等有損其國家形象的醜陋之所，被圈設於「三業」指定地，一些來自社會底層的日本人也被冠以「流浪漢」之名加以管制、驅逐……

### 100年前歷史性時刻

「青島回歸是不徹底的回歸。」

1922年12月10日上午11時，青島行政接收儀式在日本青島守備軍司令部會議廳（今沂水路11號「老市府」）舉行。12時，日本國旗自樓頂降下，升中國國旗。海上軍艦同時鳴炮致

敬……同日，日本駐青總領事館設立，館址位於今太平路 14 號(原為德華銀行青島分行舊址)。然而，當日，日本就設置「日本駐青總領事館員警署」，下轄吳淞街、曲阜街、台東鎮等 9 處派出所，公開執行警務。後經反復交涉，次年摘牌，但依然行使員警權。

在接收當日抵達青島的竺可楨曾描摹當時的青島氣氛：「余此次經其地，則氣象迥異，通衢各肆，強半閉歇，夜無燈火，行客寂寥。」「是故百業停頓，居民他徙，風聲鶴唳，一夕數驚。」「招待者告余曰：『沿途匪類甚多，設非汽車之疾馳，恐遭匪類之劫掠也』。」

1922 年那個蕭瑟冬日的歷史性時刻，中國雖然收回了青島行政權，但日本的戰略利益卻未因交還青島而受到實質性損失。相反，通過交還青島這一戰術性讓步，日本鞏固了在中國東北地區的侵略成果。同時，以青島為橋頭堡蠶食鯨吞中國的基礎依然存在。1927 年和 1928 年，日軍兩次在青島登陸，並通過膠濟鐵路暢通無阻地出兵濟南，武力阻撓國民黨軍北伐。楊來青總結說：「青島回歸是不徹底的回歸，當時的青島依然是一座具有殖民地半殖民屬性的城市。」

### 後記

楊來青提出：目前對青島城市歷史基礎性、系統性的研究工作還很薄弱。比較典型的例子是青島至今沒有一部城市通史，甚至沒有一本城市簡史。青島城市歷史研究呈現出兩個極端的現象，一是研究城市建設、歷史文化名人等具體史實的人比較多。而對歷史上青島城市發展基本規律、青島與國家乃至世界的關係研究不夠深入，與其他城市的比較研究成果也是鳳毛麟角；二是德國佔領時期研究成果相對較多，給人以青島城市歷史似乎主要就是德占時期那些事的印象。基於這兩點，他認為，應該從最基本的史實著手，對青島城市歷史進行全面的、系統的梳理，尤其是在基礎史料收集和研究方面多下功夫。

\*\*\*\*\*



1920 年代，位於青島市北區大窯溝一帶的堂邑路，是新町（日本人街區）的核心地帶。當時，這裡日商店鋪林立，繁華熱鬧，並作為連接中山路商圈與館陶路金融街的交通樞紐。該區段在建築風貌和城市機能上，有以下幾個顯著特徵：(1)地標建築集聚 -- 新町一帶的標誌性建築，如青島郵政局大樓（今堂邑路郵電局）以及大鮑島配電所，皆坐落於此。(2)通訊與交通樞紐 -- 1920 年，膠澳商埠電話局及堂邑路郵局全面投入使用，成為當時青島市內極重要的郵電與通信中心。(3)日式商業街區 -- 堂邑路所處的「新町」在第一次日佔時期，被規劃為日僑商業住宅區，周邊街道如聊城路（當時的中野町）與市場各路，充滿了濃厚的日本風情與東洋文化色彩。