

臺北扶輪社沈劍虹 -- 中華民國末任駐美國大使

Taipei Rotarian James C. H. Shen

The last Republic of China ambassador to the United States

By Herbert K. Lau (劉敬恒) (Rotary China Historian) 10 February 2024



James C. H. Shen (沈劍虹), MA (*Missouri*), BA (*Yenching*) (1909-2007), was an Active Member of Taipei Rotary Club (臺北扶輪社) when he was Director of the Government Information Office (新聞局局長) (1961-1966), Republic of China (中華民國).

The then Taipei Rotary Club was a member of the Rotary International District 345 which was compiled with 3 territories of different nations: (1) The Republic of China – Taiwan Province (中華民國-臺灣省); (2) The British Crown Colony Hong Kong (英國殖民地香港); and (3) The Portuguese Territory Macao (葡萄牙領地澳門).

Shen was noted for his service as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs (外交部次長) and as the Republic of China's final ambassador to the United States. Shen navigated pivotal shifts in U.S. foreign policy toward China, maintaining Taiwan's (臺灣) diplomatic presence in Washington from 1971 until 1979, when the U.S. transferred formal recognition to the People's Republic of China (中華人民共和國) following the 《Shanghai Communiqué 上海公報》 and subsequent negotiations. Despite restricted access to senior U.S. officials under the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, Shen conducted extensive public speaking tours across America to bolster support for the Republic of China (Taiwan), compiling 48 addresses into the two-volume collection 《The View From Twin Oaks》 (1978), which chronicled Taiwan's economic progress, cultural heritage, and advocacy for human rights amid geopolitical tensions.



Early Life and Education

Upbringing and Family Background

James C. H. Shen was born on 2 July 1909 in Shanghai of the Ch'ing Empire (大清國上海), a treaty port city emblematic of early 20th-century China's encounters with Western imperialism and internal reform efforts.

His upbringing unfolded amid the Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命) of 1911, which overthrew the Ch'ing Empire and established the Republic of China, followed by the fragmented authority of the Warlord Era (1916–1928), marked by regional power struggles and social upheaval. Shanghai's status as a semi-autonomous enclave under foreign concessions exposed residents to modern education, journalism, and global ideas, factors likely influencing Shen's later career in media and diplomacy, though specific familial roles in these dynamics remain undocumented in primary accounts.

Academic and Journalistic Training

Shen graduated from Yenching University (燕京大學) in Peking (*Beijing*) (北京) with a degree in journalism in 1932. Following his undergraduate studies, he pursued advanced training at the University of Missouri School of Journalism, earning a master's degree in 1935 with a thesis titled《Proposed: A Chinese Associated Press》 which advocated for a centralized Chinese news agency to improve international reporting on China.

Shen began his journalistic career in the early 1930s as a reporter and editor for newspapers in Shanghai and other Chinese cities, contributing to outlets amid the turbulent pre-War period. His reporting focused on domestic and international affairs, honing skills in news gathering and dissemination that later informed his government roles. This practical experience complemented his formal education, establishing him as a key figure in Chinese media before transitioning to official information services in the 1940s.

Government Service in the Republic of China

Roles in Information and Media

Shen began his government service in the Republic of China's information sector with roles in the Ministry of Information (中國國民黨中央宣傳部), including as section chief of its international department, where he contributed to analytical and commentary work on media and propaganda efforts. In this capacity, he focused on disseminating information supportive of the Nationalist government's positions internationally.

From July 1961 to November 1966, in Taiwan, Shen served as Director of the Government Information Office (GIO), a cabinet-level agency under the Executive Yuan (行政院) tasked with promoting official policies, coordinating public relations, and regulating domestic media to align with government objectives. Under his leadership, the GIO emphasized cultural initiatives, such as sponsoring the annual Golden Horse Film Awards (金馬獎) precursors, including presenting statuettes and plaques in 21 categories for Mandarin-dialect films in 1963 to encourage national linguistic unity.

As GIO Director, Shen engaged directly with U.S. officials, including meetings with President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (美國總統甘迺迪) and Secretary of State Dean Rusk (美國國務卿魯斯克) in 1961 to discuss information strategies amid Cold War tensions with the People's Republic of China. His tenure involved overseeing media oversight to counter communist narratives, reflecting the agency's dual role in propaganda dissemination and content control, though specific regulatory actions under Shen prioritized promotional activities over overt censorship enforcement. Shen's efforts extended to accompanying high-level delegations, such as Chiang Ching-Kuo's (蔣經國) 1966 U.S. visit, where he facilitated information briefings on Taiwan's anti-communist stance.

Association with Nationalist Leadership

Shen served in a personal capacity as English interpreter and secretary to Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader of the Kuomintang (KMT) (中國國民黨) and President of the Republic of China (ROC), in the 1950s, following the Republic of China's retreat to Taiwan, as Chiang Kai-Shek led the Nationalist government in exile. This role involved facilitating communications with foreign dignitaries and allies, underscoring Shen's alignment with the Nationalist government's strategy to secure international support and counter the Chinese Communist Party's (中國共產黨) advances.

His proximity to Chiang positioned Shen within the core of Nationalist leadership, which emphasized anti-communism, centralized authority, and the preservation of the Republic of China's sovereignty following the 1949 retreat to Taiwan. Shen's subsequent government roles, including in information and foreign affairs, reflected this enduring loyalty, as he advocated for the KMT's claim to represent all of China against the People's Republic of China (PRC) established on the mainland.

In his 1983 memoir 《The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally》 Shen articulated a staunch defense of the Nationalist regime's legitimacy and criticized U.S. policy shifts as betrayals of shared anti-communist principles, further evidencing his ideological commitment to KMT leadership. This perspective, drawn from his firsthand experiences, highlighted tensions between Nationalist realism and shifting Western alliances but affirmed his role as a proponent of the ROC's enduring Nationalist framework.

