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1948-1949 年中美外交摩擦的軟禁「華德事件」

Shenyang Rotarian Angus Ward

A Hostage in Communist China 1948-1949

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On the page of “Rotarians in the News” of *《The Rotarian》* magazine, Issue April 1950, there is a photo with such caption: “Angus Ward (center), former Consul General and Rotarian in Mukden, China, reports to President Truman. Now an honorary Rotarian in Allegan, Mich., he was imprisoned when Mukden was captured by the Communists and later released. Secretary of State Dean Acheson listens.”



But, there is no more information given by the Magazine on what had been happened on Rotarian Angus Ward and why he was “imprisoned” by the Chinese Communist, for how long and in what conditions before he was released. Since it was happened in China, it is better for the Rotary China Historian to tell the story.

The Rotary Club of Mukden, Republic of China, was re-organized on 12 February 1948, admitted to Rotary International on March 31st, and was later renamed as Shenyang Rotary Club (瀋陽扶輪社). But it was very short life that was eventually terminated on 21 December 1950.

Angus Ivan Ward (華德) was an Active Member of Shenyang Rotary Club in 1948 when he was the United States Consul General in Shenyang (瀋陽), capital city of Liaoning Province (遼寧省), Republic of China (中華民國). Mukden (奉天) was the Manchu name of the city.

Seven decades ago, Chinese communist troops held the staff and families of the U.S. Consulate General in Shenyang hostage for over a year. While the event attracted little popular attention in the United States, in China it became an important event in the revolution as the communists claimed they had discovered “a big American spy ring” engaged “in a plot against the Chinese people and against the Chinese people’s revolutionary enterprise.” According to Ward and his vice consul, the hostages were used as tools in the revolutionary movement to promote revolutionary fervor and to “drive a wedge between the United States and the sympathetic elements” in China.

Sino-American Conflict “The Ward Case”

“The Ward Case” was a diplomatic incident which occurred in China from 1948 to 1949 during the final years of the Chinese Civil War. The American Consul General Angus Ward and his staff were held under house arrest by Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for 13 months, creating a diplomatic rift with the United States.

As the PLA swept through China during the Civil War against the Nationalists in 1948 and 1949, they began to harass Westerners in general and Americans in particular. As one of the major trade centers in China, Shenyang was taken by the Communist troops in October 1948. In November, the Communists demanded that Ward surrender the Consulate’s radio transmitter. Ward refused. In response, the PLA troops surrounded the Consulate, putting Ward and 21 staff members under house arrest. For months, without communication, water, and electricity, Ward and the other Americans were completely isolated under guard by the Chinese Communists.

The American government ordered the Consulate be shut down but Ward was unable to do anything because the Chinese had charged the American Consulate with serving as a headquarters for espionage. With the crisis worsening, the Truman Administration called upon American allies to withhold recognition of Mao’s newly established government. In response, the PLA troops arrested Ward, accusing him and his staff members of inciting a riot outside the Consulate in October 1949. In November 1949, as Ward was brought to trial, the American public anger verged on explosion.

United States President Harry S. Truman (美國總統杜魯門), already under severe attacks for “losing” China to the Communists, could not afford to show weakness in the face of the Chinese Communist challenge. He met with his military advisors to discuss the feasibility of a rescue operation. However, although incensed with the Communists, Washington showed great restraint because it was still looking for opportunities for reaching an accommodation with the People’s Republic of China (中華人民共和國). U.S. Secretary of State Dean Gooderham Acheson (美國國務卿艾奇遜) conveyed the message to Beijing (北京) that the United States would not recognize the new Chinese government until all the Americans at Shenyang were released. On 24 November 1949, Ward and his staff were charged with the inciting-to-riot and ordered to be deported. They finally left China on 12 December 1949.

The Hostage

Elden Erickson was one of the staff members confined in the Consulate. A quote from his oral history describes the conditions they lived under:

“On November 20 the [Communists] threw a cordon of guards around the Consulate building and around the Standard Oil Compound and Ward’s residence. From then on we could only go with them. To go to the office they would come to the compound and march us with pistols in our back to the Consulate. We would have to show our lunch and they would inspect it, etc. Then they would bring us back in the evening. Only half of us would go each day so no one was isolated.

“[The confinement] was an eerie sensation. It went on and on. Then they cut off our electricity which cut off our water supply. And we had no fuel. You couldn’t take a bath because there was no hot water. You just put on layers of clothing like the Chinese did. They didn’t take our clothing away. Each week we were permitted to write a list in Chinese of what we wanted and give it to a couple who would come to the gate. But we couldn’t speak to them. We kept ordering needles because our clothes were wearing out. The servants had done all the mending before. So that really became an important thing, to have a needle. Thread was another item. But it was really the cold that I remember the worst. It would get 40 below and that was really cold. Then the pump would freeze. We didn’t have any running water, of course. We would bake bread and the cockroaches would practically line the bread pans as it was rising. We would bake it with the cockroaches in it and then just slice the sides off....They didn’t get inside the bread. What did we do? We played bridge. We didn’t have any electricity and nights start very early in the wintertime. We did get candles and that was all we had. We played pinochle five days and couldn’t stand it any longer so started playing bridge. They always let us buy vodka. The vegetables—carrots and cabbage—we got most of the time... meat, from time to time, but it would be full of straw and dirt. However, we would just wash it up and boil it well. We were never hungry. And I think that is important in maintaining at least a modicum of morale. If you are cold and hungry that is a lot worse than being just cold.”

The “Larger Question of U.S. Attitudes”

It happened suddenly but quietly on 20 November 1948. The American Consulate in the Chinese Manchurian city of Shenyang ceased all radio transmissions. Eight hundred miles away to the south communications techs at the U.S. Embassy in Nanking (*Nanjing*) (南京) thought the silence was odd, but their diplomatic colleagues assumed that the Chinese Communists, who had just occupied Shenyang after a six-month siege of Chiang Kai-Shek’s (蔣中正) garrison there, would accord customary immunities to U.S. consular personnel in the city. Besides, in those days, telegraphic communications in China were spotty at best, so people at the Embassy in Nanking and at the U.S. State Department tried to keep the affair low-keyed to avoid aggravating the situation. No one really started to worry until January.

On 5 January 1949, the Americans became alarmed. Chinese Communist representatives in the British Crown Colony Hong Kong reassured U.S. diplomats that “all personnel Shenyang American Consulate General are well”, but they ominously observed that “question of communications for Shenyang Consulate General is part of larger question of U.S. attitudes toward new [communist] government and toward [Chiang’s Nationalists] government”.

