


王正廷博士從大英帝國收回威海衛主權

Dr. Chengting T. Wang and the Return of Weihaiwei to Chinese Sovereignty

By Herbert K. Lau (劉敬恒) (Rotary China Historian)

1 October 2020



Dr. Chengting Thomas Wang (王正廷博士), *HonLLD (Peking)*, *HonLLD (St. John's)*, BA (Yale) (7 September 1882 – 21 May 1961), joined the Rotary Club of Shanghai (上海扶輪社) as Active Member on 20 August 1920, serving as the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Republic of China (中華民國), successfully negotiated and signed the agreement that restored Weihaiwei (威海衛) to Chinese sovereignty on 1 October 1930, ending 32 years of British colonial leasehold.

The Diplomatic Milestone

- The Plenipotentiaries:
On 18 April 1930, Foreign Minister Dr. Chengting T. Wang and British Minister Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson (藍普森爵士) signed 《The Sino-British Weihaiwei Rendition Convention 中英交收威海衛專約及協定》 in Nanking (*Nanjing*) (南京). (see text on Pages 2-7)
- Sovereignty Restored:
The agreement overturned the original 1898 lease, returning full territorial sovereignty of the mainland area to China.
- The Handover:
On 1 October 1930, the final British Commissioner, Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston (莊士敦爵士), officially transferred administrative power to the Chinese government.
- Special Administrative Status:
Upon recovery, Weihaiwei was designated as a Special Administrative Region under direct control of the Chinese government.

Historical Legacy

- Revolutionary Diplomacy:
This victory formed part of Dr. Wang's broader nationalist policy to systematically dismantle unequal treaties and reclaim lost tariff autonomy and territories.
- The Memorial Tower:
To celebrate the achievement, the [Monument to the Recovery of Weihaiwei 收回威海衛紀念塔] was built in Weihai, Shantung (*Shandong*) (山東威海), featuring central calligraphy personally brushed by Dr. Wang.

341.73



白皮書第十七號

中英交收威海衛專約及協定

中華民國十九年四月十八日簽訂於南京
同年十月一日互換批准於南京

中華民國國民政府外交部編印



264209

CONVENTION FOR THE RENDITION OF WEIHAIWEI

His Excellency, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

Desiring that the territory of Weihaiwei leased by China to His Britannic Majesty under the Convention of the 1st July 1898, should be restored in full sovereignty to China, have resolved to conclude a Convention for that purpose and to that end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China;

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.,

His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Republic of China;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The territory of Weihaiwei, as delimited by the boundary stones fixed by the boundary Commission of 1899-1901, comprising a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the entire coastline of the Bay of Weihaiwei and including Liukungtao and all other islands in the Bay of Weihaiwei, is hereby returned by His Britannic Majesty to the Republic of China.

ARTICLE II

The Convention for the lease of Weihaiwei, concluded on the 1st July 1898, is hereby abrogated.

ARTICLE III

The British garrison now stationed in the territory of Weihaiwei, including Liukungtao, shall be withdrawn within one month from the date of the coming into force of the present Convention.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will hand over to the National Government of the Republic of China such archives, registers, title deeds and other documents in the possession of the British Administration in Weihaiwei as may be useful for the transfer of the administration, as well as those that may be useful for the subsequent administration of the territory by the National Government.

ARTICLE V

The Government of the United Kingdom will present to the National Government of the Republic of China all lands and buildings in the territory of Weihaiwei belonging to the first-named Government.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of the United Kingdom will hand over to the National Government of the Republic of China, without compensation, all works and purchases, including the steam launch "Gallia", made under the special levy in respect of the Victory Pier and the Wukou Improvement Scheme.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the United Kingdom will present to the National Government of the Republic of China the Chefoo-Weihaiwei cable and the Government stores, including those detailed in Annex I.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of the United Kingdom will hand over to the National Government of the Republic of China free of charge the Civil Hospitals at Port Edward and Wenchuantang, including land and buildings and present equipment.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the National Government of the Republic of China all land previously owned by the Chinese Government on Liukungtao, together with the buildings thereon, and will further hand over all the land subsequently acquired by purchase and all Crown leases in respect of sites in that island with the reversionary interest in the buildings on the land so leased.

ARTICLE X

The transfer of the Administration of Weihaiwei and the transfer of public properties in the said territory, as well as of other matters under the present Convention, shall take place on the day of the coming into force of the said Convention.

ARTICLE XI

When the National Government of the Republic of China assumes the administration of the territory of Weihaiwei after rendition the existing regulations, including land and house tax, sanitary and building regulations, and policing will as far as possible be maintained.

ARTICLE XII

All documents of title to land, deeds of conveyance and mortgage and *Chihchao* under the British Weihaiwei Waste Land Ordinance No. 6 of 1919, issued to Chinese owners by the British Administration of Weihaiwei in the form prescribed within the territory of Weihaiwei, shall, subject to the terms contained therein, be recognized as being of the same validity as during the British administration, unless the documents of title are contrary to Chinese law making revision or issue of additional documents of title necessary.

ARTICLE XIII

All documents of title to land issued to persons other than Chinese by the British Administration of Weihaiwei in the prescribed form shall be exchanged for Chinese deeds of perpetual lease in the same form as those recently issued by the Chinese authorities to foreign lot holders in the former British Concession at Chinkiang, a registration fee of \$1.00

per now being charged.

All leases issued by the British Administration of Weihaiwei will be recognized by the National Government of the Republic of China.

If the National Government of the Republic of China should decide to close the port of Weihaiwei to foreign residence and trade, with a view to utilising it exclusively as a naval base, the interests of the foreign property owners and lease holders will be bought out at a fair compensation to be agreed upon between the Governments of China and the United Kingdom who will appoint a joint commission for determining the amount of this compensation in each case.

ARTICLE XIV

The National Government of the Republic of China will maintain the existing public services employing such staff as it may select, including particularly the telephone service on the mainland and connection with the island and the telegraph service between Weihaiwei mainland and island and Chefoo.

ARTICLE XV

All decisions of the British Weihaiwei High Court or magistrates' courts pronounced before rendition shall be considered after rendition to have the same force and effect as if they were decisions rendered by Chinese Courts of Justice.

ARTICLE XVI

The National Government of the Republic of China will, unless and until they decide to close the port of Weihaiwei and reserve it exclusively as a naval base, maintain it as an area for international residence and trade, including within such area all places in which foreign property owners and lease-holders are at present located.

ARTICLE XVII

Pending the enactment and general application of the laws regulating the system of local self-government in China, the Chinese local authorities will ascertain the views of the foreign residents at Weihaiwei

in such municipal matters as may directly affect their welfare and interests

ARTICLE XVIII

The National Government of the Republic of China will, unless and until they decide to close the port of Weihaiwei and reserve it exclusively as a naval base, lease to the Government of the United Kingdom free of charge for a period of 30 years, with option of renewal by the holders, certain land and buildings in the territory of Weihaiwei, as detailed in Annex II, for the requirements of the British Consulate and the public interests of the residents.

ARTICLE XIX

Existing aids to navigation, i.e., light-houses, markbuoys, storm signals, etc., shall be transferred to the National Government of the Republic of China free of charge, and shall be maintained in the future by the competent Chinese authorities, who shall administer the harbour in the same way as at the open ports of China.

ARTICLE XX

The present Convention shall be ratified, and ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Nanking on or before the the first day of October, 1930, which is the first day of the tenth month of the nineteenth year of the Republic of China.

It shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention in duplicate and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Nanking this eighteenth day of the fourth month of the nineteenth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the eighteenth day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty.

(Seal) Chengting T. Wang

(Seal) Miles W. Lampson

Diplomatic Pressures and 1930 Negotiations

In the late 1920s, the Nationalist government of the Republic of China, having achieved nominal unification under the Kuomintang (中國國民黨) (literally the Nationalist Party), mounted sustained diplomatic campaigns to abolish “unequal treaties” imposed during the Ch’ing Empire (大清國) era, including the 1898 Lease of Weihaiwei to Britain. These pressures were amplified by China’s recovery of Shantung Province from Imperial Japan’s control following the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, which returned Kiaochow Bay (膠州灣) to Chinese sovereignty but left Weihaiwei as an isolated British enclave amid resurgent Chinese nationalism. Although Japan’s occupation of Shantung from 1914 to 1922 had encircled Weihaiwei and strained British logistics---prompting temporary concessions like fleet withdrawals under Japanese influence---the enclave’s administration persisted intact, as the lease terms insulated it from direct territorial claims. The resolution of the Shantung issue, however, underscored Weihaiwei’s anomalous status and facilitated broader Sino-British rapprochement, with Britain viewing its return as a low-cost gesture to foster goodwill amid declining imperial priorities in East Asia.

Negotiations accelerated in 1929–1930, decoupled from contentious issues like extraterritoriality or tariff autonomy to expedite agreement, as recommended by British Minister to China Miles Lampson. The resulting 《Convention between His Majesty and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China for the Rendition of Wei-Hai-Wei》 was signed on 18 April 1930 in Nanking, abrogating the 1898 Lease and restoring “full and entire sovereignty” over the territory, including Liu Kung Island (劉公島) and surrounding bays, to China. Britain secured navigational freedoms for its warships in Weihaiwei port unless China opted to exclude commercial traffic and designate it a naval base, alongside provisions for orderly withdrawal of British garrisons within one month of the Convention’s entry into force and settlement of local debts and pensions.

The handover occurred on 1 October 1930, with final Commissioner Sir Reginald Johnston ceremonially transferring authority to Chinese officials, who resumed administration under the Republic while retaining some Ch’ing-era district magistrates for continuity. This retrocession marked Britain’s unilateral relinquishment of the Lease---originally indefinite but without renewal clauses---without reciprocal concessions on other holdings like Hong Kong (香港), reflecting a pragmatic acknowledgment of shifting global dynamics rather than coercive linkage to treaty extensions elsewhere.

Immediate Post-Return Transitions

The territory of Weihaiwei was formally returned to the sovereignty of the Republic of China on 1 October 1930, following the ratification of the Sino-British Convention signed on 18 April 1930, with the handover proceeding without reports of significant violence, displacement, or administrative collapse. The National Government of China assumed direct control, replacing the British commissioner with a Chinese equivalent and integrating the territory into Shantung Province’s provincial administration, while honoring all pre-existing leases issued under British rule to facilitate a seamless transfer of property rights and land tenures. British infrastructure, including administrative buildings and harbour facilities, was transferred intact, preserving operational continuity for local governance and port activities.

In parallel, the United Kingdom retained usage rights over Liu Kung Island and adjacent islets in Weihaiwei Bay exclusively for naval purposes until 31 December 1937, with provisions for earlier mutual agreement, thereby ensuring a transitional British consular and military oversight limited to those sites amid the full handover of the mainland territory. This arrangement mitigated immediate disruptions to maritime security and trade, as the leased naval base continued to support regional British naval operations without interfering in Chinese civil administration.

Locally, the transition maintained short-term stability in daily administration and economic functions, with no documented interruptions to agriculture, fishing, or small-scale commerce that had characterized the territory under British oversight. Existing postal and revenue systems persisted under Chinese adaptation, reflecting the low developmental footprint of prior British economic interventions. Amid the Nationalist consolidation following the Northern Expedition's unification efforts in 1928, residents experienced continuity in public order, though contemporary analyses attribute an eventual erosion of the frugal and stable governance model---evident in low taxation and minimal corruption under British rule---to post-handover Chinese bureaucratic practices, fostering some localized sentiment favoring the prior era's predictability during the lingering echoes of warlord fragmentation.

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British Weihaiwei (1898-1930)



British Weihaiwei was a coastal territory of approximately 285 square miles (740 km²) in Shantung Province, northeastern China, leased to the United Kingdom on 1 July 1898 and administered until its return to Chinese sovereignty on 1 October 1930. The leasehold, ostensibly tied to the duration of Russia's occupation of nearby Port Arthur (Lüshunkou 旅順口), served primarily as a naval station to protect British trade routes and counterbalance Russo-German territorial gains in the Yellow Sea region during the late Ch'ing Empire era's "Scramble for Concessions".