Involvement in Cultural Propaganda

During his tenure as Director of the Government Information Office (GIO) from July 1961 to November 1966, Shen led efforts to disseminate the ROC's narrative internationally, including through cultural channels designed to underscore Taiwan's preservation of traditional Chinese heritage amid the Cultural Revolution's (無產階級文化大革命) upheavals on the mainland. The GIO, functioning as the executive branch's primary information apparatus under the Kuomintang regime, coordinated media outputs, publications, and events that portrayed the ROC as the legitimate guardian of Confucian values, classical arts, and anti-communist ideology, contrasting these with the PRC's state-enforced iconoclasm.

Shen, leveraging his journalistic background, expanded the GIO's overseas operations, including the establishment and management of branches like the one in New York, which facilitated propaganda materials such as films, pamphlets, and cultural exhibits targeting Western audiences to bolster diplomatic support for the ROC. These initiatives often framed cultural promotion as a "Free China" counteroffensive, with Shen publicly emphasizing the need to highlight Taiwan's economic and social achievements alongside traditional festivals, opera performances, and scholarly exchanges to undermine PRC claims to cultural authenticity. For instance, GIO-sponsored publications like the 《Free China Review》---distributed globally under his oversight---regularly featured articles on Taiwanese cultural resilience and serving as a key tool in shaping favorable perceptions among intellectuals and policymakers.

Critics, including some U.S. observers during the Cold War era, viewed these activities as systematic propaganda rather than neutral cultural diplomacy, noting the GIO's integration with intelligence elements to monitor and influence overseas Chinese communities. Shen's approach prioritized empirical demonstrations of ROC stability---such as land reform successes tied to cultural narratives of harmony---over ideological abstraction, aligning with first-principles emphasis on verifiable governance outcomes to legitimize the regime's international stance. His resignation from the GIO in November 1966 preceded a shift to foreign affairs roles, but the cultural frameworks he institutionalized persisted in ROC efforts to maintain U.S. alliances.

Diplomatic Career

Ambassador to Australia

James C. H. Shen entered the diplomatic service of the Republic of China with his appointment as Ambassador to Australia by the Executive Yuan in 1966. This marked his initial major overseas posting, leveraging his prior experience in public information and as spokesman for the Presidential Office to advance Taiwan's foreign relations in a key Western ally. Australia maintained formal diplomatic recognition of the ROC during this period, viewing it as the legitimate government of China amid Cold War tensions with communist regimes.

During his tenure from 1966 to 1968, Shen oversaw embassy operations in Canberra, focusing on bilateral cooperation in trade, technical assistance, and anti-communist alignment. Australia provided economic aid to Taiwan's development efforts, and Shen facilitated discussions on regional security, including responses to expansions of influence by the People's Republic of China and Soviet-aligned states. His journalistic background aided in media outreach to counter narratives favoring Beijing, emphasizing the ROC's stability and economic progress.

Shen concluded his Australian ambassadorship in 1968, returning to Taiwan amid shifting global dynamics that increasingly challenged the ROC's international standing.

This early assignment established his reputation in foreign affairs, paving the way for higher roles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No prior overseas diplomatic postings are documented in available records, underscoring Australia's role as the foundational phase of his envoy career.

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

James C. H. Shen assumed the position of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China in 1968, following his tenure as Ambassador to Australia from 1966 to 1968. In this role, which he held until 1971, Shen played a key part in managing Taiwan's diplomatic outreach during a period of intensifying competition with the PRC for international legitimacy.

Shen actively represented Taiwan at multilateral forums to bolster its position against PRC encroachments. For example, in April 1969, he attended the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) meeting in Singapore, where he advocated for the ROC's interests amid discussions on regional ties that risked favoring Beijing. His efforts focused on preserving alliances and countering diplomatic isolation, including through bilateral engagements. Australian diplomatic records from the era note his presence in high-level talks alongside other ROC officials, emphasizing continuity in relations with non-communist partners.

As Vice Minister, Shen also contributed to internal foreign policy coordination, drawing on his prior experience in media and information services to integrate propaganda and public diplomacy elements into Taiwan's strategy. This included addressing U.S. policy signals, as evidenced by his communications channels to ROC leadership on American intentions, which foreshadowed challenges in maintaining formal ties. His tenure underscored Taiwan's reliance on personal diplomacy to navigate shifting global alignments, with Shen often serving as a spokesperson for the Ministry on critical issues like economic cooperation and anti-communist solidarity.

Ambassador to the United States

James C. H. Shen assumed the role of Republic of China Ambassador to the United States in 1971, arriving in Washington, D.C., mere months before President Richard Nixon's (美國總統尼克森) July 15th announcement of his forthcoming visit to the PRC, which signaled a pivot in U.S. foreign policy. His appointment came amid escalating tensions over U.S. recognition of the two Chinas, with Shen tasked to reinforce the longstanding alliance forged during World War II and the Korean War. Shen presented his credentials and immediately focused on high-level diplomacy to underscore the ROC's anti-communist stance and economic progress, delivering a keynote address at the National Press Club on 24 June 1971 that highlighted Taiwan's democratic resilience and strategic value to U.S. interests in Asia.

Throughout his tenure, which extended until the U.S. de-recognition of the ROC in January 1979, Shen conducted regular consultations with U.S. officials to mitigate the erosion

of bilateral ties. Notable engagements included meetings with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (美國國家安全顧問季辛吉), such as one on 15 October 1971, where discussions addressed ROC concerns over U.S.-PRC overtures and reaffirmed commitments to Taiwan's defense under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. Another session on 6 August 1973, involved Counselor Henry Chen (中華民國駐美國大使館政治參事陳希元) and focused on sustaining economic and military cooperation amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. Shen also traveled for consultations in Taipei, as reviewed in the 3 May 1972 debrief to align ROC strategies with U.S. policy nuances.

Shen prioritized public diplomacy to cultivate American support, speaking at institutions like the Economic Club of New York and universities such as Jacksonville State University on 22 November 1971, to emphasize Taiwan's cultural heritage, scientific advancements, and role as a bulwark against communism. These efforts aimed to counter PRC propaganda and lobby U.S. policymakers, though they occurred against a backdrop of domestic U.S. debates favoring détente with Beijing. In direct response to Nixon's policies, Shen issued formal protests, including public statements decrying the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué's implications for ROC sovereignty. His diplomatic correspondence and advocacy, documented in declassified U.S. records, persistently argued that abandoning Taiwan would undermine U.S. credibility in Asia, drawing on empirical evidence of ROC stability versus PRC turmoil. Despite these initiatives, Shen's eight-year service marked the final phase of formal ROC-U.S. embassy relations, culminating in his recall as the last ambassador under the pre-1979 framework.