For the next six months, the U.S. Embassy in Nanking and the Consulate General in Peiping (*Beijing*) (北平) attempted to contact the Consulate in Shenyang, to no avail, and they tried continuously to engage Chinese Communist liaison officials on the issue. But the Communist interlocutors simply shrugged that it was “out of their jurisdiction” and offered no assistance.

Political Rivalries in the Chinese Leadership

Indeed, these protestations of “no jurisdiction” are now known to have been valid. The city of Shenyang was then under the jurisdiction of the Soviet-influenced “Northeast People’s Government” headed by Gao Gang (高崗) – Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) main rival in the Chinese Communist politburo and a man who was emphatically not subject to Mao’s command. Gao and his Soviet overlords brooked little interference in their rule of Manchuria, and Mao generally left them alone.

On 6 April 1949, the British Consulate in Shenyang managed to get a message to its Legation in Peiping which explained that occupying Chinese Communist troops had confiscated the radio equipment from all foreign consulates in the city. The Americans -- alone of the foreign consuls in Shenyang -- were being held “in house arrest”, forbidden to leave their compound, and permitted only one visit a day between their rooms and their offices. Their identity cards were confiscated, their electricity cut, their cesspools went un-emptied. At this point, the fact of the Americans’ detention became public knowledge -- at least in China. Intriguing signals came from Shanghai which had been occupied by the Communists on 26 May. On 7 June, *《The Shanghai Post》* published an editorial speculating that the Soviets may have been responsible for the arrest of the American consular staff in Shenyang, “because of their special interest in Manchuria.” Still, no one knew why the Americans were singled out for harassment. Indeed, at the time, an emissary from Mao’s deputy Zhou Enlai (周恩來) was exploring the possibility of U.S. economic aid to China with the U.S. Consul General in Peiping, O. Edmund Clubb. Then the second shoe dropped.

An American Espionage Organ

On 19 June 1949, following months of unceasing but fruitless American demarches to the provisional government in Peiping, the Communist Party’s Xinhua News Agency (新華通訊社) issued a lurid 3,000-word account which reported in great detail spy activities at the U.S. Consulate in Shenyang. While some of the accusations were grounded in slivers of truth – that a U.S. Army Liaison Group had been engaged in intelligence collection in Manchuria well after the end of the Japanese surrender – the charges that the Consulate was an American espionage organ were too fantastic to deserve comment, and in fact, there weren’t even any Chinese-language officers at the Consulate, and there hadn’t been for over a year.

Yet, the day after the Xinhua charges, the Chinese began to permit the Americans to send some uncoded messages over telegraph lines and via the mail. Four days later, the Chinese Communist foreign affairs office in Shenyang told Ward that the American staff and spouses

“had been permitted to leave Shenyang with movable property.” The U.S. State Department was optimistic. Yet, nothing happened.

Six weeks passed. On 5 August, the local Shenyang press said exit permits were being issued to foreigners and the Americans immediately applied to leave the city. On 12 August, the Consulate staff was “ready to leave” but by 17 August, Ward telegraphed that “no permits have been issued” and the “conditions of our confinement unchanged.”

On 15 September 1949, a full ten months after the Consulate staff was placed under house arrest, the U.S. State Department finally issued its first press release on the issue, but only said the “Department has instructed Consul General Ward to continue to make every effort to obtain from local authorities necessary permission” to leave China. Still nothing.

Then the Chinese began to get nasty. On 28 September, a disgruntled former consular employee appeared at the American compound to demand back pay. The man started a fight with the Consul General and then attacked two other Americans. When the man was wrestled out the front gate of the American compound, he filed a complaint with the Communist security guards, who subsequently arrested Consul General Ward and four other Americans. The Consulate managed to transmit an incident report out to the Embassy in Nanking outlining what really had happened. But true to form, Xinhua News Agency ran a lurid 700-word report alleging that the Chinese employee had been forced by the Americans into exhausting labor, and when he could no longer perform, they fired him. When the Chinese employee asked for his pay, the Americans beat him up. “The case of this violent act of Ward and American special agents was unearthed a short time ago in Mukden” the Xinhua report said. By 27 October, Ward and the others had been charged formally with assault.

Nine hundred miles away, in communist-occupied Shanghai (上海), U.S. Consul General Walter P. McConaughy (馬康衛) read the two accounts of the fracas in Shenyang. He cabled the U.S. State Department relating a similar incident that happened to him in July. Though not similarly harassed by the local officials in Shanghai, McConaughy said the incident “shows that the Communists will not scruple to fabricate charges and incidents out of whole cloth when it serves their purposes.”

This, of course, was no consolation to Ward. Through October and into November, he languished in an unheated Manchurian jail on “six slices of bread and three ounces of hot water” a day. The other Americans fared no better, one suffered a complete nervous breakdown and another was “in danger of gangrene infection” from frostbite.

On 10 November, the U.S. State Department warned that it would use all its efforts to block admission of the newly established People’s Republic of China to the United Nations. Beginning on 11 November and continuing through 16 November, scores of American newspapers ran non-stop editorial and opinion commentary lambasting China’s “uncivilized” behavior, and calling for more muscular reaction from the U.S. State Department. By one count, over 10.6 million American newspaper readers were exposed to a steady diet of anti-Chinese (and not insignificantly, anti-State Department) sentiment. It was a turning point in United States public opinion. Public opinion, which had been lukewarm-to-positive on extending diplomatic recognition to the new Chinese government, soured on China, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned on 16 November that the United States would not consider diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime until Ward and the Americans were released.

The threats had the desired effect. On 23 November, the Americans were tried, found guilty and after being sentenced to deportation they were released from jail and returned to their compound. They appeared at a second “trial” on 27 November, where Chinese, Japanese and Koreans – all unknown to the Americans – were convicted of spy charges apparently related to the June Xinhua news report.

United States President Harry S. Truman considered, but rejected the use of military force to recuse the hostages or punish the Chinese and opted to be patient and apply diplomatic pressure. Recognition of the new Communist government was made contingent, at least in part, on the release of Ward and his colleagues and the U.S. State Department tried to get the international community to condemn China. During their detention, Ward and his staff were tried and found guilty, not of spying, but of beating up a Chinese citizen who worked at the Consulate, and were sentenced to a short jail term. Rather than have them serve that sentence, Chinese authorities ordered them deported China.

The Liberation of Angus Ward

At 3 a.m. on 7 December 1949, the 22 Americans were all escorted through the arctic Manchurian night to the city train station, and sent under guard on a 40-hour ride to the Chinese port of Tientsin (*Tianjin*) (天津) where they were put on the British vessel S.S. *Lakeland Victory* bound for Yokohama, Japan. At 7:15 on the morning of 12 December 1949, a Chinese tug moved up beside the American freighter standing off Taku Bar. A tall, shaggy-faced man in fur cap, heavy canvas coat and felt leggings clambered up the gangplank alone. At 9 o'clock he returned to the tossing tug with news for 19 others still held there: the Communists would now let them board the S.S. *Lakeland Victory*. After 13 months of humiliation and misery in Shenyang, Ward, his wife and his staff were entering the free world again.