Governed by a civil commissioner---initially Sir James Haldane Stewart Lockhart (駱克爵士) from 1902 to 1921---the territory operated under a distinctive legal framework blending British oversight with deference to Chinese customary law, exercising exclusive jurisdiction over a predominantly local Chinese population while retaining nominal Imperial Ch'ing sovereignty until 1912 and Republican thereafter. This approach, hampered by chronic underfunding and geopolitical uncertainty, yielded scant infrastructure or economic transformation, rendering

Weihaiwei an “ill-fated” enclave with failed development initiatives and reliance on seasonal naval presence rather than permanent settlement or commercialization akin to Hong Kong. Britain’s voluntary relinquishment in 1930, formalized via treaty with the Nationalist government, reflected post-World War I shifts toward imperial retrenchment and the earlier transfer of Port Arthur to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, though the Lease had persisted amid evolving Sino-foreign dynamics.

Geopolitical and Historical Context

Late Ch’ing Empire Instability and Foreign Pressures

The Ch’ing Empire experienced profound internal instability in the late 19th century, exacerbated by massive rebellions that drained resources and eroded central authority. The Taiping Rebellion (太平天國) (1850–1864) alone resulted in an estimated 20 to 30 million deaths and devastated much of southern and central China, compelling the Imperial Ch’ing to rely on regional armies like those led by Tseng Kuo-Fan (曾國藩) and Li Hung-Chang (李鴻章), which fostered semi-autonomous power centers and weakened imperial control. Corruption permeated the bureaucracy, with officials routinely embezzling military funds, leading to ill-equipped troops and ineffective governance. In Shantung Province, where Weihaiwei was located, this manifested in lax provincial administration and vulnerability to local banditry, though major uprisings were less prevalent there compared to other regions until the late 1890s. The influence of Empress Dowager Cixi (慈禧太后) and eunuchs further prioritized palace intrigues over reforms, stifling modernization efforts and leaving the empire structurally fragile.

External pressures intensified Imperial Ch’ing vulnerabilities through a series of military defeats and “unequal treaties” that imposed territorial losses, indemnities, and extraterritorial rights on Western powers and Japan. The First Opium War (第一次鴉片戰爭) (1839–1842) ended with the 《Treaty of Nanking 南京條約》, forcing Imperial Ch’ing to cede Hong Kong, open five treaty ports, and pay an indemnity of 21 million silver dollars, marking the onset of coerced openings that undermined sovereignty. The Second Opium War (第二次鴉片戰爭) (1856–1860) compounded this via the 《Treaty of Tientsin 天津條約》, which legalized opium imports, expanded foreign residence rights, and extracted further indemnities totaling around 8 million taels of silver, while missionary activities surged under treaty protections, fostering resentment and sporadic anti-foreign violence. Subsequent conflicts, including the Sino-French War (清法戰爭) (1884–1885), affirmed French dominance in Indochina without direct territorial cessions but highlighted naval inadequacies. These cumulative burdens---indemnities equaling years of revenue---strained the treasury and compelled resource diversion from defense.

The First Sino-Japanese War (甲午戰爭) (1894–1895) decisively exposed these weaknesses, particularly at Weihaiwei, the anchorage of the Imperial Ch’ing’s Beiyang Fleet (大清北洋水師)---China’s most modern naval force on paper, comprising ironclads and cruisers purchased from Europe. Japanese forces besieged Weihaiwei from January 20 to February 12, 1895, landing troops to overrun coastal forts and torpedo or capture the bulk of the fleet, with the Chinese admiral Ting Ju-Ch’ang (水師提督丁汝昌) surrendering on February 17 amid scuttling to avoid total loss. Japan occupied the territory until December 1895, using it as leverage for indemnity payments under the

《Treaty of Shimonoseki 馬關條約》, which demanded 200 million kuping taels (approximately three times Imperial Ch'ing annual revenue) and ceded Taiwan (臺灣) and the Pescadores (澎湖群島), though Liaotung (*Liaodong*) Peninsula (遼東半島) was later returned via international intervention. This annihilation revealed the Imperial Ch'ing navy's tactical and logistical deficiencies---poor training, divided command, and obsolete tactics against Japan's cohesive, Western-trained forces---leaving the northern coast undefended and Peking's (北京) sea approaches exposed, thus inviting further foreign encroachments in the ensuing "scramble for concessions".

European Leases and Spheres of Influence in China

In the late 1890s, the Ch'ing Empire's vulnerability after defeats in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 invited European powers to extract territorial concessions through diplomatic pressure and military demonstrations, establishing leased territories as naval and strategic bases amid intensifying rivalry. Germany's occupation of Kiaochow Bay on 14 November 1897---preceded by the murder of two German Catholic missionaries in Shantung Province on November 1---provided the pretext for seizing the area around Tsingtao (*Qingdao*) (青島), which China formalized as a 99-year lease on 6 March 1898 granting Germany exclusive administrative rights over approximately 552 square kilometers. This move, justified by Berlin as punitive and protective, alarmed British policymakers, who viewed it as an aggressive encroachment threatening trade routes and naval balance in the Yellow Sea (黃海).

Russia capitalized on the post-war power vacuum by dispatching naval forces to occupy Port Arthur (Lüshun) on 27 December 1897, securing a 25-year Lease on 27 March 1898, for the Kwantung Peninsula (關東半島), including Lüshun (旅順) and Dalian (大連), spanning about 3,500 square kilometers with rights to fortify the harbour as a warm-water naval base and extend railway access. This northern expansion, building on Russia's influence in Manchuria, heightened British concerns over potential encirclement of key interests, as the Lease facilitated Russian dominance over the Bohai Sea (渤海) approaches and challenged Anglo-Japanese understandings in the region.

France followed suit in May 1898, obtaining a 99-year Lease on Kwang Cho Wan (*Guangzhouwan*) (Kouang-Tchéou-Wan 廣州灣), a coastal enclave of roughly 1,300 square kilometers in Kwangtung (*Guangdong*) Province (廣東省) with Fort Bayard (*Zhanjiang*) (湛江) as its center, administered from Indochina to safeguard southern maritime lanes and counterbalance British holdings like Hong Kong. These leases exemplified realpolitik calculations, with Britain responding by acquiring Weihaiwei on 1 July 1898 primarily as a defensive naval station opposite Kiaochow Bay and Port Arthur, eschewing extensive economic development in favour of maintaining open seas access without the commercial infrastructure ambitions evident in German Tsingtao. Such countermeasures reflected mutual deterrence rather than coordinated partition, as spheres of influence---Britain's in the Yangtze valley, for instance---remained informal economic preferences overlaid on these hardened territorial claims.

Acquisition of the Lease

Strategic Motivations and Negotiations

The German occupation of Kiaochow Bay on 14 November 1897 prompted widespread indignation in British public opinion and the press, who viewed it as a threat to British commercial

interests in China and criticized the Salisbury government's initial restraint. This sentiment intensified following Russia's occupation of Port Arthur on 27 March 1898 with newspapers such as 《The Standard》 decrying official inaction and demanding a countervailing British foothold to preserve imperial prestige.

The Foreign Office, adhering to an “open door” policy favouring equal commercial access over territorial grabs, initially resisted populist calls for acquisition, prioritizing diplomatic equilibrium amid the “scramble for concessions”. However, mounting pressure from Parliament, the press, and naval advocates---coupled with fears of Russian dominance across the Gulf of Bohai---overrode these reservations, leading to authorization for negotiations on 4 April 1898. The decision reflected a defensive imperial calculus rather than aggressive expansion, aimed at checking Russo-German advances without committing to large-scale colonization or garrisons.

In Peking, British envoy Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald (寶納樂爵士) engaged the Imperial Ch'ing *Tsungli Yamen* (大清國總理衙門 Office for the General Management of Affairs Concerning the Various Countries) amid the dynasty's vulnerability following Japan's withdrawal from Weihaiwei in May 1895 and escalating foreign demands, positioning the Lease as a mutual safeguard against further encroachments. The Imperial Ch'ing, seeking British naval deterrence, acceded swiftly, formalizing the arrangement on 1 July 1898 for the duration of Russia's Port Arthur tenure, with Weihaiwei envisioned primarily as a coaling station and repair base for the Royal Navy's China Squadron. This minimal-investment approach---eschewing commercial development and limiting forces to a small detachment---underscored its role as a strategic counterweight rather than a settler colony.

Terms of the 1898 Agreement

《The Convention for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei 訂租威海衛專條》, signed on 1 July 1898 in Peking between representatives of the United Kingdom and the Ch'ing Empire, delineated the leased territory as comprising Liu Kung Island, all other islands within Weihaiwei Bay, and a contiguous belt of mainland ten English miles wide along the Bay's entire coast. This area totaled approximately 288 square miles. The agreement granted Britain the authority to utilize the territory as a naval base for protecting commerce, including the right to construct fortifications, station troops east of the 127° 40' E meridian, and exercise sole jurisdiction over the leased areas, encompassing both Chinese subjects and foreigners.

The Lease's duration was fixed to persist “as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia”, mirroring the 25-year term of Russia's concurrent lease of that strategic port, with no provision for unilateral extension by Britain absent mutual consent or changed circumstances. Ch'ing officials were to continue exercising jurisdiction within the walled city of Weihaiwei, provided such administration did not interfere with British naval or military operations, thereby preserving elements of Ch'ing routine governance in that locale while subordinating it to overarching British control elsewhere in the territory. No troops from third powers were permitted, and Ch'ing warships retained navigational rights in the Bay's waters.

Sovereignty remained vested in the Ch'ing Empire, with the Convention explicitly framing the arrangement as a revocable lease rather than a permanent cession or alienation of territory. Britain

was required to restore full possession upon the Lease's expiration or earlier if Port Arthur reverted to Ch'ing control, underscoring the provisional nature of the occupation as a counterbalance to Russian expansion rather than an assertion of outright colonial dominion. Inhabitants faced no forced expropriation or expulsion, though land requisitions for public purposes mandated fair-market compensation. The Treaty further prohibited Imperial Ch'ing from ceding or leasing any part of the territory to another foreign power during the lease term.

Territorial and Administrative Overview

Geographical Extent and Key Sites

The British leased territory of Weihaiwei encompassed a coastal region on the northeastern Shantung Peninsula, facing the Yellow Sea. Defined by the 1898 Convention, it included Liu Kung Island and all adjacent islands within Weihaiwei Bay, alongside a mainland belt extending 10 English miles inland from the coastline. This belt traced the Bay's perimeter from Yung Ching (榮成) in the north to Ta Tung (大東) in the south, with an additional extension southward from a point 5 miles north of Ta Tung to 5 miles south of Ning Hai (寧海). The total area measured approximately 288 square miles (750 km²), providing a compact maritime enclave rather than expansive inland dominion.

Key settlements within the territory featured the walled city of Weihaiwei, a historic coastal fortress, and Port Edward, established as the primary administrative hub on the mainland north of the city. Weihaiwei Bay served as the strategic core, offering a deep-water natural harbour sheltered by surrounding hills and Liu Kung Island, which facilitated naval anchoring and limited landward access. The rural hinterland consisted of undulating terrain with gentle slopes, broad valleys, and scattered villages, predominantly agricultural and thinly settled. Population estimates for 1901 indicate over 120,000 Chinese residents, chiefly peasants engaged in farming and fishing, underscoring the area's modest density and agrarian character.

Unique Governance Model under British Oversight

The British administration of Weihaiwei implemented a hybrid governance structure that preserved existing Chinese administrative mechanisms while asserting ultimate authority, reflecting a deliberate policy of limited intervention to ensure stability in the leased territory from 1898 to 1930. This model devolved routine civil administration to local Chinese magistrates and village headmen, who handled disputes and daily affairs according to customary practices, subject to British oversight and veto in matters impinging on foreign relations, security, or imperial interests. Such delegation aligned with the 1898 Lease Convention, which permitted continued Chinese jurisdiction within the walled city except where inconsistent with British objectives.

Administrative efficiency was achieved through a parsimonious bureaucracy, comprising primarily one senior commissioner, a deputy assistant stationed on-site year-round, and a minimal supporting staff of British officials, often totaling fewer than a dozen expatriates. The commissioner frequently conducted oversight from Peking during summer months to coordinate with broader diplomatic activities, relying on local Chinese intermediaries for on-ground implementation. This lean structure avoided the expansive colonial apparatuses seen elsewhere, reducing overhead costs and administrative friction.