The U.S. De-recognition of the Republic of China

Shen's Efforts to Preserve Relations

As U.S. President Jimmy Carter (美國總統卡特) announced on 15 December 1978, the United States' intent to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) effective 1 January 1979, thereby derecognizing the Republic of China (ROC), Ambassador James Shen, in his final weeks in office, pursued diplomatic channels to avert or soften the break. Shen conveyed Taiwan's position through direct engagements with U.S. congressional leaders sympathetic to the ROC, including Senator Barry Goldwater (參議員高華德), who publicly denounced the policy shift during a farewell meeting with Shen on 30 December 1978. He also coordinated with figures like Senator Robert Joseph "Bob" Dole (參議員杜爾) to manage responses, agreeing to restrain ROC diplomatic protests to avoid escalating tensions.

In parallel, Shen made formal representations to State Department officials, emphasizing the ROC's status as a World War II ally and warning of strategic repercussions. These efforts, spanning late 1978 into early 1979, aimed to preserve substantive ties despite the impending formal severance, drawing on Shen's prior lobbying against U.S. alignment with the PRC since his 1971 appointment.

Post-derecognition, Shen facilitated the ROC's transition by assembling a team of trusted Chinese-American academics to advise on countermeasures, contributing to the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Enacted by Congress on 10 April 1979, and signed into law despite Carter's veto threat, the TRA established unofficial channels for commercial, cultural, and security relations between the U.S. and Taiwan, effectively codifying continued U.S. commitments to Taiwan's defense against coercion. Shen's coordination underscored the ROC's strategy to leverage bipartisan congressional support, bypassing executive branch policy. These initiatives delayed full relational rupture, maintaining de facto U.S. engagement with Taiwan amid the "one China" pivot.

Immediate Aftermath and Transition Role

Following U.S. President Jimmy Carter's 15 December 1978 announcement of de-recognition of the Republic of China effective 1 January 1979, Ambassador James Shen, informed mere minutes prior, registered profound shock and lodged immediate diplomatic protests against the decision, emphasizing its betrayal of longstanding mutual commitments. Shen met with senior U.S. officials to reiterate Taiwan's position and seek assurances on continued substantive ties.

As the Embassy closed, Shen departed Washington on 29 December 1978 after a ceremonial farewell that included lowering the Republic of China flag for the final time. He left a tape-recorded message for U.S. Congress members, imploring them to enact legislation preserving robust U.S.-Taiwan relations amid the shift. This marked the end of formal diplomatic presence, transitioning to unofficial channels under the yet-to-be-fully established Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) (北美事務協調委員會), Taiwan's de facto embassy equivalent.

Upon returning to Taipei, Shen assumed an advisory capacity, counseling the government on navigating the post-derecognition landscape, including adaptation to unofficial U.S. engagement mechanisms like the American Institute in Taiwan (美國在台協會), while also dedicating time to research and authorship on the policy reversal's implications. His efforts focused on mitigating immediate diplomatic isolation, though he stepped back from frontline roles by mid-1979, paving the way for successors such as Konsin Shah (夏功權) to formalize the CCNAA structure. This transitional involvement underscored Shen's continuity in sustaining Taiwan's interests during the abrupt reconfiguration of bilateral ties.

Perspectives on the Policy Shift

James C. H. Shen, as the Republic of China's final ambassador to the United States, viewed the 1979 de-recognition as a profound betrayal of a longstanding alliance dating back to 1844, describing the decision---initiated by President Nixon's 1972 visit to the Mainland and finalized by President Carter in December 1978---as a "shattering" blow to Taiwan despite its anticipation. In his 1983 memoir, Shen critiqued the U.S. approach as

prioritizing geopolitical maneuvering with the People's Republic of China over fidelity to the anti-communist Republic of China, portraying Nixon's engagement with Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and Zhou Enlai (周恩來) as reminiscent of historical tributary missions to imperial courts, which he believed invited derision from Chinese leaders. He further lambasted National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's admiration for Mao and Zhou as "intellectual giants", seeing it as part of a narrative justifying the shift at Taiwan's expense.

During the 10 September 1977 meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (美國國務卿范斯), Shen voiced ROC apprehensions that normalization with the PRC risked regional instability, potentially provoking a Chinese attack on Taiwan and triggering economic turmoil including capital flight and civil disorder on the island. He urged the U.S. to reaffirm ongoing diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, emphasizing Taipei's unchanged claim as the legitimate government of all China and its dependence on American support. Shen warned that abrupt severance would damage U.S. interests without commensurate gains, reflecting broader Taiwanese elite concerns over eroded deterrence and self-determination prospects.

From the U.S. vantage, administration officials like Vance framed the policy evolution as a measured pursuit of full normalization to foster a peaceful Taiwan resolution by its inhabitants and mainlanders, while safeguarding Taiwan's security and "essential relations" post-derecognition---evident in subsequent legislation like the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This realpolitik rationale, rooted in countering Soviet influence and leveraging PRC's opening since Nixon's era, contrasted sharply with Shen's portrayal of capitulation, though declassified records show U.S. assurances aimed at mitigating alliance rupture effects without halting the strategic pivot. Critics within U.S. Congress and pro-Taiwan lobbies echoed Shen's sentiments, decrying the move as undermining democratic allies amid unproven PRC reciprocity on human rights or restraint.

Post-Diplomacy Activities

Following the end of his tenure as Ambassador to the United States in December 1978 amid the U.S. de-recognition of the Republic of China, James Shen returned to Taipei in 1979 and retired from diplomatic service. He resided in the city for the remainder of his life, without assuming further official roles in government or international affairs, but continued informal advising, studying, and writing.

Shen passed away at his home in Taipei on 12 July 2007, at the age of 98, after a prolonged illness. He was survived by his wife, Wei-Yi Shen (魏惟儀).