(Left Photo) Angus Ward (center) on board S.S. Lakeland Victory with staff members breathe free air again. (Right Photo) Armed PLA soldier posted aboard ship fondles Tommy gun as he watching.



Group portrait of American Consul Angus Ward (center left, in fur hat), his staff, and their families as they pose on the deck of the S.S. Lakeland Victory, 12 December 1949. The entire group had been held under house arrest by the Communist People's Liberation Army. (Photo by Carl Mydans)



*On board S.S. Lakeland Victory, Angus Ward receives health examination by the military doctor.
(Photo by Carl Mydans)*



*Safe aboard U.S. rescue ship, Ward reshapes scraggly vandyke beard with a borrowed electric razor.
(Photo by Carl Mydans)*

“Squeezing the Americans out of the Liberated Zone”

Chinese materials now available demonstrate that in 1949-1950, Mao Zedong and the China Communist Party (CCP) (中國共產黨) leadership were unwilling to pursue Western recognition or to establish diplomatic relations with Western countries. This attitude was most clearly demonstrated by the CCP leadership’s handling of the Ward Case.

In early November 1948, Chinese Communist troops occupied Shenyang (Mukden), the largest city in the China’s northeast. U.S. Consul General Angus Ward, together with his consulate staff, remained in the city after the Communist takeover. In the first two weeks of November, Ward actively pursued establishing official contacts with the new Communist municipal authorities. Local Chinese Communist officials demonstrated some interest in dealing with Ward, but the attitude of the CCP central leadership was intransigent. After a short waiting period, CCP leaders decided to adopt a policy of “squeezing” American and other Western diplomats out of the “liberated zone” in the Northeast, rendering Ward’s efforts hopeless. A CCP Central Committee telegram (drafted by Zhou Enlai) to the Party’s Northeast Bureau on 10 November maintained that because the British, American, and French governments had not recognized Chinese Communist authorities, the CCP in turn would not grant official status to their diplomats either, but would treat them as common foreign residents without diplomatic immunity. The telegram further instructed the Northeast Bureau to take “certain measures” to confine the “freedom of action” of the Western diplomats, so that “they will have to withdraw from Shenyang.”

By mid-November, Shenyang’s situation had worsened dramatically for Ward and his staff. On 15 November, the Communist Shenyang Municipal Military Control Commission informed “former” British, French and American consulates in Shenyang that they should hand over their radio transmitters to the Commission within 36 hours. In reality, this order was particularly targeted at the Americans since the British and French usually relied upon regular Chinese communication services. As it soon turned out, the purpose of this order was to create another excuse for the Communists to force Western diplomats, and the Americans in particular, from the city.

In a few days, when the Americans refused to hand over their radio transmitters, the pressure from the Chinese Communists escalated. On 17 November, Mao Zedong instructed Gao Gang, Secretary of the CCP Northeast Bureau, to “act resolutely” to force the British, American, and the French diplomats out of Shenyang. The CCP chairman also criticized Zhu Qiwen (朱其文), the Communist Shenyang Mayor, for his unauthorized reception of Ward during the early days after Shenyang’s liberation. The next day, Mao authorized the Communist in Shenyang to seize the radio transmitters in the Western consulates and instructed them to isolate the American, British, and the French consulates, so that they “would evacuate in the face of difficulties and their purpose of squeezing them out could be reached.” On 20 November, when the Americans persistently refused to hand over their radio equipment to Communist authorities, the Communists followed the advice of Soviet representatives in the Northeast and, without advance warning, placed Ward and his staff under house detention. Ward and the other American diplomats were not allowed to leave China until December 1949.

The crisis lasted for more than a year, by which time the already fragile United States relations with the Chinese Communists had been damaged virtually beyond repair.


The CCP's challenge to Western presence in Shenyang resulted in part from immediate concerns that Western diplomats might use their radio transmitters to convey military intelligence to the Nationalist Party (KMT) (中國國民黨) in the ongoing civil war. The advice from the Soviet representatives in Shenyang that the CCP should not permit Western diplomats to remain in the liberated zone also played an important role. Mao, eager to maintain solidarity with Moscow, instructed CCP leaders in the Northeast to inform the Soviets that "in so far as our foreign policy in the Northeast and the whole country is concerned, we will certainly consult with the Soviet Union in order to maintain an identical stand with it."

In a deeper sense, though, the CCP's action against Ward and his staff in Shenyang reflected the Party leadership's determination to "make a fresh start" in China's external relations, which required the Party to "clean the house before entertaining guests," as well as to "lean to one side" (the side of the Soviet Union). Indeed, these three principles constituted the guidelines of Communist China's early diplomacy. In a telegram to the Northeast Bureau on 23 November 1948, the CCP Central Committee expounded its view that the Party would refuse to recognize diplomatic relations between the KMT government and the West. In the Central Committee's Directive on Diplomatic Affairs, a key CCP foreign policy document issued on 19 January 1949, Mao Zedong declared that "with no exception we will not recognize any of the embassies, legations, and consulates of capitalist countries, as well as the diplomatic establishments and personnel attached to them accredited to the KMT." The Directive also made it clear that the CCP would treat American and Soviet diplomats differently since "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other new democratic countries has differed totally from that of the capitalist countries." At the Central Committee's Second Plenary Session in March 1949, the CCP leadership further reached the consensus that the new Chinese Communist regime should neither hastily seek recognition from, nor pursue diplomatic relations with, the United States or other Western countries. "As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries," asserted Mao, "we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after nationwide victory."

What the Ward analogy taught was that patient diplomacy could secure the release of hostages. After a year of diplomatic pressure and after the hostages had served their purpose in the revolution, the hostages were all safely released without the use of force. Regarding the international and domestic lessons of the Angus Ward analogy, the experience showed that a strategy of patient diplomacy could work without doing much, if any, damage to America's international reputation or the President's domestic standing. As the detention of Ward and his associates never attracted sustained attention outside China (for example the *New York Times* only ran one story on it), Truman's patient diplomacy did not result in accusations that the United States was too weak to lead its allies or that Truman was too weak to lead the nation. At least it did not add significantly to the chorus of recriminations against Truman for "losing" China.