Central to the model was a strict non-interference stance regarding indigenous land tenure arrangements and traditional taxation systems, which were left intact to avert economic disruption or social upheaval among the predominantly rural Chinese population of approximately 170,000. By refraining from reforms that might provoke resistance, the administration maintained order without significant British troop deployments beyond naval presence, demonstrating empirical success in fostering quiescence over three decades amid Imperial Ch'ing's internal turmoil. The absence of major uprisings or fiscal crises underscored the causal efficacy of this restraint, prioritizing pragmatic stability over ideological imposition.

Leadership and Symbolism

Role and List of Commissioners

The Commissioner of Weihaiwei (英租威海衛專員) functioned as the senior British administrator in the leased territory, wielding authority over defense, external affairs, and general oversight while adopting an advisory stance toward Chinese internal administration to align with the 1898 Lease Convention's stipulation of preserved Chinese sovereignty. Reporting to the Colonial Office and coordinating with the British Legation in Peking, commissioners operated as plenipotentiaries tasked with ensuring territorial security against foreign threats, particularly Japanese expansion, without imposing direct colonial governance on local customs or magistracy. This role prioritized fiscal balance, with expenditures capped at revenue levels, and selective interventions such as judicial establishments and modest public works, reflecting a deliberate policy of minimal disruption to indigenous structures.

Initial commissioners held military backgrounds during the post-lease occupation phase, transitioning to civilian appointees by 1902 amid the shift from Admiralty and War Office control to Colonial Office administration in January 1901. Sir James Stewart Lockhart, serving from 1902 to 1921 as the longest-tenured commissioner, exemplified this evolution by pursuing restrained policies that respected Chinese headmen and officials, fostering continuity through collaboration rather than overhaul. Subsequent incumbents maintained this framework amid declining strategic relevance, with the final commissioner overseeing the territory's handover in 1930 following the Washington Naval Treaty.

The following list enumerates the commissioners and their tenures:

- (1) Major-General Sir Arthur Robert Ford Dorward (鐸沃德少將) 1898–1901
- (2) Commander John Dodson Daintree (德恩垂) 1901–1902
- (3) Sir James Haldane Stewart Lockhart (駱克爵士) 1902–1921
- (4) Arthur Powlett Blunt (巴蘭德) 1921–1923
- (5) Walter Russell Brown (布朗) 1923–1927
- (6) Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston (莊士敦爵士) 1927–1930



Commissioner's Flag and Official Insignia

There had been 2 different designs for the flag of the Commissioner of British Weihaiwei. The left figure shows the flag used from 1899 until 1903. The right figure shows the flag used from 1903 until 1930 featured the Union Jack defaced centrally with the territory's badge, consisting of a pair of mandarin ducks on a white disc. This design replaced the earlier variant used which incorporated a badge of a yellow-ground Chinese imperial dragon. The 1903 iteration was formally approved that year, adapting British heraldic conventions to the leased territory's unique status.

Unlike flags of fully administered British colonies, which typically employed a Blue Ensign for civil governors with a localized badge, the Weihaiwei Commissioner's flag utilized the Union Jack to emphasize oversight of a temporary lease rather than outright colonial possession. This distinction aligned with the 1898 Convention's provisions for British administration without sovereignty transfer, limiting displays to official functions denoting the Commissioner's authority.

The badge of facing mandarin ducks functioned as the primary official insignia, evoking Chinese cultural motifs of fidelity while serving on seals, documents, and correspondence to authenticate administrative acts. Its restrained application underscored Weihaiwei's peripheral role as a naval coaling station and health resort, where symbolic pomp was minimized to avoid provoking Chinese sensitivities or implying permanence amid the Lease's indemnity-based duration. Commissioners were additionally entitled to a garlanded variant per the 1869 Order in Council governing such emblems, though records indicate infrequent ceremonial use reflective of the territory's non-settler orientation.

Security and Defense

Weihaiwei Regiment and Local Forces

The Weihaiwei Regiment, formally designated the 1st Chinese Regiment, was established in late 1898 following British occupation of the territory, with formal approval via Army Order No. 2 of 1899 and initial listing in January of that year. It comprised locally recruited Chinese non-commissioned officers and enlisted men under the command of British officers drawn from various regiments, serving primarily as a cost-effective auxiliary force for territorial defense and internal stability. Intended to safeguard the Royal Navy base at Weihaiwei against external threats, the unit emphasized drill, marksmanship, and rapid mobilization, with early operations including intelligence gathering in civilian attire and preemptive seizures of rudimentary weapons from potential agitators in March 1900 to avert unrest.

By early 1900, the Regiment numbered approximately 420 men organized into seven companies, though it expanded to a peak of 1,312 personnel across 12 companies by late 1901 amid heightened regional tensions. Its primary roles within Weihaiwei involved patrolling boundaries, maintaining order during administrative activities such as territorial demarcation, and deterring banditry or smuggling through visible presence and quick-response parades, which proved effective in minimizing incidents without widespread combat engagement in the leased area. This low incidence of localized fighting underscored the Regiment's success as a stabilizing deterrent, supplemented by a small contingent of around 200 British troops forming the overall garrison.

During the Boxer Rebellion (義和團運動), detachments totaling 22 British officers and 363 Chinese ranks were deployed externally in July 1900 to support the relief of Tientsin (*Tianjin*) (天津) and subsequent advance on Peking, engaging in urban combat, sniper clearance, and guard duties over 18 days of operations under Major General Dorward's command, incurring casualties of two officers and 21 men killed. Upon return, the unit resumed routine defensive and policing-adjacent duties, quelling remnants of unrest without major escalations.

The Regiment was disbanded on 1 June 1906 with about 300 remaining men, many of whom transitioned to local civil roles, reflecting a shift toward reduced military needs as the territory stabilized under British oversight until the Lease's end in 1930. Thereafter, defense relied more heavily on the residual British garrison and non-military mechanisms, with no equivalent local regiment reformed.

Police Organization and Crime Management

The police organization in British Weihaiwei consisted of a small constabulary primarily composed of Chinese personnel under the supervision of a limited number of European inspectors, focusing on routine civil enforcement rather than militarized operations. By 1910, the force included three European inspectors and 55 Chinese constables, with the magistrate serving as superintendent supported by detectives, runners, clerks, and interpreters. This modest structure reflected the territory's rural character and low administrative demands, emphasizing patrol, investigation of petty offenses, and coordination with local authorities over expansive policing.

Policing integrated hybrid elements by relying heavily on the traditional Chinese system of village headmen---equivalent to the *baojia* mutual responsibility framework---for grassroots surveillance and dispute resolution, thereby avoiding direct British overreach into rural communities. Headmen, appointed and commissioned by the administration, assisted in maintaining order, mediating minor conflicts, and reporting issues, which supplemented the constabulary's limited resources across the 288-square-mile territory. This approach handled common matters such as theft (e.g., minor property appropriations like stolen grass) and interpersonal disputes over land or debts, with headmen facilitating informal settlements to reduce court burdens.

Crime management was characterized by notably low incidence of serious offenses, with the territory reported as largely free of lawlessness and no recorded murders for several years prior to 1910, attributable to effective border controls mitigating smuggling, rebellion, and vice like opium trafficking---which was strictly prohibited unlike in nearby concessions. Population stability, from 123,750 in 1901 to 154,663 in 1921, and the emphasis on preventive mediation contributed to this equilibrium, with criminal prosecutions remaining infrequent compared to civil litigation.

Judicial Framework

Establishment of the High Court

The Wei-Hai-Wei Order in Council of 24 July 1901 established His Majesty's High Court for Weihaiwei, vesting it with comprehensive original and appellate jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters within the territory. This framework empowered the Court to handle appeals from magistrates' decisions as well as trials for serious offenses, while allowing concurrent exercise

of authority with lower courts. The High Court could transfer cases from magistrates at its discretion to ensure uniformity in application of justice. The Court's structure reflected the territory's modest scale and administrative priorities, comprising the Commissioner—who could sit as judge—and a designated judicial officer, or either individually, enabling flexible operation without a permanent bench.

Jurisdiction extended to British subjects, other foreigners under extraterritorial protections, and Chinese residents, adapting English common law and procedure as the baseline while mandating deference to Chinese customary law in civil disputes exclusively between natives to avoid cultural imposition. This selective incorporation preserved local norms for interpersonal Chinese matters, such as family or property customs, without wholesale Western legal overhaul, aligning with Britain's policy of light administrative footprint in Weihaiwei. Sessions were typically convened in Port Edward, the administrative hub, often in portable or ad hoc formats that mirrored the Commissioner's itinerant oversight of rural districts, underscoring the Court's role in a non-settler colony rather than a rigidly formalized judiciary.

Legal Practices and Extraterritorial Elements

In the British leased territory of Weihaiwei, British subjects benefited from extraterritorial jurisdiction, exempting them from Chinese legal authority and subjecting them instead to British common law principles as adapted for the territory. This framework aligned with broader imperial practices in China, where foreign nationals retained privileges under treaties dating to the mid-19th century, ensuring trials occurred under British oversight to avoid perceived deficiencies in local justice systems.

For the Chinese population, comprising the majority of residents, the administration prioritized customary Chinese law in civil disputes to minimize disruption to local norms, with headmen assisting magistrates in adjudication. Criminal matters involving Chinese defendants, however, increasingly incorporated British procedural elements, such as evidence rules and sentencing guidelines from the 1901 Order in Council, though lay magistrates often handled initial hearings without legal representation for defendants. Serious offenses like murder were escalated to the High Court for trial under formalized British procedures, as seen in 1912 when two such domestic cases were adjudicated there, reflecting a hybrid approach that blended evidentiary standards with contextual adaptations for local customs.

Appeals from High Court decisions followed a structured path, typically to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong and ultimately the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, rather than the British Supreme Court (大英按察使司衙門) in Shanghai (上海), which primarily served consular jurisdictions in treaty ports. This separation underscored Weihaiwei's status as a distinct leased territory, not a mere extension of extraterritorial enclaves.

Post-1930 Chinese nationalist critiques, amplified in recovering nationalist narratives, derided the courts as “kangaroo courts” engineered to perpetuate British dominance through biased enforcement favoring colonial interests over equitable justice. Such assessments, drawn from official records and contemporary accounts analyzed in scholarly works, highlight procedural inconsistencies—like the absence of jury trials for most Chinese defendants and reliance on

untranslated local testimonies---but overlook pragmatic outcomes, including sustained territorial stability amid China's broader turmoil from 1898 to 1930, with civil litigation volumes suggesting perceived accessibility rather than outright rejection by locals. Despite these tensions, conviction rates remained low for capital offenses, attributable to evidentiary hurdles under British standards that filtered out weaker prosecutions, fostering a deterrent effect without mass punitive excess.

Economic and Monetary Systems

Postage Stamps and Postal Operations

The initial postal operations in British Weihaiwei commenced shortly after the territory's lease in 1898, with a local courier service operated by Cornabé & Co. (高林洋行) to handle mail dispatch to Chefoo (芝罘) for onward transmission. This service utilized provisional postage stamps, including 2c black on scarlet and 5c black on red values hand-stamped on primitive paper, with handwritten denominations and the firm's chop. Production was limited, with only around 784 examples of certain values recorded. These stamps asserted basic administrative control over communications in the absence of formal infrastructure, though usage ceased by March 1899 upon the opening of a Chinese Imperial Post Office (大清郵政局) under the Imperial Maritime Customs Service (大清皇家海關總稅務司署).

A British post office opened in Weihaiwei---initially at Port Edward and later extending to Liu Kung Island---on or around 1 September 1899, operating in parallel to the Chinese Imperial facility to serve British military, consular, and expatriate needs for international mail. Initially reliant on standard Hong Kong postage stamps, the system transitioned to Hong Kong definitives overprinted "CHINA" starting 1 January 1917, denominations ranging from 1c to \$10 featuring King George V portraits and standard colonial motifs without specific Weihaiwei iconography. These overprints, produced in limited quantities for British agencies in China, functioned as both a postal medium and a symbol of extraterritorial postal sovereignty, bypassing Chinese systems for outbound correspondence while generating modest revenue through low-volume transactions in the sparsely populated territory.