Key Publications

Shen published 《The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally》 in 1983, a critical account of American foreign policy shifts toward the Republic of China on Taiwan, particularly the 1979 de-recognition and its perceived betrayal of alliance commitments. The book draws on Shen's firsthand diplomatic experience as ROC ambassador to the United

States, arguing that U.S. actions undermined a long-standing partnership without sufficient strategic justification, emphasizing economic and military dependencies that were abruptly severed.

In the same year, Shen released his Chinese-language autobiography 《半生憂患：沈劍虹回憶錄》 (Half a Lifetime of Worries: Memoir of James Shen), chronicling his career from early diplomatic postings through the pivotal U.S. relations crisis. This work provides introspective details on Taiwan's international isolation efforts and personal reflections on policy failures, serving as a primary source for ROC perspectives on mid-20th-century global realignments.

Assessment of Contributions and Criticisms

Shen's diplomatic career, spanning roles as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to Australia (1964–1970), and the United States (1971–1979), exemplified steadfast advocacy for the Republic of China amid eroding international support. His efforts in Washington included direct protests against U.S. overtures to the People's Republic of China, such as formal diplomatic notes to Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green following Nixon's 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, underscoring Taiwan's security concerns and historical alliance contributions during World War II. These actions, while unable to reverse U.S. policy, contributed to the framework of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act by highlighting Taiwan's strategic value, which informed subsequent unofficial security and economic ties.

In retirement, Shen's publications advanced historical understanding of ROC-U.S. relations from a firsthand perspective. His 1983 memoir 《The U.S. and Free China: How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally》 meticulously documents interactions with U.S. leaders like Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Jimmy Carter, critiquing their policies as a betrayal of alliance commitments and providing anecdotes of perceived duplicity, such as Kissinger's assurances of non-abandonment juxtaposed with secret Beijing engagements. This work, informed by his prior service as Chiang Kai-Shek's interpreter and journalist, offers empirical insights into diplomatic maneuvering, countering narratives that downplayed Taiwan's legitimacy claims.

Criticisms of Shen center less on personal failings than on the constraints of his position during the 1979 de-recognition crisis. Taiwanese observers, including in retrospective analyses, have noted that Shen bore disproportionate harm from U.S. shifts, enduring tense exchanges with Kissinger---such as rebukes over praise for Mao Zedong---and serving as a "lame duck" ambassador after offering his resignation, which ROC President Chiang Ching-Kuo rejected to maintain continuity. This prolonged role symbolized diplomatic isolation, with some viewing it as emblematic of broader ROC vulnerabilities rather than Shen's strategic missteps, though his optimistic post-announcement remarks on gaining "breathing space" drew caustic internal reactions amid public betrayal sentiments. Overall, assessments affirm his resilience and documentation as enduring assets, unmarred by systemic geopolitical reversals beyond his control.

Remembering Kissinger and Shen

By Stanley Kao (高碩泰) 18 December 2023

(Taiwan's representative to the US from 2016 to 2020)

(Translated by Rita Wang)

Following former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger's death, I found the editorial about him in the Liberty Times (the sister paper of the Taipei Times) an interesting read. The article offered profound insights coupled with objective commentary on Kissinger's life and legacy.

On Dec. 15, 1978, then-US president Jimmy Carter announced at the White House that the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) had agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of Jan. 1, 1979, and that the US would sever its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Kissinger was the main strategist behind this geopolitical grand scheme to restrain the Soviet Union by collaborating with Chinese communists. The potential establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China had been on the cards for some time, an inconvenient predicament which had kept the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwanese public on tenterhooks.

It took a decade across three former US presidents, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Carter, to see the normalization of US-China diplomacy, during which time Taiwan maintained de jure diplomatic relations with the US, notwithstanding awkward sentiments during this time.

The person who was harmed most over this fallout was former Republic of China (ROC) ambassador to the US James Shen (沈劍虹), the Taiwanese diplomat with most experience of working with Kissinger. In his memoir published before his death, Shen told how he and Kissinger went head to head on many issues, an unpleasant experience for Shen as the US was courting China at the time.

In July 1971, Kissinger feigned illness during a visit to Pakistan and flew undercover to Beijing for unprecedented talks with then-Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and then-Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來) about establishing formal diplomatic relations. When the news broke, Taiwanese were enraged, shocked and perplexed.

After returning to the US, Kissinger bragged about the historical trip and the thawing of China-US relations, while putting up a front by saying that the US would not change its stance with the ROC.

However, due to changing international circumstances and the domestic pressure over the Vietnam War, Kissinger had to carry out the trip in secret, albeit feeling bad for Taiwan and reassuring Taipei that then-US president Richard Nixon would not betray an old friend.

A few weeks later, Kissinger was invited to a dinner banquet at Twin Oaks, where he sang the praises of Mao and Zhou in front of Shen, lauding them as outstanding Chinese leaders, but again reassuring Shen that the US does not harbor illusions about Beijing and that the US stands steadfast with Taiwan. To Shen, the hypocrisy, duplicity and slickness were like nails being dragged across a chalkboard.

In late October 1971, the UN held a debate in the General Assembly regarding ROC membership. Kissinger again went to China to lay the groundwork for Nixon's visit in the following year, a move that heralded the end of the Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) faction in the UN.

On Oct. 25, 1971, the UN General Assembly passed UN Resolution 2758, which stated that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China.

In terms of the US pulling the rug out from underneath the ROC, Kissinger only coldly told Shen that it was no one's fault, only conceding that then-US ambassador to the UN George H.W. Bush should have delayed the debate to buy time for other remedial actions.

After the incident, Bush complained to Shen that he was on orders to mediate with Chinese officials and defend the ROC's position, but that Kissinger should not have been visiting China at the time and that things happened so fast. Shen believed that Bush and Kissinger were both trying to pass the buck and that finger pointing would not do the ROC any good.

By the end of February 1972, when Nixon and Zhou published the Shanghai Communique, Kissinger was still reassuring Shen that Washington had not yielded to Beijing and that its partnership with the ROC remained rock solid. Nevertheless, Shen noted Kissinger's shifty look and evasive attitude. It was the last formal exchange Shen and Kissinger had while Shen was ROC ambassador to the US.