Given the slowness of communications and China's backward infrastructure, the mini-crisis festered for over a year. But in the end, United States threats to keep China out of the United Nations appear to have prompted the Chinese to release the Americans -- but the United States blocked China's membership anyway. In the end, China's entry into the Korean War -- not just the Mukden Incident -- convinced Americans that the new Chinese communist regime was the enemy.

1948-1949 年中美外交摩擦的軟禁「華德事件」



Angus Ivan Ward 安格斯·華德

1950 年 4 月號的英文扶輪雜誌《The Rotarian》刊登了一節簡短圖片新聞：「前駐中國瀋陽總領事暨瀋陽扶輪社社員、現今密歇根州阿勒根扶輪社的榮譽社員安格斯·華德（Angus Ward）（中），向杜魯門總統報告：當共產黨人佔領了瀋陽後，他被軟禁。國務卿迪恩·艾奇遜在旁邊聆聽。」（圖見第一頁）

1948 年 11 月至 1949 年 12 月，中國共產黨（中共）與美國在瀋陽發生了一起棘手的外交糾紛。當時，美國駐瀋陽總領事華德等人，因拒絕主動交出電台及涉嫌間諜活動等原因，被長期軟禁在領事館內。進而又被拘押和審判，直至最終被驅逐出境。史稱「華德事件」（The Ward Case），亦稱「瀋陽事件」（The Mukden Incident 1949）。國際扶輪的宗旨，並不參與任何政治事務。但由於華德是瀋陽扶輪社的社員，扶輪雜誌有義務向全世界的社員報導「軟禁」的消息。

美國駐瀋陽總領事館座落於中國東北，瀋陽領事區由遼寧省、吉林省和黑龍江省組成。總領事館的工作主要是服務領事區內的美國公民和美國公司的需求，同時促進美國政府外交目標的達成。領事館在領事、商業、經濟、政治、文化和教育等領域，深化美中關係。

美國駐瀋陽總領事館於 1904 年開館，最早座落於小西門外的兩個廢棄的寺廟裏。1924 年前，領事館搬到原俄國領事館內，登記地址為五緯路 1 號。那個時候，美國駐東北還有其他的領事館，包括駐哈爾濱和駐大連領事館。這些領事館在第二次世界大戰前關閉，瀋陽總領事館在二戰大部分時間正常運作。在中國共產黨軟禁總領事館美方員工一年多並將他們驅逐出境後，領事館於 1949 年閉館。在美中關係正常化的第五年，即 1984 年，瀋陽總領事館重新開館（瀋陽市和平區十四緯路 52 號）。今天，領事館在深化美國與中國東北的關係方面，發揮着重要的作用。

中共控制瀋陽 決定「擠走」美國總領事

1945 年抗戰勝利後，隨着國民黨政府收復東北，美國隨即在瀋陽設立了總領事館；同時，美國的一支軍事偵察分隊也由上海派往瀋陽，多方刺探中共和蘇聯(蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)遠東地區的軍事情況。1948 年 9 月 12 日，國共內戰「遼瀋戰役」打響後，美國情報人員更是在東北加緊了偵察活動。10 月 30 日下午，國民黨軍隊打敗，撤退瀋陽。11 月 2 日，中國共產黨人民解放軍控制瀋陽全境。翌日，瀋陽特別市軍事管制委員會(軍管會)成立，由陳雲擔任主任。美國駐瀋陽總領事館並沒有隨即撤離，而是留了下來，希望能同中共進行接觸。

當時，對於中共中央東北局提出的對美國等駐瀋陽領事館應如何處置的問題，中央軍委代總參謀長周恩來在瀋陽解放當天曾致電指出：對美、英、蘇等國領事館，「在軍事管制期間應派兵保護；撤銷後亦應派警察站崗」。對領事館出入人員及其內部「都不應實行人身和室內檢查」。另外，許多外交事宜和國際慣例，我們「甚不熟悉，應多向蘇聯外交人員請教」，對其意見「應重視，但亦只做參考，凡與政策有關者均應先報告中央請示。」

根據蘇聯方面的意見，中共中央隨後調整了對美領事政策，並於 11 月 10 日發出指示強調：「美、英、法等國既然不承認我們的政策，我們當然也不承認他們的領事。為此，我們有必要利用目前的軍事管制，達到封鎖和孤立美、英等國在瀋陽外交機構的目的，不給他們自由活動的餘地。」此即中共所謂「擠走」的方針。

拒交電台 華德等人遭軟禁

當時，中共為了確保軍事行動的萬無一失，早在部隊進入瀋陽之前，就已下達了關於必須注意收繳城市中一切電台的指示。據此，11 月 15 日上午 10 時，解放軍瀋陽軍事管制委員會向華德發出了公函和通令，明確要求除軍管會特別批准者外，任何中國和外國公民與機構，凡有電台及其收發報裝置者，均須在 36 小時之內報知該委員會，並送交其保管。而華德在當天給軍管會的公函中提出，如果「本地當局仍希望敝總領事館之繼續存在與工作」就請「准予繼續使用該項電台」。

11 月 16 日，蘇聯駐哈爾濱總領事馬里寧在給東北局書記高崗的電話裡，明確要求中共立即派人沒收美、英、法駐瀋陽領事館的所有電台，並說明「這是關係到蘇聯的很大的事情」。高崗當即通報了中共的行動及政策。

11 月 18 日下午 2 時，軍管會召見華德並通知，當日下午 5 時將派參謀人員前往總領事館接收一切。今後美國總領事館對外聯絡方面的重要電報，可經軍管會審查批准後由新華社代發。下午 4 時，華德匆忙發出最後一份電報，通知美國國務院和美國駐華大使，瀋陽總領事館的電台將就此關閉並被沒收。同時，他還草擬了一份明碼電報交給瀋陽軍管會，請其代為發往華盛頓，以驗證此種聯合方式是否可行。

當時，軍管會由於不了解衛戍部隊是否有權力進入外國領事館強制執行，所以遲遲未能採取行動。就在雙方僵持一定之規時，中共中央致電指出：既然美國舊領事故意違抗命令，就應派隊入室檢查，並將電台帶走。據此，軍管會於 11 月 20 日上午 11 時，即在 18 日下午 5 時的期限過了整整 42 小時後，才正式派人前往美國總領事館沒收電台。兩小時後，華德收到了一份來自瀋陽軍管會措辭嚴厲的書面說明，聲明不再承認華德的總領事身份，而稱其為「先生」，同時嚴厲

指出：「因先生等蔑視本會之命令，今後除經市政府批准外，特禁止舊美領事館全部人員與外界自由來往。」隨後，包括華德本人在內的美國駐瀋陽總領事館各類人員及其家屬，立即被分別軟禁在領事館等三處。