No bespoke postage stamps bearing the Weihaiwei name or local designs were issued during the lease period, distinguishing it from many other British colonies. Instead, the overprinted Hong Kong issues sufficed for the modest demands of a naval station and small administrative hub. Postal services emphasized reliability for official dispatches rather than commercial volume, with mail routed via Hong Kong or Shanghai hubs. Operations concluded on 1 October 1930 with the territory's return to China, after which remaining stocks were withdrawn, contributing to the stamps' scarcity---early courier provisionals command high philatelic value due to their rarity and historical context, often catalogued in excess of £4,000 for unused examples. This limited circulation underscored the territory's role as a strategic enclave rather than a commercial entrepôt, with postal infrastructure reinforcing administrative isolation from broader Chinese networks.

Currency Usage and Limited Trade Developments

The British administration in Weihaiwei refrained from imposing British coinage or establishing a distinct local currency, opting instead for the continued use of traditional Chinese silver taels and Mexican silver dollars, which were prevalent in the region as reliable silver-based

mediums of exchange. Chinese-issued banknotes bearing Weihaiwei overprints also circulated freely, supplemented by the Hong Kong dollar, reflecting a policy of minimal monetary interference to preserve the existing economic fabric without introducing inflationary sterling equivalents.

This approach aligned with broader fiscal restraint, characterized by low land taxes collected through the Chinese Affairs Department and the absence of customs duties, which avoided burdening the agrarian populace and sustained self-sufficiency in a territory lacking major commercial infrastructure. Revenue from such modest levies remained small, underscoring the administration's emphasis on strategic rather than extractive priorities.

Commercial activity stayed subdued, with trade confined to local outputs like gulf fisheries and occasional silk production, directed primarily toward Hong Kong markets rather than expansive export networks. No railroads connected Weihaiwei to the Shantung interior, and port facilities prioritized naval utility over trade facilitation, as articulated by policymakers who deemed large-scale commercialization unfeasible given regional competition from better-endowed nearby ports. This strategic orientation limited economic dynamism, fostering a peasant-based economy insulated from broader disruptions.

Social, Infrastructural, and Cultural Aspects

Infrastructure Improvements and Daily Life

The British administration in Weihaiwei prioritized modest infrastructure enhancements to support its role as a naval base and summer resort, focusing on accessibility and habitability rather than large-scale industrialization. By late 1899, main streets in Port Edward were widened and paved to improve local mobility and accommodate seasonal influxes. Tree-lined avenues were constructed by 1903, utilizing prison labor, while government roads extended connectivity across the territory. A bund and recreational facilities were added to the harbour at Port Edward (formerly Mat'ou 碼頭) by 1903, facilitating pier access for shipping and leisure.

Bungalows and other structures emerged primarily for British use, with about a dozen neat, partly furnished bungalows built at Narcissus Bay and Half Moon Bay to house summer visitors. The Public Health and Buildings Ordinance of 1903 mandated minimum standards for construction, ventilation, and sanitation in new edifices, while shanty dwellings in Port Edward were demolished or repaired by 1902 to enforce order. Building regulations updated in 1917 specified foundations, heights, and setbacks from roads, reflecting a regulatory approach to prevent haphazard growth.

Sanitation and health initiatives emphasized prevention, leveraging Weihaiwei's natural salubrity to contrast with mainland epidemics. The 1903 Public Health and Buildings Ordinance regulated drains, privies, refuse disposal, and sewage, closing unsanitary abattoirs by 1899 and imposing hygiene rules on dairies by 1920. Cholera control under the ordinance allowed for patient isolation in hospitals, while the Quarantine Ordinance of 1903 screened ships against diseases like smallpox, as during the 1911 outbreak response. Rabies measures via the Dogs Ordinance of 1904 required licensing and, by 1922, muzzling in urban areas. These steps contributed to low incidence rates, with empirical records showing no major cholera outbreaks locally amid regional threats.

Daily life for the Chinese majority remained agrarian and unaltered by British oversight, centered on fishing and farming with minimal economic disruption. British presence was transient,

peaking at hundreds annually—such as 580 adults and 76 children from May to September 1921--- who resided in facilities like the 80-room Queen’s Hotel, engaging in sea bathing, golf, and tennis via licensed rickshaws and ferries. Local routines persisted under light administration, with infrastructure serving dual purposes of utility for residents and appeal for visitors.

British Expatriate Presence and Chinese Interactions

The British expatriate presence in Weihaiwei consisted of a small elite group, numbering fewer than a dozen Europeans at any given time, primarily comprising administrative officials, a handful of merchants, and missionaries. These individuals were concentrated in Port Edward on the mainland and Liu Kung Island, with no evidence of mass settlement or significant civilian immigration; the territory functioned more as a naval and administrative outpost than a colonial settlement attracting large-scale British migration. Officials, including the Commissioner, financial assistants, police inspectors, and medical officers, handled governance from Government House, while merchants engaged in limited trade supported by local Chinese clerks and servants, and missionaries operated small schools enrolling only dozens of children in basic subjects like geography and arithmetic.

Interactions between British expatriates and the local Chinese population of approximately 150,000 were characterized by cooperative administration rather than coercion, with British magistrates adjudicating disputes in the Mandarin dialect using Chinese law, customs, and Confucian principles as outlined in the Order-in-Council, thereby respecting traditional norms and minimizing cultural imposition.

Local headmen retained confirmed roles in village governance, collaborating on matters such as public works, trade facilitation, and rescue operations for shipwrecked junks, as exemplified by the recognition of headman Ch’ê Shuo-Hsüeh (車碩學) for lifesaving efforts. Villagers sought employment under British oversight and accessed courts for accessible, low-cost resolution of family, property, and inheritance cases---such as adoption disputes or feng-shui-related graveyard conflicts---often preferring this system for its perceived fairness and lack of corruption compared to broader Chinese provincial practices.

Positive local perceptions stemmed from policies like light taxation aligned with pre-lease levels, effective dispute mediation that preserved social order without undermining Confucian hierarchies, and practical benefits including vaccination drives and enhanced coastal safety, which drew Chinese junks to Weihaiwei shores voluntarily. While some villagers expressed concerns over potential over-litigation encouraged by cheap access to courts or fears of land dispossession, overt resistance was absent, and the administration’s non-interference in ancestral rites or daily customs fostered acquiescence, viewed as an extension of tacit Chinese governmental approval rather than foreign domination.

Cultural exchanges remained limited, with British officials learning local dialects for judicial purposes and missionaries introducing Western education without proselytizing aggressively, though their influence did not extend beyond small-scale schooling. Intermarriages were rare across British communities in China, with no documented prevalence in Weihaiwei.

Legacy and Historical Evaluations

Strategic and Administrative Impacts

The acquisition of Weihaiwei in 1898 served as a direct geopolitical counterweight to Russian expansion in northern China, particularly following Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and their growing influence in the Bohai Gulf, thereby safeguarding British interests in the approaches to Beijing and preventing potential Russian naval dominance in the region. Although initial plans envisioned Port Edward as a fortified naval base rivaling Port Arthur, a Royal Engineers survey in 1899 concluded the site was unsuitable for major development due to silting and logistical challenges, leading to limited utilization primarily as a seasonal anchorage for the Royal Navy's China Station rather than a permanent operational hub. This underutilization did not diminish its symbolic efficacy, as the British presence alone maintained a balance of power amid the "scramble for concessions" and deterred further Russian encroachment without escalating to conflict.

Administratively, Weihaiwei exemplified a model of economical governance, with civilian commissioners overseeing a territory of approximately 288 square miles through indirect rule via local Chinese headmen, minimizing British staffing to under 50 personnel and sustaining public order in an era of Chinese dynastic collapse and revolutionary unrest at an annual civil expenditure often below £10,000 by the early 1900s. Naval-related costs added modestly---for instance, £25,500 in 1898-99 for depot establishment---but overall operations avoided heavy infrastructure investment, reflecting a pragmatic approach that prioritized stability over exploitation and influenced British policy toward other leased territories by demonstrating the feasibility of low-overhead imperial footholds. This fiscal restraint, necessitated partly by the Boer War's demands, ensured the enclave's viability as a strategic asset without straining metropolitan resources, thereby extending British leverage in East Asia through presence rather than projection.


Achievements, Criticisms, and Modern Perspectives


The British administration of Weihaiwei maintained administrative stability over 32 years (1898-1930), a period encompassing major upheavals in China such as the Boxer Rebellion (1900), the Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命) (1911), and the warlord fragmentation of the 1910s-1920s, during which large swathes of the mainland experienced famine, banditry, and governance collapse. With only a small British staff---typically under 20 officials---and no standing army after 1906, the territory avoided such disruptions through a policy of indirect rule, deferring to Chinese magistrates for local disputes while enforcing basic order via naval presence from the adjacent base. This approach minimized fiscal burden on Britain, costing an average of £20,000 annually, and preserved social continuity for the approximately 150,000 Chinese residents, who retained land ownership and customary law absent overt exploitation.

Infrastructure achievements included targeted investments in urban planning, yielding improved roads connecting Port Edward (the administrative center) to rural districts, harbour dredging for coaling stations, and construction of European-style bungalows and administrative offices that served as summer retreats for officials from hotter treaty ports. These developments, though modest compared to concessions like Hong Kong, enhanced local sanitation and connectivity, laying foundations for Weihai's later emergence as a modern port.

Critics, particularly in Chinese historiography influenced by post-1949 narratives, decry the 1898 Lease Convention---extracted amid Imperial Ch'ing weakness post-Sino-Japanese War---as a quintessential unequal treaty emblematic of “semi-colonialism”, eroding sovereignty by granting Britain perpetual naval rights and extraterritorial jurisdiction without equivalent reciprocity or local economic uplift. Some Western analysts echo this by portraying the venture as irrational imperialism, arguing administrative underinvestment---eschewing railways or large-scale trade promotion---stifled development potential, rendering Weihaiwei a strategic white elephant sustained more by geopolitical posturing than viable governance.

In contemporary China, British-era vestiges like preserved European-style villas and the former commissioner’s residence in Weihai attract tourists as historical curiosities, integrated into sites such as the Weihai Museum (威海市博物館) and Liugong Island exhibits, where they symbolize a bygone foreign presence amid narratives of national resilience. Official People’s Republic of China (中華人民共和國) framing emphasizes the Lease as an imperialist intrusion rectified by 1930 repatriation, yet local tourism promotion acknowledges infrastructural echoes contributing to Weihai’s status as a coastal hub. Western evaluations, drawing on archival records, often recast it as a model of restrained colonialism---efficiently providing stability at low cost without the extractive excesses of other enclaves---contrasting biased academic tendencies to overemphasize victimhood over causal factors like Ch'ing Empire incapacity and the Lease’s mutual strategic utility against Russo-Japanese threats.






1898-1930 年—英國領地威海衛專員府第。
1898-1930 – Government House of the British Weihaiwei.



1898-1940 年，威海衛劉公島上的英國皇家海軍步槍靶場。
The British Royal Navy rifle range on Liu Kung Island, Weihaiwei, 1898-1940.




1898-1930 年—英國領地威海衛愛德華港外灘
 1898-1930 -- The Bund, Port Edward, British Weihaiwei



香港郵票自 1862 年起在英國領地威海衛使用，但 1917 年 1 月 1 日後，郵票上加蓋了「中國」字樣。此後，劉公島郵局和愛德華港郵局繼續使用該郵票，直至 1930 年 10 月 1 日威海衛歸還中華民國。

Postage stamps of Hong Kong were used in the British Weihaiwei from 1862 onward,
 but after 1 January 1917 the stamps were overprinted "CHINA".


It was continued in use in both Liu Kung Island Post Office and Port Edward Office
 until Weihaiwei was restored to Republic of China on 1 October 1930.



山東省威海市，海濱路，三角花園，「收回威海衛紀念塔」巍然聳立。漢白玉塔身上，鑲金的魏碑體銘文左側，題寫人的款識赫然在目 -- 「王正廷」。王正廷博士是收回威海衛的全權代表，題寫了《收回威海衛紀念塔》。威海人民把他的大名銘刻於塔上，以示紀念。

In Weihai City, Shandong Province, on Haibin Road, in the Triangle Garden, stands the [Memorial Tower for the Recapture of Weihaiwei]. On the white marble tower, the inscription in gilded stele script on the left side clearly shows the inscription's name [Chengting Wang]. Dr. Chengting Wang, the plenipotentiary representative for the recapture of Weihaiwei, inscribed the 《Memorial Tower for the Recapture of Weihaiwei》. The people of Weihai engraved his name on the tower in commemoration.