Amid this tense environment, Shen must have felt without any purpose in the White House as he offered his resignation to the ROC government. His proposal was accepted, but was rejected by the US, who found the timing inappropriate. Shen was forced to stay, but became a lame duck during his final four years as ambassador to the US, until the US and Taiwan officially severed ties and the ROC flag was removed.

It was not Shen's fault, yet the regrettable experience left a scar that both nations could not forget or erase.

According to media reports, the last time Shen ran into Kissinger was at the inauguration of former US president Ronald Reagan in January 1981. Kissinger enthusiastically told Shen that he mentioned him multiple times in his memoir *White House Years*, while Shen told Kissinger that he had done the same in his.

Although Shen passed away many years ago, he has left invaluable records in his writings of his dealings with Kissinger, giving people a glimpse of the historical diplomatic development that happened over half a century ago. Today, Taiwan-US relations are based

on shared values and solid benefits, a situation that is different from the context and background in 1979. As Taiwan-US relations have turned a page and ventured into new territory, history continues to provide lessons on addressing challenges through cooperation as well as inspiration for deepening ties.





1962年10月31日，第一屆金馬獎頒獎典禮在臺北市國光戲院舉行，
新聞局局長沈劍虹(左四)擔任大會主席，行政院副院長王雲五(左五)主持頒獎。

31 October 1962 -- The first Golden Horse Awards ceremony was held in Taipei.
Government Information Office Director James Shen (L4) served as the Chairman, and the awards
presentation was officiated by the Executive Yuan Vice President Wang Yun-Wu (L5).



1964年2月4日 -- 金門八二三砲戰期間，新聞局沈劍虹局長帶領各國駐華記者團 20 餘人
前往馬祖、北竿採訪戰況，國軍司令官迎接代表團一行。

4 February 1964 - During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, James Shen, Director of the Government
Information Office, led a delegation of 20 plus foreign journalists to Matsu and Peikam
to cover the artillery facts. The delegation was greeted by the frontier army commander.



*1964年5月9日行政院嚴家淦院長(右)及新聞局沈劍虹局長出席新聞聯絡會議。
9 May 1964 -- Executive Yuan President Yen Chia-Kan (right) and
Government Information Office Director James Shen jointly attended the press liaison meeting.*



*1966年 -- 中華民國國防部長蔣經國(左)訪問大韓民國後召開記者會，新聞局沈劍虹局長陪同。
1966 -- Chiang Ching-Kuo (left), Defense Minister of the Republic of China, holds a press conference after
visiting the Republic of Korea, accompanied by James Shen, Director of Government Information Office.*



1966年10月5日 -- 沈劍虹宣誓就任中華民國駐澳大利亞大使，嚴家淦副總統(中)代表蔣中正總統監誓。
5 October 1966 – James Shen was sworn in as the Ambassador of the Republic of China to Australia.
Vice President Yen Chia-Kan (middle) administered the oath on behalf of President Chiang Kai-Shek.



沈劍虹、魏惟儀伉儷
Mr. & Mrs. James C. H. Shen

臺北扶輪社沈劍虹 -- 中華民國末任駐美國大使



沈劍虹 (James C. H. Shen, MA (Missouri), BA (Yenching)) (1908年7月2日上海—2007年7月12日臺北)，中華民國末任駐美國大使，任內經歷了聯合國大會 2758 號決議、美國與中華民國斷交。

1961年-1966年，沈劍虹擔任政府新聞局局長期間，參加了扶輪社，是臺北扶輪社(Rotary Club of Taipei)的現職社員。當時的臺北扶輪社，是國際扶輪 345 地區的成員。該地區由 3 個不同國家的領土組成：(1) 中華民國-台灣省；(2) 英國殖民地香港；(3) 葡萄牙領地澳門。



教育背景

1908年(光緒三十四年)，沈劍虹生於大清國上海蘇州河北虹口沈家灣。父親與友人合股開設磚瓦廠，收入不豐，籌措子女學費時有困難。民國初年，沈劍虹讀完光華大學(Kwang Hua University)附屬中學後，曾以翻譯餬口。後靠在高中畢業，進入郵局工作的大哥資助，先就讀滬江大學(University of Shanghai)，再轉學到北平燕京大學(Yenching University)，獲得文學士學位。曾在上海英文報紙《大陸報》(The China Press)服務，總主管是董顯光。工作兩年後，就讀美國密蘇里大學(University of Missouri, U.S.A.)新聞研究院，獲得文學碩士學位。

進入新聞圈

1936年1月返華，經董顯光介紹，沈劍虹進入由蕭同茲主持之中央通訊社，擔任英文部編譯。1937年淞滬戰爭爆發前，奉調至上海分社工作。[註]董顯光曾是天津扶輪社社員。

後至武漢中央宣傳部國際宣傳處，擔任英文編撰科科長。1938年10月下旬，隨宣傳處西撤於11月中旬至重慶。

1939年沈劍虹與魏惟儀結婚(魏惟儀是第六任行政院新聞局局長魏景蒙之妹)。

1943年外放，沈劍虹赴美國主持國際宣傳處駐舊金山辦事處。1947年，國際宣傳處改組為行政院新聞局，出掌主管國際宣傳的第二處處長職。1948年12月沈劍虹奉派前往香港，設立行政院新聞局辦事處。

短暫離開公職

因政治環境的變化，中華民國政府陸續遷移到廣州、成都，最後 1949 年到臺灣。新聞局解散，沈劍虹離開公職。先後在香港《德臣西報》(The China Mail)、《英文虎報》(The Standard)、麗的呼聲(Rediffusion)有線廣播電台工作，前後七年，直到 1956 年。

總統府秘書 與國民黨領導層的聯繫

1950 年代，中華民國政府退守臺灣後，蔣中正總統領導流亡國民黨政府。1956 年，經總統府國策顧問陶希聖介紹，沈劍虹出任總統府秘書，為蔣中正總統翻譯《蘇俄在中國》一書為英文。他的職責包括協助蔣中正與外國政要和盟友溝通，凸顯了沈劍虹與國民黨政府爭取國際支持、對抗中國共產黨擴張戰略的一致性。在工作上接待過多位訪華的重要賓客，包括美國國務卿杜勒斯(John Foster Dulles)、美國總統艾森豪(Dwight David Eisenhower)等人。