11月25日，中共中央收到東北局來電稱，瀋陽方面於軟禁華德等人的次日，破獲了一起重大間諜案。全部係美國特務，直接由美國駐瀋陽總領事館提供各種收發報裝置、經費並領導，任務是刺探並遞送有關蘇聯、外蒙古和中國解放區的各種情報。

美方讓步 「華德事件」和平解決

美國杜魯門政府隨即作出了強烈反應。美國總統杜魯門（Harry S. Truman）甚至建議軍事部門和國務院制定和實施必要的軍事行動計劃，包括海上封鎖和派陸戰隊在中國東北登陸，以強力手段來解救華德等人。然而，軍事部門和國務院的領導人在權衡利弊後，還是勸說杜魯門放棄了這一計劃。

1949年11月10日，美國國務院向其駐聯合國代表發出指示。要最大限度地利用自己的影響，對北京施加壓力。提出以釋放華德及其同事為條件，美國將同意並保障參加聯合國大會辯論中國問題的中共代表自由通行和人身安全。隨後，美國駐華使節遵照國務院的指示，設法會見了周恩來等中共領導人。向其通報了華盛頓決定關閉駐瀋陽總領事館，請求釋放華德等人，並在其餘工作人員返美方面給予協助。

中共方面經過長期偵察和審訊，始終無法證明華德是否知曉該間諜組織並負有直接責任。鑒於此，1949年11月下旬，中華人民共和國司法部門對華德及其他4名領事館工作人員宣判，分別處以3至6個月徒刑，緩刑一年，隨後又改判驅逐出境。12月11日，華德等人過境天津，登上前往日本橫濱的英國貨輪。至此，前後一年多的「華德事件」終於得以和平解決。（圖見第6-8頁）



美國駐瀋陽總領事館 *United States Consulate General Shenyang*

華德事件與新中國對美政策的確定

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【中國共產黨人針對瀋陽領事館所採取的帶有敵視性質的行動，並不意味著他們準備與美國全面對抗，也並不意味著他們不希望得到西方國家的外交承認。問題在於，基於中國革命的反帝性質和意識形態特點，他們這時很少幻想西方國家，特別是積極支持國民黨反對自己的美國會迅速承認中國的革命政權。忽視了這一點，我們就無法理解在這一時期中共外交政策上所出現的種種變動。】

華德事件（The Ward Case），指的是美國駐瀋陽總領事華德（Angus Ivan Ward）在1948年11月中國人民解放軍佔領瀋陽後不久，因拒絕交出電台以及涉嫌間諜活動等原因，被長期軟禁，並於1949年11月受到審判被驅逐出境一事。這一事件的整個過程，正值新中國成立前後。毫無疑問，它是此後新中國政府與美國政府之間一系列嚴重衝突的開端，因而可以說是新中國與美國關係史上至關重要的一頁。同時，考慮到這一事件發生的複雜背景，以及事件發生過程中，中國共產黨對美政策一度尚未完全確定的情況。可以肯定，對於這一事件前後中共對美政策變化的深入研究，也是具體了解中國共產黨人在建國前後確定對美政策的關鍵一環。然而，迄今為止，有關這一事件的研究，在國內幾乎還處於一種空白的狀態。美國學者的研究雖稍具體，卻又較多地側重於介紹美國政府的反應，對中共方面的政策考慮則缺少深入了解和研究。這自然是一種遺憾，但願本文的發表，能夠在某種程度上適當地彌補這一缺憾。

華德事件的發生

1948年11月15日，是美國與中國共產黨關係史上一個十分重要的日子。上午10時，美國駐瀋陽總領事華德接到了中國人民解放軍瀋陽軍事管制委員會第二號公函和第四號通令。上面明確要求除軍管會特別批准者外，任何中國和外國公民與機構，凡有電台及其收發報裝置者，均須在36小時之內報知該委員會，並送交其保管。華德最初似乎並沒有把這件事放在心上。在他當天給軍管會的公函中，他甚至提出：如果「本地當局仍希望敝總領事館之繼續存在與工作」，就請「准予繼續使用該項電台」，因「敝領事館之存在須依賴此項電台之繼續使用」。華德看來相信，共產黨不會採取過分的行動，只會「採取一種更為合作與友好的態度」。

華德的樂觀估計不是沒有理由的。自從共產黨11月1日下午佔領瀋陽之後，一切跡象都表明，共產黨沒有任何企圖敵視留在瀋陽的美國外交及商業機構的計劃。不僅如此，新任命的共產黨市長朱其文上任伊始，就立即發出就職通知。並於11月5日以官方身份正式召見了美、英、法等國駐瀋陽的領事，表示將嚴格保護一切外國人和外國機構的安全；並願意為外國機構提供各種必要的服務，包括發放通行証、為機動車提供標誌旗等。三天後，朱市長又對美、英、法領事館進行了回訪，明確肯定他們的領事身份；並饒有興緻地參觀了美國新聞處設在瀋陽的一個圖書室，強調中美之間不僅需要進行技術方面的合作，而且也需要進行文化方面的交流。這自然使得受命留在瀋陽，與中共地方當局以非正式的和私人交往的形式「建立工作關係」的華德，深感振

奮。直到 11 月 16 日白天，華德打給美國國務卿和駐南京大使館的電報的調子，都是相當積極的。他樂觀地等待著朱市長和軍管會的召見，準備像前幾次那樣，與他們友好地討論關於保留美國領事館繼續使用電台的權利問題。他甚至斷言：「共產黨的意圖是承認我們，並允許我們作為美國官方機構行使職責的。」

從 15 日 10 時開始的 36 小時期限，過去了大約 30 個小時之後，華德的信心才真正有些動搖了。他預期中的與朱市長或軍管會主任的討論，遲遲沒有能夠到來。雖然 16 日晚 10 時之後並沒有出現他所擔心的行動，但 17 日他繼續尋求與朱市長接觸的努力仍舊沒有成功。直到 18 日上午，他才得到了他所盼望已久的召見通知。而在下午 2 時開始的談話中，負責接見他的軍管會副主任沒有表現出任何靈活的態度。華德反復解釋電台是美國政府的財產，並一再說明交出電台後他不能進行正常工作。但對方毫不動搖，堅持當日下午 5 時將派參謀人員前往領館接收一切。美領館對外聯絡方面，今後重要電報可經軍管會審查批准後，由新華社代發。終於，華德意識到，形勢與前有所不同了，共產黨方面的決定是不可改變的。下午 4 時，華德匆匆忙忙地發出了最後一份電報，通知美國國務院和美國大使，瀋陽領事館的電台將就此關閉並被沒收。同時，他還草擬了一份明碼電報交給瀋陽軍管會，請其代為發往華盛頓，以驗證此種聯絡方法是否可行。很顯然，聯繫到前此的樂觀估計，華德不能不感到十分沮喪。