王正廷博士從大英帝國收回威海衛主權



王正廷博士(Dr. Chengting Thomas Wang, *HonLLD (Peking)*, *HonLLD (St. John's)*, BA (Yale), *aka Chengting T. Wang; C. T. Wang*) (1882年9月7日—1961年5月21日)，1920年8月20日參加上海扶輪社(Rotary Club of Shanghai)為現職社員。擔任中華民國外交部長，於1930年10月1日成功談判並簽署了恢復威海衛主權的協議，結束了大英帝國長達32年的殖民租約。

外交里程碑

- 全權代表：

1930年4月18日，外交部長王正廷與英國公使藍普森爵士(Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson)在南京簽署《中英交收威海衛專約及英國租借劉公島協定》(Convention between His Majesty and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China for the Rendition of Weihaiwei and Agreement regarding certain Facilities for His Majesty's Navy after Rendition)。(中文文本參見第25-30頁，英文文本參見第2-7頁)

- 恢復主權：

該協議推翻了1898年的租約，將中國大陸的完全領土主權歸還給中華民國。

- 交接：

1930年10月1日，最後一位英國專員莊士敦爵士(Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston)正式將行政權力移交給中華民國政府。

- 特別行政區地位：

中華民國政府收回威海衛大部分土地後，指定為中央政府直接管轄的特別行政區。唯劉公島仍然為大英帝國海軍續租十年，直至1940年10月1日撤退。

歷史遺產

- 革命外交：

這場勝利是王正廷博士更廣泛的民族主義政策的一部分，該政策旨在系統性地廢除不平等條約，並收復失去的關稅自主權和領土。

- 紀念塔：

為慶祝這一成就，在山東威海建立了王正廷博士親筆題寫的《收回威海衛紀念塔》。



341.73



白皮書第十七號

中英交收威海衛專約及協定

中華民國十九年四月十八日簽訂於南京同年十月一日互換批准於南京

中華民國國民政府外交部編印



264209

中英交收威海衛專約及協定

中英交收威海衛專約

大中華民國與愛爾蘭暨大英國海外各屬地兼印度大皇帝因欲使一千八百九十八年七月一日中國租與英國之威海衛地域主權完全交還中國，爰決定締結一交收威海衛專約，爲此特派全權：

大中華民國國民政府主席特派

大中華民國外交部部長王正廷爲全權代表；

大不列顛與愛爾蘭暨大英國海外各屬地兼印度大皇帝爲

大不列顛及北愛爾蘭特派

大英國欽命駐華全權公使藍普森爲全權代表。

兩全權代表各將所奉文據互相校閱，均屬妥善，議定條款如左：

第一條 英國茲將威海衛地域，即一八九九年至一九〇一年劃界委員會所立界石內，所有威海衛全灣沿岸十英里地方，及劉

上海圖書館藏書



A541 212 0012 78388



公島與威海衛灣內之羣島交還中華民國。

第二條 一千八百九十八年七月一日所訂租借威海衛專條即行取消。

第三條 所有英國在威海衛及劉公島兩處駐兵，應自本專約發生效力之日起一個月內一律撤退。

第四條 英國政府允將英國威海衛行政公署所有之一切檔案登記簿契約及其他文卷等項，凡為接收及與中國政府將來管理威海衛有關者，須一律移交中華民國國民政府。

第五條 英國政府允將其在威海衛區內所有官產地畝並房屋，贈與中華民國國民政府。

第六條 英國政府允將關於德勝碼頭及塢口改良計畫所征專款項下經營之各種工作及所購物品，包括小輪「加利亞」全數，無償移交中華民國國民政府。

第七條 英國政府允將烟台威海衛間海綫及所存儲公有物品，包括第一附件內所開各項，一律贈與中華民國國民政府。

第八條 英國政府允將愛德華埠及溫泉湯兩處民醫院，包括土地房屋及其設備器具，無償移交中華民國國民政府。

第九條 英國政府允將劉公島上中國政府原有官產地畝及地上房屋暨英政府後購之地畝，交還中國政府。並將租出地畝之租契及租地上將來期滿應收歸官有房屋之產業權利，一併移交中華民國國民政府。

第十條 本專約所開移交威海衛地域之行政權及該地域之公產，並其他應行移交等件，應於本專約發生效力之日實行。

第十一條 中華民國國民政府於接收威海衛地域之行政後，當在可能範圍內，維持現行規章內包括地產房屋稅則、衛生及建築章程及警政等項。

第十二條 所有威海衛英公署按照一九一九年第六號威海衛荒地章程發給華人地主法定格式之各項地契買賣典押字據及執照，如非與中國法令抵觸，必須修改或加給新契者，應照契據內所載條件認為與在英國管理期內同一有效。

第十三條 凡從前威海衛英公署所發給外人依照法定格式之地畝契據，應換給中國永租契據，其格式與中國官廳新近發給前鎮江英租界外人地主之契據相同，每畝應納登記費一元。

凡從前威海衛英公署所發給之租契，中華民國國民政府認為有效。

如中華民國國民政府決定關閉威海衛口岸，不准外人居住通商，以便完全作為海軍根據地時，中國政府允以中英兩國政府同意之公平價格償付外人業主及租戶，收回其產業利益，此項價格，應由兩國政府派員組織一聯合委員會逐件議定之。

第十四條 中華民國國民政府允維持現行公益事務，其辦事人員由中國政府自擇，尤須注意於威海衛陸地上電話及其與劉公

島電話之交通並威海衛陸地與劉公島及烟台間電報之交通。

第十五條 所有威海衛英國高等法院或地方法院在收回前判決之案件，於收回後應認為與中國各法院自行判決者有同樣效力。

第十六條 中華民國國民政府在決定將威海衛口岸關閉，並完全保留作為海軍根據地以前，將維持該口岸為國際通商居住區域。該區域包括現在所有外國業主及租戶所在地在內。

第十七條 在中國地方自治制度未經制定通行之前，中國地方官廳凡關於市政事件與居住威海衛外僑之幸福及利益有直接關係者，將徵求該外國僑民之意見。

第十八條 中華民國國民政府在決定將威海衛口岸關閉，並完全保留作為海軍根據地以前，當將該區域內房地數處如第二附件所列舉，無償租與英國政府，為英國領事館及居留民公益之用；以三十年為期，期滿後仍得續租。

第十九條 所有現存航海各項設備如燈塔浮標風雨信號等，均無償移交中華民國國民政府，將來由中國相當機關維持，該機關管理港務，須與中國各通商口岸同樣辦理。

第二十條 本專約應行批准。其批准文件應於民國十九年十月一日，即西歷一九三〇年十月一日，或在該日前，在南京互換。

本專約自互換批准文件日起發生效力

本專約(繕寫兩份)由兩國全權畫押蓋印,以昭信守。

大中華民國十九年四月十八日訂於南京
西歷一九三〇年四月十八日

附件一

應行交還中國政府之儲藏品包括下列物件:

公所及住所中器具之一部,

電報綫(島及大陸),

亞歷山大小輪一艘及小船二艘,

街道上之電桿及路燈及英國威海衛行政公署關於路燈之儲藏品,

王正廷

(簽印)

藍普森

(簽印)

山東省威海市，海濱路，三角花園，「收回威海衛紀念塔」巍然聳立。漢白玉塔身上，鑲金的魏碑體銘文左側，題寫人的款識赫然在目——「王正廷」。威海衛為大英帝國於1898年在大清帝國山東省建立的租借地，威海衛的發展模式不同於割讓地香港。英國佔據此地的主要目的，是制衡俄羅斯帝國佔領關東州（旅順口、大連地區）的影響；此地主要用作英國皇家海軍訓練基地及休養地。1930年10月1日，中華民國政府收回威海衛大部分土地。唯劉公島仍然為大英帝國海軍續租十年，直至1940年10月1日撤退。王正廷博士是收回威海衛的全權代表。

王正廷博士，原名正庭，字儒堂，號子白，浙江奉化人。中國國民黨中央執行委員、中華民國政治家、外交官、銀行家、保險商、體育活動家，中華全國體育協進會的創始人之一。1922年至1957年間，王正廷代表中華民國出任國際奧林匹克委員會(International Olympic Committee)委員總計35年。因其對中國體育事業的貢獻，被譽為「中華奧運之父」。王正廷擔任過的職務還有中國大學校長、中華民國紅十字會總會會長、基督教青年會第一位中國籍總幹事、馮玉祥的鐵路督辦、鄭州市長、香港太平洋保險公司董事長等。

王正廷也是一位傑出的扶輪領袖，於1920年8月20日首次加入上海扶輪社(Shanghai Rotary Club)為現職社員。1935年10月1日至1936年7月31日任國際扶輪第81地區總監(地理區域包括中華民國、英國殖民地香港、美國屬土菲律賓群島)；1942年至1946年間任國際扶輪資政並同時擔任重慶扶輪社(Chungking Rotary Club)1945-1946年度社長；1944年至1946年任國際扶輪理事；1945-1946年度任國際扶輪第二副社長；1946-1947年度任第96-97-98地區總監。1950年移居香港，加入香港扶輪社(Hong Kong Rotary Club)，直到1961年他生命最後的一天。



民國時期的外交重臣

中華民國初年，各派政治勢力紛爭不已。風雲際會中的王正廷施展才幹，屢屢在各個政府中擔負外交重任。先後在武漢黎元洪軍政府、孫中山為首的廣州軍政府、以黎元洪為大總統和以曹錕為大總統的北洋政府、段祺瑞執政府，以及蔣中正南京國民政府等等擔任外交總長或部長；多次被任命為擔負專項外交重責的代表、督辦、專員，影響最大的是在1919年1月「巴黎和會」(Paris Peace Conference)上擔任中國代表。還做過處理山東問題的魯案善後督辦；處理蘇聯(蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)宣佈廢除沙俄不平等條約問題的中蘇交涉全權代表；處理上海「五卅」事件善後問題的滬案特派委員；處理收回關稅自主權問題的關稅特別會議全權代表，等等。

王正廷的外交職務，進退頻繁，短的不滿月。反映了他在那時風雲變幻的政壇上，並無根深蒂固的軍閥或者財團背景，遇風吹草動就或免或辭，掛冠而去；同時，也說明他的才幹為各方所共識，都想用他為己方的外交工作效力。在這樣複雜的環境中，他以自己的作為，在民國外交史上寫下了帶有濃厚王氏色彩的篇章。

最著口碑的，是他在巴黎和會上的奮爭。1918年第一次世界大戰結束後，戰勝國在巴黎開和會，王正廷是中國代表之一。他與顧維鈞配合默契，力爭收回戰敗的德國在中國青島和膠濟鐵路的權益，把侵佔山東並妄圖合法化的日本人駁斥得理屈詞窮。當列強在和約上犧牲中國遷就日本，北洋政府屈膝俯允電令簽字時，王正廷堅定表示「不簽字」！在爭議紛紜的代表團中，率先亮出定錘音。又不顧禁令將情況電告國內，爭取輿論支持。在全國人民的齊聲反對下，意欲簽字者不敢「遺臭萬年」，中國代表正式拒簽。後人認為，這一舉動，使人們開始認識王正廷的外交才能，也開始了他真正的外交生涯。

也借著不簽字而使山東問題成為懸案的歷史機遇，他後來任魯案善後督辦，從日本人手裡收回了膠濟鐵路和青島主權，解決了山東問題。多年後他跟親友說，巴黎拒簽是他一生中「最為得意的事情」。為此，中華民國大總統向他頒授了一級大綬寶光勳章。

開展「革命外交」

1925 年底離開北洋政府後，王正廷撰文《近二十五年中國之外交》，對清末民初的中國外交和自己從事的外交工作進行了反思。他認為，「滿清之亡，實亡於外交」；「民國以來，我國歷次內訌，何一非帝國主義者在後煽動」；「中國內亂一日不止，既彼等之權利一日不窮」；「至廢除不平等條約問題，竊以為關稅自主，最為我國起死回生之劑。若收回租界租借地，撤銷領事裁判權等等，亦易為力」。這些觀念，成為他開展「革命外交」的基本思路。