與蔣中正的密切關係，使沈劍虹躋身國民黨領導階層的核心。國民黨領導階層強調反共、中央集權以及在 1949 年退守臺灣後維護中華民國主權。沈劍虹此後在政府擔任的職務，包括新聞和外交事務，都體現了他對國民黨的忠誠。他力挺國民黨代表全中國，對抗在大陸成立的中華人民共和國。

在 1983 年出版的回憶錄《美國與自由中國：美國如何出賣其盟友》中，沈劍虹堅定捍衛國民黨政權的合法性。並批評美國政策的轉變背叛了共同的反共原則，進一步證明了他對國民黨領導層的意識形態忠誠。這種基於親身經歷的觀點，凸顯了國民黨現實主義與不斷變化的西方聯盟之間的緊張關係，同時也鞏固了他作為中國國民黨一貫政策倡導者的地位。

新聞局局長 參與文化宣傳

1961 年 7 月至 1966 年 11 月，沈劍虹擔任行政院新聞局局長。新聞局是行政院下屬的內閣級機構，負責宣傳官方政策、協調公共關係、規範國內媒體，使其符合政府目標。在他的領導下，新聞局重視文化活動，例如贊助金馬獎的前驅——1963 年設立了 21 個獎項，頒發給國語電影，以促進國家語言統一。

身為全球資訊辦公室主任，沈劍虹直接與美國官員接觸，包括 1961 年與美國總統甘迺迪(U.S. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy)和美國國務卿魯斯克(U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk)會面，討論在冷戰時期與中華人民共和國關係緊張的情況下，臺灣的信息戰略。他的職責包括監管督媒體，以對抗共產主義敘事，這體現了該機構在媒體傳播和內容控制方面的雙重角色。沈劍虹領導下的具體監管措施更側重於宣傳活動，而非公開的審查執法。沈劍虹的工作還包括陪同高級代表團訪問美國，例如 1966 年蔣經國訪問美國期間，他負責安排有關臺灣反共立場的資訊簡報。

沈劍虹擔任新聞局局長期間，兼任中央電影事業股份有限公司董事長。領導了向國際傳播中華民國敘事的工作，包括透過文化管道強調臺灣在大陸文化大革命動盪中對傳統中華文化的保護。作為國民黨政權下行政部門的主要資訊機構，新聞局協調媒體輸出、出版物和活動，將中華民國描繪成儒家價值觀、古典藝術和反共思想的合法守護者，並將其與中華人民共和國強制推行的文化破壞運動進行對比。

沈劍虹以其新聞從業背景，拓展了全球文化辦公室的海外業務，包括設立和管理紐約等分部。這些分支機構向西方受眾製作宣傳資料，例如電影、小冊子和文化展覽，以增強西方對中華民國的外交支持。這些舉措，通常將文化推廣包裝成一場「自由中國」的反擊戰。沈劍虹公開強調，除了傳統節慶活動、戲曲演出和學術交流之外，還需突顯臺灣的經濟和社會成就，以削弱中華人民共和國對文化正統性的主張。例如，由全球文化辦公室贊助的《自由中國評論》等刊物——在其監督下在全球發行——定期刊登有關臺灣文化韌性的文章，成為塑造知識分子和政策制定者對臺灣好感的重要工具。

1966年10月13日沈劍虹獲中華民國總統授予二等景星勳章。

中華民國駐澳大利亞大使

沈劍虹於1966年被行政院任命為中華民國駐澳洲大使，開啟了中華民國的外交生涯。這是他首次擔任重要的海外職務，憑藉著先前在公共資訊領域以及擔任總統府發言人的經驗，積極拓展臺灣與這一重要西方盟友的外交關係。在此期間，澳洲保持對中華民國的正式外交承認，在冷戰時期與共產主義政權的緊張關係中，視其為中國的合法政府。

1966年至1968年任職期間，沈劍虹負責坎培拉(Canberra)大使館的各項事務，並專注於推動雙邊在貿易、技術援助和反共合作方面的合作。澳洲為臺灣的發展提供了經濟援助，而沈劍虹則積極推動雙方就區域安全問題展開討論，包括如何應對中華人民共和國和蘇聯盟友勢力的擴張。豐富的媒體經驗也為他進行媒體宣傳工作提供了助力，有效反駁了有利於北京的敘事，強調中華民國的穩定和經濟發展。

沈劍虹於1968年結束其澳洲大使任期，返回臺灣。當時，全球格局正在發生變化，中華民國的國際地位日益受到挑戰。這項早期任命奠定了他在外交領域的聲譽，為他日後在外交部擔任更高職務鋪平了道路。

外交部次長

沈劍虹於1968年就任中華民國外交部次長，負責管理臺灣的外交事務。在擔任此職至1971年期間，中華民國(臺灣)與中華人民共和國爭奪國際合法性的競爭日益激烈，沈劍虹發揮了關鍵作用。

沈劍虹積極代表臺灣出席多邊論壇，以增強其抵禦中華人民共和國侵蝕的地位。例如，1969年4月，他出席了在新加坡舉行的亞洲及遠東經濟委員會(Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, ECAFE)會議，在討論可能偏袒北京的區域關係時，他力主維護中華民國的利益。他致力於維護盟友關係，避免外交孤立，包括透過雙邊接觸等方式。當時的澳洲外交記錄顯示，他與其他中華民國官員一同出席了高層會談，強調了與非共產主義夥伴保持關係的連續性。

身為外交部次長，沈劍虹也參與了內部外交政策的協調工作。憑藉其在媒體和資訊服務領域的豐富經驗，將宣傳和公共外交要素融入臺灣的策略。這包括應對美國的政策訊號，他曾就美國的意圖與中華民國領導層進行溝通，這預示著維持正式外交關係將面臨挑戰。他的任期凸顯了臺灣在應對不斷變化的全球格局時對個人外交的依賴。沈劍虹經常代表外交部就經濟合作和反共團結等關鍵議題，發表意見。