其實，事情才僅僅開了一個頭。華德無論如何沒有想到，拒絕主動交出電台還會引起更為嚴重的後果。在 18 日下午 5 時的期限過去之後，又過了整整 42 個小時，瀋陽軍管會才正式派人前來執行沒收電台的任務。但這次不再是簡單地沒收幾部電台的問題了。在 20 日中午 1 時，即瀋陽軍管會開始進入美國領事館沒收電台之後不久，華德得到了一份措辭嚴厲的書面聲明。聲明不再承認華德的領事身份，而稱其為「先生」，同時強硬地提出：「因先生等蔑視本會之命令，今後除經市政府准許外，特禁止舊美領館全部人員與外界自由來往。」隨後，美國駐瀋陽領事館各類人員及其家屬，立即被分別軟禁在領事館、美孚油行大院和總領事私宅安息日大院三處。並且，三處的電燈、電話和自來水供應也被全部切斷。但直到這時，華德仍舊不能理解，中共政策上的這種 180 度的轉變究竟是怎麼回事。

「擠走」方針的形成

從上述過程中，我們可以清楚地注意到，瀋陽軍管會及市政府對美國駐瀋陽領事館的態度，在 11 月上旬和中旬，確有明顯的不同。在 11 月上旬，至少到 8 日朱市長回訪美、英、法領事館為止，瀋陽市政府所表現出來的，希望保持和發展與美國人在經濟技術和文化交流方面的合作的態度，至少在形式上還是較為積極的。而在此之後，這種情況有了明顯的變化。這種變化，在今天或者很容易找到某種答案。因為有資料表明，朱市長 8 日回訪的某些說法，次日就受到了中共東北局的批評。東北局並為此就接待外國人的問題，作出了極為嚴格的規定。此後，瀋陽當局對各國領事館的態度自然與前不同，變得極為謹慎。

但值得注意的是，即使在這種情況下，在 11 月 15 日軍管會宣布沒收一切電台之前，瀋陽市政府仍舊以官方形式接待了領事館的官員，並回答了他們提出的一些問題。而 15 日遞交給華德的關於送交電台問題的第二號公函，也仍舊繼續承認其官方身份，稱其為「總領事」。這也就是說，沒收電台的行動，看起來最初似乎並不包含著後來的一系列根本否認華德等人官方身份，並限制其人身自由的計劃在內。那麼，事情為什麼會發展到後來那種地步呢？這當然不簡單是因華

德拒絕主動交出電台所致，而是另有背景。這裡首先應當提到的是，當時蘇聯駐東北外交人員的態度。

據目前查閱到的資料，可以肯定，瀋陽軍管會 11 月 14 日正式簽發的沒收電台的通令，主要還並不是一個針對美國等國駐瀋陽領事館而採取的一個外交行動。它只是根據中共中央在部隊進入瀋陽之前，就已經下達的一個關於必須注意收繳城市中一切電台，以確保部隊軍事行動的指示，而向所有中外機關和個人發佈的一個泛泛的通告。它確實不包含著具體地否認和打擊美國在瀋陽領事館的計劃在內，因此瀋陽軍管會在發出通令之前，甚至沒有再具體請示中共中央。導致事態向後來的方向發展的，是軍管會宣布沒收電台第二天，蘇聯駐哈爾濱總領事馬里寧給東北局書記高崗的一個電話。馬里寧在電話裡明確要求中共立即派人沒收美、英、法駐瀋陽領事館的所有電台，並說明「這是關係到蘇聯的很大的事情」。高崗當即答覆說：駐瀋陽衛戍司令部已經通知各領事館，必須於 36 小時之內交出所有電台。而我們對美、英、法留在瀋陽的領事館的策略，則是「擠走」的方針。馬里寧當即對此表示歡迎，並稱蘇聯領導人將會因此感到高興。一旦美、英、法領事館不再起任何作用，人民也憎恨他們，他們最後就只好滾出東北。顯然，把沒收電台的行動，直接同反對美、英、法領事館在東北存在的方針聯繫起來的，確實同馬里寧的這個電話有關。

但我們能不能說，沒收電台的行動事先中共中央一無所知，事後也明確反對呢？如果我們仔細分析上述資料的話，恐怕還不能得出這樣的結論。從上述資料中可以清楚地看出，事態的發展同中共中央的態度也有密切關係。因為高崗在電話中明確表示，我們對美國等國留在瀋陽的外交機構的態度是已經決定了的，這就是「擠走」的方針。這裡所說的「擠走」方針，事實上還在瀋陽當局決定沒收當地所有電台之前，中共中央就已經明確提出來了。那是在 11 月 10 日，中共中央針對東北局提出，對堅持留在瀋陽不撤的美國等西方國家領事館應如何處置的問題，曾發出指示稱：美、英、法等國既然不承認我們的政府，我們當然也不承認他們的領事。為此，我們有必要利用目前的軍事管制，達到封鎖和孤立美、英等國在瀋陽的外交機構的目的，不給他們自由活動的餘地。只要堅持這樣做，相持日久，他們自然會被迫撤走。不難看出，正是蘇聯方面這時的態度，使得這次沒收電台的行動迅速同中共中央內定的「擠走」美國等國在瀋陽外交機構的外交行動，聯繫了起來。17 日，毛澤東覆電中一句「同意你所取擠走瀋陽美、英、法領事館的方針」，為瀋陽軍管會把沒收美國領事館電台的行動，升格為封鎖與孤立美國在瀋陽外交人員的行動，正式開了綠燈。只是，如何具體實施這種封鎖與孤立，還頗費了一些周折。

瀋陽軍管會在發出沒收電台通令時，完全沒有估計到可能引起外交糾紛。因此，當美國總領事華德表示拒絕主動交出電台之後，由於不了解衛戍部隊是否有權利進入外國領事館強制執行，他們遲遲未能採取行動。以至出現了上文所提到的情況，在 11 月 16 日晚 10 時 36 小時期限過了之後，沒收行動竟又拖延了三天半之久。對此，毛澤東自然頗不滿意。由周恩來起草的中共中央的指示電明確提出：既然美國舊領事故意違抗命令，就應派隊入室檢查，並將電台帶走。「凡駐在該舊領事館的人員，因其蔑視中國人民政府限期交出電台的命令，將禁止其與外界自由往來。如有需要，須經市政府特許，方准外出（在核准其外出後，應有武裝隨行保護）。你們如此辦理，可達到我們內定之擠走美、英、法等國領事的方針。而形式上，則以雙方無正式外交關係並實行軍事管制。首先給美國舊領事以限制，使其知難而退」。