1928 年 6 月出任南京國民政府外交部長後，王正廷循著這些思路，與各國開展實行關稅自主、取消「治外法權」、收回租界和租借地的談判交涉。經過努力，先後與美國、挪威、德國、比利時、義大利、丹麥、葡萄牙、荷蘭、瑞典、法國、英國、西班牙及日本等，簽訂了新的關稅或通商條約；取消外國人對中國關稅的把持，實行關稅自主。1929 年 12 月，南京政府宣佈取消所有國家在華的領事裁判權。同時，收回了天津的比利時租界、鎮江和廈門的英國租界、威海衛的英國租借地。

王正廷在南京政府任外長 3 年，應該說，這 3 年，是他在外交領域成就最大的 3 年，也是他為中華民族貢獻最大的 3 年。這些成就和貢獻，奠定了他被譽為民國著名外交家的歷史地位。正如臺灣學者描述的那樣，「王正廷所代表的溫和型『革命外交』的精神與實踐，是有一份不可磨滅的貢獻的」。

由於歷史局限，王正廷推行的「革命外交」步履艱難。此中原因他也清楚，在「國家多故，國本未甯，致外人觀我者，不復生敬畏之心」的國際環境中，外交的根本在於國力而非一己才華。所以，少不得有一些以妥協換退讓的舉動，少不得在說出堅定的語言時使用和緩的語氣，於「革命的鐵拳之外裹上一層橡皮」。而這些做法，很多人不以為然。

王正廷熟悉歐美，卻對日本侵華野心缺乏足夠警惕。1931 年「九一八」事變爆發時，國民政府奉行不抵抗政策。南京的學生認為是外交懦弱，闖進外交部當面質問，王正廷無言以對。憤怒的學生一氣之下，把部長室裡正襟危坐的他打得頭破血流。這頓毆打讓他官儀盡失，臉面無存，鬱悶地辭職下臺，成了他「最倒楣的事情」。蔣中正知道這是給自己做了替罪羊，幾年後讓他去華盛頓當駐美國大使，聊作補償。回國後，他就離開外交領域，也離開了民國的政治核心圈。

收回威海衛的全權代表

1898 年，英國人以保持均勢抵制沙俄為由，強向大清國租借威海衛。與清廷簽約的租期是「按照俄國駐守旅順之期相同」，將威海衛及附近水面和全灣沿岸 10 英里以內，東起大嵐山、西至馬山嘴、南至草廟子以內，不包括威海衛城的 738.15 平方公里的區域租給英國，租期與俄國租借旅大期限相同，為 25 年。8 月，英國海軍將領鐸沃德(Arthur Robert Ford Dorward)帶領軍隊占領威海衛，清政府山東候補道嚴道洪等人 and 英國代表在劉公島西海岸舉行了交接威海衛儀式。從此，英國軍隊正式駐

繫於威海衛港。1904年，日本人打跑俄國人，在旅順取而代之。清廷提出俄國人走了，你英國人該把威海衛還我了。可英國人說旅順還在外國人手裡，賴著不交。

中華民國成立後，特別是巴黎和會之後，中國強烈要求廢除列強在中國的不平等條約，收回威海衛。迫於形勢，英國人不得不同意交還，但卻提出了種種苛刻條件，試圖最大化地保持自己的既得利益。北洋政府派梁如浩為代表和英國人屢屢談判，議成草約因對英人讓步過多，被全國人民斥為賣國而廢。1924年，顧維鈞當外交總長時，再和英國人談判。折衝樽俎，幾番周折，總算談得差不多了。正待雙方簽字後付諸踐約，政局發生動盪。北京政權更迭，此事又耽誤下來。這時，早已超過了25年。

王正廷當南京政府外交部長時，把收回威海衛作為其「革命外交」鏈條上的一環。1929年1月9日，任外長剛半年的王正廷就約見英國駐華公使藍普森爵士(Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson)，提出收回威海衛。24日，又在南京電臺的廣播演講中，重提此事。中國鄭重其事，英方也不得不當回事，開始內部協商，籌備相關事宜。3月1日，王正廷通知英方，要求就此開始談判。5月20日，他和藍普森在南京舉行第一次談判，以後的6月2日、21日、22日、28日，又進行了4次會談。他明確提出要進一步修改1924年談判的條約，無條件收回包括劉公島在內的整個威海衛，並於當年秋天辦理交接。英國人並不想無條件退出，堅持要保留在威海衛特權，保留劉公島為其海軍基地，導致談判破裂，當年未能收回。下半年，蔣中正、馮玉祥、閻錫山之間的矛盾激化，軍閥混戰一觸即發。

南京政府處於危機之中，急於收回威海衛以壯門面。英國人與蔣中正利益相關，也不願看到他下臺。於是在王、藍首次相談整整一年後，又在1930年1月11日重開談判，王正廷為議訂收回威海衛租借地全權代表。在英國人略作讓步後，王正廷同意他們續租劉公島10年。王正廷還提議將協議分成兩塊，收回威海衛搞個正式的《中英交收威海衛專約》，與當年的《租威海衛專條》相對應，續租劉公島另搞個無名無姓的《協議》。2月14日，雙方交換草約。4月18日，王正廷與藍普森正式簽字，收回威海衛的談判總算在中方的妥協中告成。

10月1日上午9時，中華民國外交部長王正廷和英國駐華公使代辦許立德在南京薩家灣外交官舍分別代表本國政府互換了《中英交收威海衛專約及協定》及附件的批准書，條約正式生效。同日，外交部副部長王家楨、徐祖善等率領海軍陸戰隊官兵300人，由青島乘「海琛」、「鎮海」兩艦抵達威海衛登岸。英艦「彼得斯菲爾特號」(HMS Petersfield)鳴禮炮15響，以示歡迎。當日上午10時50分，接收典禮在英國威海衛行政長官署大院舉行。下午2時，舉行威海衛管理公署專員就職典禮，正式宣布威海衛地方行政機構——威海衛管理公署的建立。嗣後，威海衛管理公署會同山東省政府重新勘定邊界，將英租界界石改刻「威海衛界」和「中華民國十九年十月一日立」等字樣。

1931年10月1日，威海衛管理公署在市區三角花園修建「收回威海衛紀念塔」，塔高32英尺，象徵牢記威海衛32年的被殖民史。塔上部鐫刻著外交部長王正廷書寫的「收回威海衛紀念塔」八個鎔金大字；塔下部三面分別鐫刻碑文、《中英交收威海衛專約》、《三民主義》。儘管留下了英國續租劉公島10年的尾巴，但畢竟是在王正廷的手上完成了談判和收回程式，其功其勳自不可沒。威海衛管理公署第一任專員徐祖善曾對他說：「威海衛收回為我公一手造成，……全威20萬民眾同深感戴。」

南京国民政府收回 威海卫的谈判及其实现

刘本森

内容提要 随着英国对华政策的调整,南京国民政府成为英国对华外交的重点。当国民政府成为一个能够有效控制山东的权威政府时,英国与南京国民政府就威海卫交还展开交涉。南京国民政府代表王正廷与英国驻华大使蓝普森以1924年交收威海卫草案为蓝本进行多次谈判,最终于1930年10月1日成功收回威海卫。

关键词 南京国民政府 英国 威海卫 王正廷 蓝普森

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1898年英国租占威海卫,“租期与俄租旅大相同”。此后,清政府和北洋政府先后与英国政府就收回威海卫一事展开交涉,但未能如愿收回。直到1929年,南京国民政府代表与英国政府代表就威海卫归还展开谈判,并最终于1930年10月1日将收回威海卫。对于此次谈判的经过和交收的过程,学界已有朱世全、帕梅拉·艾特威尔、李恩涵等人做出研究,各项研究的特点如下:朱世全的成果侧重于对《中英交收威海卫专约》的内容以及筹收情形的介绍和分析,重中方资料的存留^[1];帕梅拉·艾特威尔(Pamela Atwell)的著作侧重介绍威海卫地方政府的行动以及对威海卫及其周边形势的分析^[2];李恩涵的研究则侧重对中英双方代表谈判交涉过程的描述^[3]。另外,参与威海卫交收的国民政府代表徐祖善、王家桢二人,分别有短文记录他们参加交收威海卫时的经历和见闻^[4]。

以上成果已经较为全面地勾勒出中英交涉威海卫问题的经过,然均未注意英国对华政策的改变与将威海卫归还给国民政府之间的关系,对中英两国政府在此次谈判中的考虑和特点也交代得不很清楚。本文拟就以上问题尝试做出解答。

[1]朱世全:《威海问题》,〔上海〕商务印书馆1931年版,第56-70页。

[2]Pamela Atwell, *British mandarins and Chinese reformers: the British administration of Weihaiwei (1898-1930) and the territory's return to Chinese rule*, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp.156-172.

[3]李恩涵:《中英交收威海卫租借地的交涉(1921-1930)》,〔台北〕《中央研究院近代史研究所集刊》1992年第21期,第187-196页。

[4]徐祖善:《中英交收威海卫之经过及礼节》,威海市政协科教文史委员会编:《英国租占威海卫三十二年(威海文史资料第10辑)》,1998年,内部印刷,第186-189页。王家桢:《收回威海卫英租地历见记》,同书,第190-192页。

一、英国对华新政策

一战之后,英国的实力下降,对维护其庞大的海外殖民利益已经感到力不从心,并担心世界范围内的各种摩擦或战争“会使英国的商业和金融利益遭受损失”^[1],因此将“维持势力均衡和保持现状”作为其外交行动的“指导原则”^[2]。具体到中国问题上,英国把“保持稳定和华盛顿会议确定的现状,维持并发展在华利益作为主要目标”^[3]。面对列强在华新形势和中国的政治局面,英国适时调整了对华政策^[4]。

国民革命兴起后,华南地区强大的排外运动使得英国的利益受到沉重打击。因此,英国采取了继续支持北洋政府、镇压南方民众运动的政策。1925年五六月份,“五卅惨案”、“沙基惨案”相继发生,香港、广州的工人掀起省港大罢工。英国成为中国人民最主要的斗争对象,受到的打击也最大。“1925年(英国)的对华贸易额比1924年减少21%,香港对大陆的贸易额减少近23%;同期英国和香港对华贸易商品价值合计损失32%。”^[5]在这种情况下,适时调整政策、保护在华利益成为英国对华外交的当务之急。1925年8月,英国外交部拒绝了中协会武装封锁广州的建议。1926年初,英国外交部提出了应对中国革命的五种方案供驻华官员讨论:使用武力、封锁、援助反共势力、向莫斯科施加压力、怀柔。参与讨论者认为:“除了最后一种,别的都非常危险或者困难”,只有“最后一项怀柔似乎是可实践并富有建设性的”^[6]。用驻华公使麻克类(Ronald Macleay)的话说则是:“我们最聪明的方针是就此袖手,静观其发展,以期中国即将来临的事件导致广州的布尔什维克势力削弱,更温和的党派在那里占优势。”^[7]

1926年1月到7月,英国政府再次调整对华外交政策,由静观变为与广州国民政府进行外交接触。英国认为“实现解决排货必须是我国政策的首要目标”^[8],所以就罢工与抵货运动与广州政府展开谈判。同时,英国“避免卷入大规模地干涉中国事务,尽可能实行忍耐与怀柔政策”,拒绝了吴佩孚、孙传芳的求援^[9]。英国还撤换了主张支持北方的公使麻克类,改派蓝普森(Sir Miles Lampson)担任驻华公使。这表明英国此时已将国民政府的外交作为对华外交的重点。

1926年12月1日,英国内阁批准了《英国对华政策备忘录》,并于12月26日正式公布。因为圣诞节刚过,所以这被称为“圣诞节备忘录”。备忘录做出了“保护中国之完整独立,增进中国政治、经济之发展,修复中国之财政”、承认“广州有一强健国民政府”、“中国内争期间”坚持“不干涉之政策”等声明^[10]。这一声明意在树立对国民政府的友好形象。该备忘录标志着英国“第一次尝试着找到一项

[1] Anne Order, *Great Britain and International Security, 1920-1926*, London, 1978, p.1.

[2] John Robert C. Ferris, *The Evolution of British Strategy Policy, 1919-1926*, Macmillan, 1989, p.43.