中華民國駐美國大使

沈劍虹於 1971 年 4 月就任中華民國駐美國大使，抵達華盛頓特區。他的主要任務，是阻止中華人民共和國取代中華民國在聯合國的席位。

就在幾個月後，美國總統尼克森（U.S. President Richard Nixon）在 7 月 15 日宣布即將訪問中華人民共和國，這標誌著美國外交政策的轉變。沈劍虹的任命正值美國承認「兩個中國」的立場日益緊張之際，他的任務是鞏固二戰和韓戰期間建立的長期聯盟。沈劍虹遞交國書後，立即著手進行高層外交，強調中華民國的反共立場和經濟發展成就。1971 年 6 月 24 日，他在國家新聞俱樂部發表主題演講，重點闡述了臺灣的民主韌性及其對美國在亞洲利益的戰略價值。

在任期間（直至 1979 年 1 月美國宣布不承認中華民國），沈劍虹定期與美國官員磋商，以緩和雙邊關係的惡化。值得一提的是，他曾與美國國家安全顧問季辛吉（U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger）會面，例如 1971 年 10 月 15 日的一次會晤，討論了中華民國對中美關係緩和的擔憂，並重申了 1954 年《共同防禦條約》下對臺灣國防的承諾。當時季辛吉曾當面表示美國絕對會堅定地支持中華民國。然而，季辛吉在同年訪問巴基斯坦（Pakistan）時，以腹痛為名取消原定的公開活動。暗中前往北京與周恩來會面，秘密推動美國與中華人民共和國的關係正常化，沈劍虹完全不知情。

在同年 1971 年 10 月 25 日的聯合國大會（The United Nations General Assembly）中，通過了「聯合國大會 2758 號決議」：

恢復中華人民共和國的一切權利，承認她的政府的代表為中國在聯合國組織的唯一合法代表並立即把蔣介石的代表從它在聯合國組織及其所屬一切機構中所非法占據的席位上驅逐出去。

UNITED NATIONS — THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY Resolution 2758 (XXVI) -- Resolution on Admitting Peking

Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Considering the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under the Charter.

Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.

決議前，中華民國外交部部長周書楷已宣佈「中華民國退出聯合國」。然而在紐約（New York）發生的這些重大事件，身處華盛頓（Washington）的沈劍虹大使竟全然不知情。他是通過電視新聞才得知這些事件，顯見當時中華民國臺北政府與美國外交管道所發生的嚴重問題。

目前國際間對該決議是否涉及臺灣的主權，仍有辯論。北京政府主張該決議確立了「一個中國原則」；而美國等部分國家則認為，該決議僅解決了聯合國席位問題，並未定義臺灣的法律地位。

沈劍虹將公共外交置於首位，以爭取美國的支持。他曾於1971年11月22日在紐約經濟俱樂部和傑克遜維爾州立大學(Jacksonville State University)等機構發表演講，強調臺灣的文化遺產、科技成就以及其作為對抗共產主義堡壘的作用。這些努力旨在反擊中華人民共和國的宣傳，並遊說美國決策者，儘管當時美國國內的辯論傾向於與北京緩和關係。

1972年美國總統尼克森(Richard Milhous Nixon)訪華，在上海簽訂《上海公報》，沈劍虹完全無能為力。隨後中華人民共和國政府與美國雙方之間進行了更多的交流，包括繼任的美國總統福特(Gerald Rudolph Ford, Jr.)訪華、鄧小平訪美，對此，沈劍虹都只能概括承受。

為了直接回應尼克森的政策，沈劍虹發表了正式抗議，包括公開聲明譴責1972年《上海公報》對中華民國主權的影響。他所發表的外交信函和遊說活動（已在美國解密檔案中記錄）始終堅持認為，放棄臺灣將損害美國在亞洲的信譽，並援引中華民國的穩定與中華人民共和國的動盪形成鮮明對比。

1973年8月6日與中華民國駐美國大使館政治參事陳希元一起，再次會晤季辛吉，重點討論了在不斷變化的地緣政治格局下維持經濟和軍事合作。沈劍虹也曾前往臺北進行磋商，相關情況在1972年5月3日的匯報中有所提及，旨在使中華民國的戰略與美國的政策細微差別相協調。儘管採取了這些舉措，沈劍虹八年的外交生涯，標誌著中華民國與美國正式外交關係的最後階段。

1979年，中華人民共和國與美利堅合眾國正式建交。沈劍虹黯然地離開中華民國駐美國大使館，降下中華民國國旗。返回臺北，任總統府國策顧問。他成為中華民國最後一位正式官銜為「特命全權大使」的駐美國大使，而後駐美國大使的職務由「駐美國代表」取代。

沈劍虹在其回憶錄《使美八年紀要》和《The U.S. & Free China – How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally》兩書中，詳盡記錄了他在這段動盪時期的外交爭鬥與無奈。

貢獻和批評的評估

沈劍虹作為中華民國最後一任駐美國大使（1971-1978），其外交生涯正值臺灣外交最艱困的「斷交潮」時期。對其貢獻與批評的評估主要集中在他在美期間的危機處理，以及面對美國對華政策轉向時的應對表現。

貢獻評估

- 忠實履行外交使命：在尼克森、福特及卡特三任美國總統期間，沈劍虹始終堅持維護中華民國的利益。他在《使美八年紀要》一書中詳盡記錄了與美方高層的交涉過程，為研究1970年代中美臺關係提供了重要的第一手史料。
- 危機中的穩定力量：1971年中華民國退出聯合國後，沈劍虹在華府奔走，試圖將斷交的損害降至最低。儘管大勢已去，但他維持了雙邊溝通管道，並在任內強化了與美國國會及民間的聯繫。
- 堅守反共與「一中」原則：他深受蔣中正與蔣經國信任，任內始終貫徹政府的「漢賊不兩立」政策，體現了當時國民黨政府的強硬立場。