由於美國領事公然違抗命令，「首先給美國舊領事以限制，使其知難而退」，無疑是中共中央這時實施「擠走」美、英、法等國領事方針的一種策略。但瀋陽方面在實行時，卻又忽略了這種策略上的必要性。具體說來，在我們上面所提到的 20 日中午開始的行動中，有些看來並不完

全符合中共中央的意圖。比如在這一天，他們其實是不僅將美國領事館的人員，而且還將英、法兩國領事館的人員也都統統軟禁起來了。而他們全面切斷領事館的電燈、電話和自來水供應，也並非受命於中共中央。純粹是當時考慮到東北主力部隊即將入關，必須設法封鎖消息，參考了蘇聯在瀋陽的商務代表的建議的結果。顯然，對於剛剛進入大城市的共產黨人來說，他們在外交方面的經驗是欠缺的。因此，這回又是在毛澤東的指導下，情況才多少有了改觀。儘管已經開始對美、英、法三國在瀋陽的領事館人員的軟禁和斷電等，一時難以立即改變。但瀋陽方面的中共領導人，畢竟已經注意到必須區別對待英、法人員，而以主要力量對付美國人了。

要不要與美國建交？

中國共產黨人針對瀋陽領事館所採取的帶有敵視性質的行動，並不意味著他們準備與美國全面對抗，也並不意味著他們不希望得到西方國家的外交承認。問題在於，基於中國革命的反帝性質和意識形態特點，他們這時很少幻想西方國家，特別是積極支持國民黨反對自己的美國，會迅速承認中國的革命政權。忽視了這一點，我們就無法理解在這一時期，中共外交政策上所出現的種種變動。特別是在此之前，中共中央剛剛召開過政治局會議。會上人們多半相信：「根本打倒國民黨大概要五年左右」，因此與會者甚至完全沒有談到外交問題。只有毛澤東簡單地提到一句：「一旦我們成立中央政府，至少以蘇聯為首的國際人民民主力量，會跟我們合作的。」從這句話裡，可以清楚地看出中共領導人這時唯一寄予希望的，只是以蘇聯為首的民主國家，他們對美、英等國政府極不信任。當然，一旦這種外交承認問題開始提上議事日程，從共產黨人自身利益著想，他們中許多人未必不會對西方國家抱以某種希望。事實上，注意到中共部分領導人，第一次開始在瀋陽處理與美、英、法等國領事館的外交接觸問題時，一度極力爭取後者的好感，積極主動地去做聯絡工作。就可以看出，他們確實存有這樣的希望。即使是中共中央，最初也並沒有把美國等國領事館繼續留在瀋陽，看成是一件很危險的事情。他們只是不清楚，按照國際慣例和外交條約，應當如何對待這些堅持留在自己控制區域裡，卻承認國民黨政權的西方國家的外交官。當然，無論是毛澤東，還是在東北的中共領導人，他們很快就了解到自己應該怎樣做了。因為東北畢竟是一個極其特殊的地方，在那裡的蘇聯人，十分明確地反對任何美國人繼續留在這一地區。他們尖銳地指出，美、英、法領事館堅持留在共產黨控制的中國東北地區，這完全是「別有用心」，中共方面必須「提高警惕」。

越是距離新中國的誕生不遠，毛澤東就越是寄希望於蘇聯的承認與支持。在不可避免地要面對以美帝國主義為首的強大的資本主義陣營威脅的情況下，一個百廢待興的新中國，只有加入到以蘇聯為首的社會主義強大陣營中去，才有可能生存和發展。正是基於這樣一種考慮，中共中央必須重視蘇聯方面的意見。因此，毛澤東在得知蘇聯方面的考慮之後，即明確表示：「關於東北以及全國的外交政策，我們一定和蘇聯協商處理，以求一致」。當然，這並不等於說，中國共產黨只能亦步亦趨地根據蘇聯方面的勸告去做。一向重視統戰策略和鬥爭手法的毛澤東，還在周恩來剛剛起草了中共中央有關「擠走」美國等國駐瀋陽領事館的方針的文件之後不久，就在再度發出指示。強調區別對待英、法與美國，「對於英、法，似應較對美稍微緩和些」，明確認為即使在外交鬥爭中，也要注意策略問題。

區別對待的方法，長期以來就是毛澤東運用嫺熟的一種鬥爭策略。何況整個「擠走」方針，其實也並不是根本不要與這些西方國家建立外交關係。問題的實質僅僅在於，在目前情況下，這些國家的政府，一般地還不可能放棄與國民黨政權的關係。但並不等於說，這些國家完全沒有分化的可能。因此，「擠走」方針的本身完全可以包含鬥爭的手法問題。至於先「擠」誰後「擠」

誰，則應完全視需要而定。重要的只在於孤立美國，因為美國是一切帝國主義的總頭子，是國民黨的總後台。它不僅保持著與國民黨的外交關係，而且還在處心積慮地援助國民黨反對共產黨。因此，毛澤東主張「對於英、法，似應較對美稍微和緩些」。在瀋陽不必禁止其出入，過一時期更應准其修復電燈電話。再度由周恩來擬稿的中共中央11月23日的指示，更進一步對毛澤東的意見作了具體的說明。指示稱：「我們目前堅持不承認國民黨與這些帝國主義國家的外交關係，是為了使我外交立於主動。」「並不等於我們永遠不與這些帝國主義國家發生外交關係，也不等於對待這些帝國主義國家毫無區別。擠走美、英、法三國駐瀋領事館的一般方針，……並不一定在東北以外的解放區都實行，而且對英、法和對美必須有所區別。」

比較一下，同是周恩來起草的11月10日和11月23日這兩封解釋中共中央「擠走」方針的指示電，是有意義的。因為這兩封電報有一點是顯著不同的，那就是，在11月10日最初提出「擠走」方針時，中共中央並沒有在政策上做任何區分。它只是籠統地提出封鎖和孤立美、英、法，既沒有提出區別美國和英、法，也沒有提出區別東北與關內。而在23日的指示電中，則不僅提出了區別美、英、法，而且宣佈說「擠走」的方針在東北以外的地區並不一定要實行。要了解這種改變的背景，還必須注意到11月中旬毛澤東對革命勝利時間估計的改變。因為恰恰是這種估計的改變，使得中共中央此前此後對於未來外交的前途，一度開始有了頗為不同的認識。