[3] 王蓉霞:《英国和日本在中国(1925-1931)》,首都师范大学博士论文,2001年,第74页。

[4] 国外学者的研究可参见 Edmund S. K. Fung 的 *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: British South China Policy, 1924-1931* (New York, 1991) 以及 W. R. Louis 的 *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939* (Oxford, 1971); 国内学者中,牛大勇先后发表《英国的两手政策与省港罢工之收束》(《北京大学学报》1991年第2期)、《英国对华政策与国民革命的危机》(《历史研究》1991年第4期)、《国民革命时期影响列强对华政策的若干因素》(《北京大学学报》1992年第3期)等文章,讨论这一时期的英国及列强对华政策及其转变。

[5][8] 牛大勇:《英国的两手政策与省港罢工之收束》,《北京大学学报》1991年第2期。

[6] W. R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, pp.129-130.

[7] Macleay to Chamberlain, 30 Jan. 1930, FO371/11621.

[9] FO405/252A, pp.249-250, 转引自李新主编:《中华民国史》(第六卷),[北京]中华书局2011年版,第258页。

[10] 复旦大学历史系中国近代史教研组编:《中国近代对外关系史资料选辑(1840-1949)》,下卷第一分册,上海人民出版社1977年版,第111-117页。

政策,它代替了无目的且对现状放任自流的政策”^[1]。在这一政策之下,英国的对华外交更显温和。1927年1月初,汉口、九江群众冲击英租界,英方不放一枪,撤出租界。

3月24日,“南京事件”发生,英国代表台克满就此与武汉政府陈友仁交涉。不久后,蒋介石发动了“四一二”政变,宁汉分裂,随后蒋介石迅速站稳脚跟。英国认识到“汉口国民政府已丧失统治地位,现仅徒有其名”^[2],新任驻汉口代表牛顿(B. C. Newton)随即离开汉口^[3]。随后,蒋介石通过司法部长王宠惠在上海与英国驻华公使蓝普森进行非正式接触,商讨解决“宁案”。8月9日,双方达成协议,互换照会。1928年6月15日,南京国民政府外交部长王正廷发表对外宣言,宣称重新订约,并要求各国正式承认。在美国最先承认国民政府之后,12月20日,中英关税条约签订,同日英国承认南京国民政府。

二、中英交收威海卫谈判

1924年,英国政府与北洋政府达成归还威海卫的协议,然而由于10月冯玉祥发动政变,协议搁置。随后英国表示,“威海卫只能归还给一个拥有权威的、能够保证条约内特殊条款落实的政府。只有等到这样的政府出现之后,才会把威海卫归还中国”^[4]。此后,英国一直没有找到“足以谈判的政府”,未能归还威海卫^[5]。

南京国民政府成立后,1929年1月9日,外交部长王正廷在与英国公使蓝普森会晤时提及愿意就交收威海卫展开谈判,24日又在南京广播电台的广播中提及威海卫问题^[6]。此时,威海卫在反帝热潮下也处于混乱和动荡的包围之中,逐渐成为英国的负担,英国在此获利很少,却要负责其管理和安全,所以也想早日交收。威海卫行政长官庄士敦建议尽快谈判交接^[7]。英国政府各部门也表示了赞同归还的意见^[8]。据此,蓝普森形成了与王正廷谈判的基本原则:以1924年的《专约草案》为谈判的基础,尤其重视两项权利,第一续租刘公岛设施问题,第二英国威海卫行政公署发给外国人的土地产权证应换持中国30年租契,期满可续租^[9]。

1929年3月1日,英国驻南京总领事牛顿接到王正廷的通知,称要与蓝普森谈判交收威海卫问题。牛顿致信蓝普森转达了王正廷的意见:1.原来规定停泊权首先留给中国,其次由英国船只使用。中国认为他们有权让所有外国船只撤出,以支持中国的海军。2.留给英国使用的建筑太多。牛顿还提及,“王正廷很显然不想提之前(指1924年)那份草案,不仅因为那份草案需要修订,更因为那是北洋政府进行的谈判”^[10]。对此,英国外交大臣表示:“一旦民国政府能够有效控制山东,表明他们有权

[1]Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: British South China Policy, 1924–1931*, New York, 1991, p.265.

[2]W. R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939*, pp.133–134.

[3]《汉口民国日报》,1927年5月20日。

[4]Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. O' Malley, 29 Nov. 1926, Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part 2, Series E, Volume 31*, p.287.此后缩写为B DFA.

[5]Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 13 Dec. 1928, Enclosure 1 Johnston to Amery, 14 Sep. 1928, FO228/6859, No.374/10.

[6]Commissioner to Minister, 3 Feb. 1929, FO228/4033.

[7]Commissioner to Sir M. Lampson, 1 Feb. 1929, Commissioner to Minister, 7 Feb. 1929, FO228/4033.

[8]Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 31 Jan. 1929, FO228/584. War Office to Foreign Office, 16 Mar. 1929, FO228/4033. Foreign Office to Sir M. Lampson, 12 Jan. 1929, FO228/4033.

[9]Sir M. Lampson to Commissioner, 3 May 1929, FO228/6859.

[10]Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 Mar. 1929, B DFA, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, pp.173–174.

接收威海卫,英国政府将以双方都最能接受的态度修改1924年草案”,同时强调谈判必须以1924年草案为基础,必须要考虑到租借地内的军事使用,在确定归还实际日期的同时应该尽可能少地给到威海卫疗养制造麻烦^[1],并催促蓝普森“尽快行动”^[2]。

蓝普森遂于5月20日和王正廷在上海展开非正式谈判。王正廷表示他并不反对,但不能“完全接受”以1924年的草案为重启谈判的蓝本。蓝普森则称,如果决定签署1924年草案,至时停泊权和英人使用建筑数量的问题都可以提出^[3]。双方就中国政府多大程度上承认1924年草案展开讨论。王正廷认为草案只是一份建议,中国政府并未签署,然而蓝普森认为1924年不仅顾维钧接受了这一草案,接任顾维钧的王正廷本人也接受了^[4]。

5月25日,英国外交大臣奥斯汀·张伯伦指示蓝普森:“应让王正廷意识到他必须为进一步的拖延负责。如果他仍然坚持修改,在必要时你可以同意与他进行逐条修改”,同时要求“所做的修改尽可能最低”^[5]。

6月2日,双方再次会晤。接到新指示的蓝普森称:山东局势稳定之后,英方可以完成1924年协议草案^[6]。双方决定派专家审定1924年草案中的可修改之处,英方派台克满、中方派张履鳌为代表^[7]。

6月21日,王正廷与蓝普森展开第三次会晤。王正廷一开始即提出:因为中方做出了建设海军的决定,并选择威海卫作为未来的海军基地,需要对1924年的草案进行进一步修改。双方就是否以1924年的草案为蓝本进行谈判展开讨论。英方坚持可以对1924年草案做出细微调整,但是该草案的要点不能变,另特地指出,第23条决不能变^[8]。蓝普森数次警告王正廷,如果因此耽搁了威海卫的归还,责任全在中方。他私下认为,中方不敢耽搁,因为如果威海卫的归还再次拖延,中国将成为失败者^[9]。

会谈后,蓝普森与王正廷进行了私下交流。王正廷称问题在于海军次长陈绍宽坚持陆地上的爱德华港区不能对外国人开放,也不能进行贸易,建议蓝普森去拜访陈绍宽。当晚八点半,蓝普森拜访陈绍宽,称威海卫陆地并不适合用作海军基地,而更适合用作消夏休养院和贸易港口,刘公岛更适合作为海军基地。陈绍宽对此未置可否^[10]。

6月22日上午,双方再次展开会谈。中方会谈人员是王正廷、外交部欧美司司长徐谟、外交部顾问刁敏谦,英方代表是蓝普森、台克满和艾威林(Aveling)^[11]。会谈开始后中方提出修改清单,其中较大处有两项:其一,取消所有条款中将爱德华港(威海卫码头)提供给外国人居住和贸易的规定;其二,刘公岛上借给英国使用的海军设备,期限缩减为三年,期满不得延期。蓝普森认为这些修改都是根本性的,已经超出了他的权限,他需要请示。在接下来的谈判中,王正廷表示他同意英方对威海卫码头的定位,将会尽力劝说海军部,促使该港保持为商港,但是刘公岛则仍为军港,并坚持岛上设备只能借给英国三年^[12]。

6月23日,蓝普森专访海军部政务次长陈绍宽,讨论威海应否改为军港与借用刘公岛设备的问

[1]Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir M. Lampson, 8 May 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, pp.328-329.

[2]Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Garstin, 8 May 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, p.366.

[3]Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 21 May 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, p.368.

[4][6][11]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 28 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 37, p.96, p.97, p.98.

[5]Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul-General Garstin, 25 May 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, pp.381-382.

[7]Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 3 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, p.400.

[8]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 21 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, p.429.第23条的内容是:“中国政府允将刘公岛内房屋数所及便利数项(如第三附件所列举)无偿借与英国政府,作为英国海军消夏养病之用,以十年为期,期满后经两国政府同意后,得适用原条件续借,借期终止时,所有地亩房屋等一并归还中国。”

[9][10]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 21 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, p.429, p.429.

[12]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 22 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume 36, p.431.

题。蓝普森认为码头不适合用作海军基地,并对借用刘公岛问题做出让步,只借用十年,而不再续借。陈绍宽只是专心听着,并未表态^[1]。

25日,双方再次会面,王正廷询问蓝普森是否收到了新的指示。蓝普森以原来的指示示之,王正廷不以为然,认为那是前任英国外交大臣的意见^[2]。会谈并无结果。

27日,蓝普森收到了新任英国外交大臣亨德森(Henderson)的电报,称在他离开南京前(7月1日),英国政府无法做出关于威海卫问题的决定。这也就导致了28日蓝普森离开南京前双方的最后一次谈判无法达成一致意见。蓝普森认为中方在上述两个问题上的拖延导致问题未能解决。他指出,归还威海卫是贝尔福在华盛顿会议上的声明,声明中有两个条件:第一,英国舰队继续使用海军设施,第二,保证外国人的财产权和代表参政权^[3]。对此,王正廷并无回应^[4]。

7月8日,蓝普森致电亨德森,表示威海卫问题应该作为一个单独的问题来讨论,不能与其他中英交涉问题联系在一起。他建议与中方继续谈判:第一,关于关闭爱德华港,英方应首先致力于劝阻这一行为,如中方特别坚持,英方可声明,所有外国人的财产权、投票权和其他权利(无论是政府的还是私人的)都需要全价购买,并且要在归还前付清。第二,关于海军设施的问题,英方准备接受借期十年,不再续借,前提是依照草案第23条借用,不做修改^[5]。11日,亨德森复电称,8日与中国大使会面,中国不接受英方关于爱德华港和海军设施的条件,希望英方满足中方的愿望。对此,英国政府正在考虑^[6]。8月8日,听取英国政府各部门的意见之后,亨德森致信蓝普森,否决其“借用刘公岛设备十年,而不续借”的建议^[7]。

随后,中英双方的谈判焦点转移到废除领事裁判权的谈判上;威海卫问题成为在这一重大问题之下的次要问题。直至1930年1月9日,蓝普森与王正廷再次接触,双方开始第一次协商废除领事裁判权问题。次日,蓝普森分别与王正廷、陈绍宽谈判威海卫问题。在与陈绍宽将军的非正式会谈中,蓝普森得知:“反对使用刘公岛设备的意见源于政方。”^[8]

1月11日,蓝普森与王正廷继续谈判。蓝普森表示,对陆地上的外国人财产权,要么按照1924年草案的条款进行保护,要么全价购回,但是英国借用的刘公岛设施对英驻华海军是“绝对关键的”,英国“必须坚持”依照1924年《专约草案》的协议照办。王正廷起初想讨价还价,只愿将刘公岛借用期续延一次,即先租三年,再租五年。然而,最终的处理意见是:原《草案》第23条的规定不变,但是取消附则,所使用设备在草案中列清。实际上,这相当于没有变化,也就是说,仍然依照英所坚持的借期十年,期满经双方同意可以续借。这是王正廷最大的一项让步。王正廷表示,希望尽快签订收交威海卫的专约^[9]。英方最在乎的权利解决之后,其他问题都迎刃而解。会后,蓝普森在致亨德森的电报中表示对此次谈判非常满意,他称:“毫无疑问,因为政治原因,外交部长似乎非常急切地想达成协议。在我看来,以上代表了我们从未可能达成的最有利条款。我强烈建议得到授权,毫不耽搁地签署协议。”^[10]

原则问题确定之后,剩下的就是具体操作层面的谈判。1月13日,双方再次展开讨论。王正廷提议将1924年协议草案分为交收协议和借用刘公岛海军设施的协议两部分,蓝普森表示同意。随后,

[1][3][4]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 28 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume37, p.99, p.436, pp.96-101.