批評評估

- 資訊掌握不足與被動：批評者認為，沈劍虹對於美國與中國大陸秘密接觸的資訊掌握不夠及時。例如在季辛吉秘密訪華前，他雖有警覺但未能提前攔阻或取得關鍵情資，導致臺灣在外交變局中處於被動。
- 僵化的外交立場：部分後世學者認為，沈劍虹堅守「唯一代表」的僵化政策，使其在面對國際現實轉變時缺乏彈性，未能開闢如「雙重代表權」等可能的生存空間。
- 斷交責任的爭議：雖然斷交是當時全球戰略格局變動的結果，但沈劍虹在 1978 年 12 月 15 日（美東時間）卡特總統宣布建交前夕，才接獲美方官員（如克里斯多福）的正式通報，這反映出他在美國工作多年仍難以突破美方決策圈的圍堵。

沈劍虹的歷史角色，更像是一名在沉船邊緣苦撐的守門人。他雖然無法扭轉歷史大勢，但他對國家的忠誠以及在《使美八年紀要》中所留下的紀錄，讓他成為研究該段歷史不可或缺的人物。

著作

- 《使美八年紀要》，1981 年完成，為擔任中華民國駐美國大使時期的回憶錄。
- 《半生憂患》(1983)，為回憶個人外交及新聞工作點滴的個人文集。
- 《The U.S. & Free China – How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally》(1983)

沈劍虹夫人魏惟儀女士

魏惟儀女士，文學作家，1918 年出生於北京，民初翻譯名家魏易之女，上海聖瑪利亞女校 (St. Mary's Hall) 畢業。曾隨夫婿出使澳洲及美國。魏惟儀創作文學包括散文、劇本及兒童文學。筆觸純熟，收放自如。散文內容，多為勾勒大半生所經歷的人世滄桑，以及從絢爛歸於恬淡的隱居生涯。情感真摯，引人沈思。文學成就，曾獲中山學術文化基金文藝創作獎。已經出版的作品有：《熠熠七星》《星軺東來：記美駐華十位大使及一位特使》《華府二三事》《歸去來》



沈劍虹與季辛吉

高碩泰 (2016-2020 年中華民國駐美國代表) (2023 年 12 月 18 日)

美東時間 1978 年 12 月 15 日晚間(臺北時間 12 月 16 日上午)美國總統卡特在白宮宣布，華府將於 1979 年 1 月 1 日與北京建交，並終止與中華民國的外交關係。這項「聯匪制俄」地緣政治大戰略，關鍵推手即是季辛吉。而最終的美中建交結局，一直在當時國民黨政府和台灣民眾忐忑預料之中，卻多不願真實面對。

美中「關係正常化」，歷經尼克森、福特、卡特三任總統。而台灣處於這段長達十年「有名無實」的邦交，立場尷尬，毋寧是切膚之痛。感受最刻骨銘心者，恐非當時駐美大使沈劍虹莫屬，他也是歷來唯一且和季氏交手最多的我方外交人物。根據沈氏生前出版的回憶錄「使美八年紀要」，在當時美中熱衷交往的氛圍下，二氏的互動難免處處機鋒，對沈氏顯然都不是愉快的經驗。

季氏在 1971 年 7 月以肚子不適為藉口，偷偷經由巴基斯坦潛赴北京與毛澤東、周恩來談判關係正常化，舉世震驚。我方後知後覺之餘，憤怒、困惑可知。季氏返美後會見沈氏，夸夸其談該歷史性破冰之旅，洋洋自得，卻虛情假意表示美國重視與中華民國邦誼。但華府基於國際局勢改變，加上國內壓力（美國深陷越戰泥淖），季氏乃不得不奉命進行該項秘密任務。內心對台灣仍覺難過，惟重申尼克森總統絕不會出賣老朋友。

幾週後季氏應邀赴雙橡園晚宴，又當著沈氏面前推崇毛、周出類拔萃，乃兩位絕頂聰明的中共領導人。但尼、季對北京不存幻想，向沈氏保證絕不會出賣台灣。其敷衍巧詐，虛與委蛇，聽在主人沈氏耳裡，如何消受！

1971 年 10 月下旬聯合國正激烈辯論中華民國會籍案，季氏卻再度赴北京洽談尼克森翌年訪問中國大陸的安排。不啻宣告了「蔣介石集團」在聯合國的命運，於 10 月 25 日聯大通過 2758 號決議後劃下了休止符。對台灣這項外交重挫，季氏冷冷地向沈氏指出該項不幸結局，在美方乃無人之過。但當時駐聯合國大使老布希應設法延遲辯論，再謀挽救之道。老布希事後親口向沈氏抱怨，他銜命在聯大辛苦和中共同路人周旋，捍衛中華民國席位。季氏根本不該在當時訪問北京，致情況急轉直下。沈氏無奈認為季、布二人互相卸責、指責，對中華民國而言根本於事無助、無補！

等到尼、周在 1972 年 2 月底發表「上海公報」，季氏事後雖然當面向沈氏重申華府從未向北京讓步，對中華民國的立場維持不變。但沈氏觀察季氏神情顯著不安，言詞閃爍，這也是沈氏在駐美大使任內和季氏正式交鋒的最後回合。

沈氏在大環境的壓力下，自覺在華府已無法發揮作用，遂向台北高層表達辭意，也獲得首肯。詎料華府認為時機不宜，拒絕接受換使。沈氏不得已繼續留下，駐美最後四年成為「跛鴨」，直至斷交降旗。對沈氏個人即便是非戰之罪，此段不堪的過程，已烙印成為兩國無法抹滅的歷史刻痕。

根據媒體報導，沈氏最後一次與季氏不期而遇，係在 1981 年 1 月雷根總統就職大典場邊。季氏狀至熱絡向沈氏表示「大使先生，我在回憶錄（白宮歲月）中多處提到閣下呢！」沈氏則回敬「國務卿先生，我相信閣下也會在我撰寫的回憶錄中多次出現！」

沈劍虹大使已物故多年，但留下了與季氏多方交手的敘述。補足了半個世紀前的恩怨情仇往事，其歷史見證彌足珍貴。當今的台美關係，植基於共享價值與堅實利益，早非 1979 年以前的時空環境與人事因素所可比擬。前事不忘，後事之師。台美關係雖然翻過了那一頁，對吾人思考如何掌握優勢，深化台美互信，協作因應諸般挑戰，仍不乏啟發與惕厲！