11月10日的電報，中共中央仍舊是以9月政治局會議上，關於五年左右勝利的估計為依據的。因而它對早日與西方國家建立外交關係，不抱多少希望。但就在這封電報發出的第二天，毛澤東即改變了形勢的估計。11月11日，毛澤東在給各方面負責同志的電報指示中，明確指出：「九月上旬（濟南戰役前）中央政治局會議時所作的五年左右建軍五百萬，殲敵五百個正規師，根本上打倒國民黨的估計及任務。因為九、十兩月的偉大勝利，顯然已經顯得是落後了。這一任務的完成，大概只需要再有一年左右的時間即可達到」。正是從這種新的估計出發，23日的電報對與西方國家，特別是與英、法兩國建立一種外交關係的可能性，較前有了更多的靈活性。而毛澤東對此似乎更樂觀、更大膽。他明確提出，即使是在東北地區，是否擠走英、法也還要看那個時候的具體情況；即使是「擠走」美國，最後的決定權也必須操在中央手裡，況且就是擠走也並不意味著將來不與美國建交。因此做事也要留有一定的餘地，比如電台所有權可仍屬美方，由我代管，「將來兩國建立外交關係時退還」。一方面沒收電台，封鎖美駐瀋領事館，軟禁其人員；一方面估計不久的將來，有可能同美國建交而主張留有餘地。這清楚地表明，毛澤東這時固然對帝國主義的頭子美國不信任，但並沒有根本否定即將誕生的新中國與美國建立外交關係的可能性。為此，中共中央甚至很快電示東北局，對美國領事館的封鎖也不宜像監禁一樣。分別軟禁在三處的領事館人員及其家屬，應該允許他們自由來往。但這樣一種相對積極的做法，突然被25日收到的一份東北局的電報打斷了。

這份24日發出的電報報告說，瀋陽方面於軟禁美國總領事華德等人之後的次日，破獲了一起重大間諜案。全部係美國特務，直接由美國駐瀋陽領事館提供各種收發報裝置、經費並領導。任務是刺探並遞送有關蘇聯、外蒙古和中國解放區的各種情報。這一情況的出現，對中共中央外交政策沖擊之大，是出人意料之外的。蘇聯人關於美國堅持留在東北是「別有用心」的說法，得到了充分的証實。因此，恢復瀋陽美國領事館三處人員自由來往的指示，暫時停止執行了。對瀋陽美國領事館事件的性質估計，迅速開始發生變化。中共中央又再度不加區別地提出「逐步擠走」美、英、法三國駐瀋陽外交人員的主張，並且開始提出：「我們不應允許資本主義國家記者留在解放區發新聞」。而更加火上澆油的是，幾天之後，毛澤東又獲悉美國政府正在考慮以某種方式，

承認中國即將產生的新的聯合政府。通過恢復與新中國的貿易，鼓勵對新中國的投資等方式，分化中國現在的統一戰線。努力造成新的聯合政府中的反對派，以抵抗共產黨。毛澤東不禁勃然大怒：武裝援助蔣介石打不敗共產黨，現在竟親自出馬搞起孫悟空鑽進牛魔王肚子的卑鄙勾當來了。他憤然批示：「此種陰謀必須立即開始注意，不要使美帝陰謀在新政協及聯合政府中得逞」，「決不允許」那些心懷鬼胎的外國人到解放區來。根據毛澤東的這一指示，周恩來很快又起草了中共中央關於對待資本主義國家外交及新聞人員態度的指示，明確指出：「現時帝國主義外交人員及冒險分子，都在尋找機會企圖鑽進解放區來，進行挑撥和破壞民主陣營的工作。我應嚴正地注視這一發展，並在適當時機用適當方式，揭露其陰謀，打破其幻想。」故對美、英、法等資本主義國家中要求進入解放區的外交人員、記者等，一概拒絕；各種問題，一律不予答覆。對於堅持留在我解放區，包括今後留在平津、上海、南京、武漢等地區的外交人員，只當外國僑民看待；對於留在這些地區的美國武官（連同原美國駐延安觀察組組長包瑞德在內），因美國軍官正在助蔣作戰，故應以武裝監視；對於留下來的外國記者，因其均為反共報紙或通訊社的記者，故亦不承認其為記者，不給以任何採訪和發電之權。軍管期間，還應監視其行動。發現其有破壞行為，即予懲辦，甚至驅逐出境。如此強烈的反應，當然不能不對他們前此的外交形勢估計，產生嚴重的影響。

1949年初，中共中央接連召開會議，討論建立新中國的各項準備工作，外交問題第一次提上議事日程。但對帝國主義陰謀保持高度警惕，成了人們議論的重點，外交承認問題反而被放在一邊了。由於即將成立的新政權還帶有聯合政權的性質，政權內部還包含有相當一部分資產階級和小資產階級政黨的代表。國內還有相當一部分人對帝國主義，特別是對美帝存在程度不同的幻想。這使得剛剛得到政權的共產黨領導人，對美國人的陰謀極其反感和擔心。毛澤東強調指出：「我們的革命是帶反帝國主義性質的，帝國主義恨死了我們的革命。尤其是美帝在中國失掉了威信，它當然不會甘心。美帝的對華政策就是兩手，一是幫國民黨打我們；二是通過某些右派，甚至利用特務從我們內部破壞我們。從現在情況看，國民黨失敗後，他們是可能承認我們的。這樣他們就能夠鑽到我們內部來，同我們作鬥爭了。因此，我們相當長的一段時間之內，應當不給他們這種機會。我們要等到中國全部解放了，我們已經站穩了腳跟，並且把帝國主義在中國的影響和基礎統統搞掉，再說承認的話。」他這時有過一句很形象的說法，叫做「打掃乾淨房子再請客」。而他親自起草的1949年1月8日中共中央政治局關於形勢與任務的指示，則向全黨明確宣佈了對美國的這種強硬態度。… … … …

新中國成立之後，它的鞏固與安全成為首當其衝的問題。而這種鞏固和安全的最大隱患，就是美國的干涉和破壞。為了減少帝國主義國家，特別是美國利用其在中國的半合法地位，進行政治破壞和思想影響的可能性，根據毛澤東既定的方針，新中國政府很快採取嚴厲措施，以打擊美國政府繼續在中國呆下去的信心。1949年10月31日，美國駐瀋陽總領事華德等因對中國僱員使用暴力，受到中國僱員聯名起訴而被拘押。隨即，瀋陽市公安局再以間諜案對華德等人提起公訴。11月下旬，華德等人很快被分別處以數月徒刑，緩刑一年，然後驅逐出境。而12月初，中共中央進一步討論了擠走美國在華所有外交人員的策略。隨後於1950年1月6日，下令徵用美國等國駐北京領事館根據《辛丑條約》佔據的舊兵營。最終迫使美國關閉了在中國的全部領事館，並撤走了全部政府人員。