[2]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 25 June 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume36, pp.433-434.

[5]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 5 July 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume37, pp.28-29.

[6]Mr. A. Henderson to Sir M. Lampson, 11 July 1929, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume37, p.35.

[7]Foreign Office to Sir M. Lampson, 8 Aug. 1929, FO228/4033.

[8]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 10 Jan. 1930, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume37, p.382.

[9][10]Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 11 Jan. 1930, BDF A, Part 2, Series E, Volume37, p.396, p.396.

双方助手徐谟与台克满逐条审查修订1924年草案^[1]。

2月2日,蓝普森到达南京,准备威海卫签约事宜。2月10日,蓝普森与王正廷再次会面。蓝普森将两份协议交给王正廷。王正廷对关于租用刘公岛海军设施的第二份协议的第一处换文提出严重异议。原来,英方在第二份协议中有处换文称“鉴于中英海军的传统友好关系,应准英国海军舰队使用威海卫水域作为避暑之用,为此特订立此协定,……”。王正廷认为中国政府不可能接受这样的插入语(reinsertion),因为七年前就是这样的条款阻碍了收回,他希望英国政府不再坚持,以防再次阻碍签约。双方争执的焦点其实在于十年后的续借问题。最终,双方议定取消换文,将十年后续借问题在协定中表述为“期满后经两国政府同意,得适用原条件或适用其他经两国政府同意之条件续借”^[2]。其他修改之处,双方均无大的异议。接下来,双方约定将交收时间定为10月1日。最后,徐谟和台克满就英方的草案进行了详细的审阅。

2月13日,经徐谟和台克满修订后的专约由双方互换,交收协议名为《专约》(convention)(共20条),借用刘公岛上某些设施的协议名为“协定”(agreement)(共6条)。此后几天,徐谟和台克满又讨论了协议中所附地图,最终决定以1924年草案中的地图为准^[3]。3月28日,英外交大臣亨德森对蓝普森的谈判结果感到满意,专电授其全权决定正式签字^[4]。

4月17日,蓝普森抵达南京,准备签约。下午,蓝普森会见王正廷。两人就两项文件的版本展开讨论。条约原本只有英文本,应中方要求,又准备了“中文核证翻译本”。4月18日晚正式签字时,王正廷与蓝普森在英文本的《专约》与《协定》上正式签字,在“中文本”上“草签”上姓名^[5]。签字完毕后,两人交换函件,声明如果南京国民政府在《专约》与《协定》正式批准时还不能控制山东,将延期交还,直至其对山东完全控制时再移交^[6]。

三、南京国民政府接收威海卫

从1930年4月份《专约》签署到10月1日正式归还,其间还有将近半年的时间,部分威海卫百姓和在威中英商人并不愿在此时局动荡之机失去英国的庇护。4月7日,庄士敦致电殖民部和蓝普森,禀告威海卫士绅梁德让建议推迟归还威海卫一事^[7]。同时,英商克拉克也表示,在威英人“一直感到很担忧放弃对威海卫的租占后,我们的利益会受到损害”^[8]。

这些担心不无道理,1930年5月,蒋阎冯中原大战爆发,山东成为主战场之一。7月份,已经到达威海卫的中方接收委员会首席代表徐祖善,在与威海卫行政长官庄士敦的谈话中表示,尽管目前政治不稳定,但南京政府仍要“根据条约的条款在10月1日接管威海卫”。他说,“即使到时候南京政府不完全直接控制山东”,中方也将由张学良部代表南京政府接收并管理威海卫(尽管此时张学良还未宣布易帜),“听命于沈阳的海军司令沈鸿烈将军会负责威海卫的防御”,“这样将使南京政府免受请求英国政府同意推迟归还的耻辱”^[9]。但蓝普森反对这一建议,也反对延期交还威海卫,因为那将使

[1] Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 14 Jan. 1930, BDFA, Part 2, Series E, Volume 37, p.403.

[2] Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 11 Feb. 1930, BDFA, Part 2, Series E, Volume 38, pp.25-26.

[3][5][6] Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 29 Apr. 1930, BDFA, Part 2, Series E, Volume 38, p.195, pp.196-197, p.197.

[4] Rohan Bulter, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Second Series, vol. 8, chapter 2, No.250, Henderson to Lampson, 28 Mar. 1930, p.336.

[7] Colonial Office to Foreign Office and Enclosure 1 & 2, 3 June 1930, BDFA, Part 2, Series E, Volume 38, pp.152-153.

[8] Clarke to Johnston, 9 Sep. 1930, 威海市档案馆《英租档案》,档案号:229-1-217。

[9] Johnston to Colonial Office, 10 July 1930, CO521/69.

英国陷于不守条约和失信伪善的困扰^[1]。英国外交部则认为,如果山东局势继续混乱,至少应顺延一年交还威海卫^[2]。

所幸战事在向国民政府有利的方向发展。9月10日,投靠蒋介石的原西北军将领韩复榘被任命为山东省主席。同日,王正廷与蓝普森举行会谈,会后蓝普森致电亨德森,称王正廷通知他国民政府已经完全控制山东,威海卫归还不存在问题^[3]。随后几日,双方就在南京交换《批准书》和在威海卫当地进行接收仪式进行讨论。15日,殖民部通知威海卫行政长官庄士敦:按照原定计划于10月1日归还威海卫^[4]。

早在6月中旬,南京国民政府已经成立筹办威海卫事宜办事处,并于6月20日公布了该处规程。据《申报》载:规程“全文计九条,规定设特派员一人,筹办接收一切事务;设事务股主任一人、股员二人,办理收发编辑统计及庶务等事项;调查股主任一人、股员二至四人,办理调查威海卫区域内之行政司法港务财政卫生交通商业农林公产工程等事项;至于计划及会议接收事宜、则另设委员会处理”。另外,筹备收回威海卫事宜专员徐祖善也于20日经上海赴威海^[5]。

8月上旬,国民政府外交部决定将威海卫收回后作为行政院直辖市,并拟就《威海卫组织规则草案》24条报行政院鉴核^[6]。9月中旬后,随着接收日期临近,国民政府做出更为细致的安排。王家桢作为威海卫接收专员,徐祖善作为威海卫管理专员,率接管人员由上海乘轮船前往青岛,那天晚上,上海的霓虹灯滚动播放这一消息。在青岛期间,他们商定:

- 一派朱世全、李翼之、王耀东接收第七条及附件一应移交之物品。
- 一派邝光林、吴采衡接收营房及附属品。
- 一派葛祖广、杨景焕、贺书绅接收官产及附属品并先期与英财政秘书接洽。
- 一派丁延龄、邱均接收坞口验货局事宜。

至接防问题,关系地方治安,则由东北海军陆战队李大队长督同陆战队三百名赴威协助警察以维持之。^[7]

9月30日,接收威海卫专员王家桢、徐祖善一行于凌晨三时从青岛出发,次日早上抵达威海^[8]。10月1日上午九时,外交部长王正廷与英公使代表、驻南京领事许立德“在萨家湾外交官舍将双方批准书实行互换”^[9]。同时,接收仪式在威海卫举行。是日,威海市内各处悬挂党国旗、张贴“还我山河”等标语。上午九时,王家桢、徐祖善两位专员乘坐的海琛、镇海两艘军舰抵达威海,商会代表及民众团体三千余人到埠欢迎。英国威海卫行政公署长官庄士敦、驻华舰队海军司令率同全体行政官员及海陆军队在码头迎接。英军舰彼得斯飞尔特号停泊行政公署附近海面听候鸣炮致敬,森特威舰停泊爱德华埠迎接中国专员登陆。十点半,中方专员正式登陆,英国海陆警卫队各五十名连同海军军乐队列队迎接,彼得斯飞尔特舰鸣礼炮15响致敬。随后,庄士敦引导各位代表乘汽车赴长官公署。

十点五十分,交接典礼正式开始。当专员抵达公署时,军乐队奏英国国歌。随后,庄士敦会同中

[1] Sir M. Lampson to Foreign Office, 6 Aug. 1930, CO521/69.

[2] Foreign Office to Sir M. Lampson, 4 Sep. 1930, CO521/69.

[3] Sir M. Lampson to Mr. A. Henderson, 10 Sep. 1930, BDFA, Part 2, Series E, Volume 38, pp.284-285.

[4] Colonial Office to Johnston, 15 Sep. 1930, CO521/69.

[5] 《收回威海卫案》,《申报》,1930年6月21日,第8版。

[6] 《威海卫收回后之行政管理方案》,《申报》,1930年8月13日,第4版。

[7] 王家桢:《收回威海卫英租地历见记》,第191页。

[8] 《收回威海卫案》,《申报》,1930年9月30日,第5版;1930年10月1日,第4版。

[9] 《中英交收威海卫典礼昨日举行》,《申报》,1930年10月2日,第4版。

国管理专员及英海军司令在典礼台上宣读交收威海卫专约中若干条,先读英文,次读中文,然后他下令同升中国国旗及英国国旗(日落时一同降下,10月2日只升中国国旗),军乐队奏中国国歌,彼得斯飞尔特舰、肯姆脱舰会同中国军舰,各鸣炮21响致敬,典礼结束。十一点十分,举行茶会,中英代表彼此举杯致敬。十一点四十五分,庄士敦赴码头,乘船离开,中方专员到码头相送,中国军舰向长官鸣炮15响致敬^[1]。

午后二时,威海卫管理公署专员徐祖善就职礼在公署举行。随后,王家桢、徐祖善“将接收顺利情形,分电蒋主席、行政院、外交部备案,而三十二年在英人治理之威海卫乃完全收回矣”^[2]。

四、结 论

威海卫是南京国民政府通过谈判成功收回的第一个租借地。该租借地的成功收回与国民政府自身实力的发展和外交政策的正确关系密切。国民革命之后,国民革命军连战连胜,成立了南京国民政府。其自身实力的发展使英国政府调整了对华政策,英国政府由支持北洋政府反对革命,转变为观望政策,再调整为与国民政府进行外交接触,最后承认国民政府。当国民政府成为一个能够有效控制山东的权威政府时,英国与国民政府展开了威海卫交收谈判。

南京国民政府在收回威海卫的谈判中体现出外交延续性的鲜明特点。其一,南京国民政府与英国政府的威海卫谈判以1924年英国政府与北洋政府达成草案为蓝本;其二,国民政府中负责谈判的王正廷曾是北洋政府的外交官,他曾参与1924年的威海卫交收谈判,当时有很多历经晚清、北洋、南京三个政府的外交官。在这两重意义上,威海卫谈判体现出中国近代外交的延续性。实际上,这种延续性不仅体现在威海卫交涉中,自清末及北洋再至南京国民政府的外交,大多存在这一特点。

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Weihaiwei Negotiation and its Return to the Republic of China

Liu Bensen

Abstract: With the British policy changes in China, Republic of China has become the focus of British diplomacy in China. When the national government became a powerful government and can effectively control Shandong, the UK and the national government started negotiations about the return of Weihaiwei. C. T. Wang and Lampson as the negotiators conducted several rounds of negotiations based on the 1924 draft. Finally, Weihaiwei was successfully returned to the Republic of China on Oct. 1, 1930.

Keywords: The Nanjing Decade of the Republic of China; Britain; Weihaiwei; C. T. Wang; Lampson

[1]参见《中英交收威海卫典礼昨日举行》,《申报》,1930年10月2日,第4版;王家桢:《收回威海卫英租地历见记》,徐祖善:《中英交收威海卫之经过及礼节》,威海市政协科教文史委员会编:《英国租占威海卫三十二年(威海文史资料第10辑)》,1998年,内部印刷,第186-194页。

[2]徐祖善:《中英交收威海卫之经过及礼节》,第187页。