

# 'Journey Between Two Chinas'

One China is that of 1946-49, during the Chinese Civil War. The second China is that of the Communist mainland today. An overview by a China observer:

by Seymour Topping

THE AVERAGE MAN probably knows more about the surface of the moon than he does about the mass of land and people known as the People's Republic of China. For more than geography separates us from the typical citizen of Communist China. Philosophy, psychology, history, religion (and absence thereof), economics, politics, education, the very routine of daily life—all create a nearly insurmountable barrier.

Yet as Leo Rosten, author and political scientist, has written: "Wisdom consists of the capacity to confront disturbing ideas, even intolerable ideas, with equanimity."

Today the spin of ping-pong diplomacy, China's entry into the United Nations, and the U.S. President's unprecedented trip to Peking have propelled this creation of Mao Tse-tung to centerstage of the international scene. Whatever our individual feelings toward Communist China, we need candid information about this land, its 800 million people, and its broadening impact on the world.

Seymour Topping, assistant managing editor of The New York Times, has been actively studying China from both inside and out for more than 25 years. In 1946, his deep affection for the Chinese people compelled him to go to the scene and try to understand the bloody rush of events then convulsing wartorn Nationalist China. Three years later the "Bamboo Curtain" was drawn over the mainland and Topping, like many other free world correspondents, was forced to leave the new Communist Chinese state.

Subsequent assignments for the Associated Press and later the Times took Topping around the world, but he remained a close student of China. The following article is an excerpt from his book, *Journey Between Two Chinas* (reprinted by permission of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. © 1972). The first China is that of 1946-49, the final days of the Nationalist regime and the violent birth of Mao's People's Republic. The second China was 22 years later when

Topping returned to the mainland to find a different China, one that had undergone a violent mass transformation. For five weeks, accompanied by his wife, Audrey, one of the photojournalists whose work illustrates this article, he traveled on the mainland, talking with peasants, students, urban workers, and government officials of every rank. His trip ended with a long interview with Chou En-lai.

Topping's perceptive observations of what had transpired—both good and bad—during the 22 years of Communist rule convinced him that the free world's lack of communication with Communist China had increased international tensions during the last two decades. U.S. President Richard Nixon echoed this last year in Peking when he uttered the hope that "walls will not divide the peoples of the world, that peoples regardless of differences in philosophy and background will have an opportunity to communicate with each other and know each other."

With the hope that this article will provide one such opportunity, we invite reader comment.

—THE EDITORS



The author, surrounded by Chinese factory workers, tries out a tractor in a mainland plant.

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PAOLO KOCH

AUDREY TOPPING

*Chinese youths wave Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Little Red Book. The zealotry of Mao's personality cult has pulled mainland China through revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and now, after 24 years, is readying the People's Republic of China to turn outward toward the rest of the world.*



I STRODE THROUGH the lobby of the Commodore Hotel where I was to lecture to the Rotary Club of New York on China, muttering unkind words about the retired *New York Times* advertising executive who had prodded me into this speaking chore. Should I delight them with tales of my wife's adventures in China or should I read to them from my yellowed clippings of two decades ago? It was May 13, 1971, and one week since Audrey, my wife, visiting China with her Canadian diplomat father, had cabled from Peking: "Chou En-lai says you can come to China."

Since the arrival of Audrey's message, no authorization for a visa had yet arrived. Now, I agonized that something had gone wrong and that I would not return to China.

I gloomily entered the Windsor Ballroom and paused to pick up my ticket for the Rotary Club luncheon. But then my metabolism rate spurted when the receptionist said there was an urgent message: "You may go to China as you have requested." Elated, I returned to the luncheon, rose to speak to the Rotarians, told them of my good fortune, and

with their applause following me and feeling like a soap opera hero, I sallied forth. Soon I would see Audrey in China. I was traveling in time and space. Memories of China possessed me.

I had witnessed their revolution, 500 million people being lifted violently from feudalism, walked among the dead on the civil war battlefields hidden in the vastness of the great plains, spoken to the peasant soldier survivors, recorded their hurt, anger, and hopes. To behold revolution, then immersed in its turbulence . . . the catharsis, the cruelty, the exaltation . . . the insights gained from a society in transition at the very moments of defeat and triumph and the beginnings of transformation . . . the rush of understanding and the maturing of self before the vision and the reality. Nothing eclipsed that experience as I went to the French Indochina War, to London, Berlin, Moscow, and finally to partake of the agony in Vietnam.

In September of 1946, I had flown to Peking to become a language student and part-time correspondent. I was 24. Two months later I flew to Yen-an, in the brown hills of Shensi in the northwest where Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders lived, blockaded by the Nationalist troops of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For a week, in the cave dwellings overlooking the river valley, I spoke to Mao's followers, questioning them.



*Father and child signify traditional Chinese family ties are still strong under Red rule. The healthy look is from improved diet, medical care.*

Discussing the Communist land reform program with several members of the Party's Central Committee, I said: "You know people in the United States are suspicious of Communists. Why don't you change the name of your party to the Agrarian Reform Party or something like that?" The Central Committee members, men in blue caps and tunics, most of them lean, deeply bronzed by years in the field fighting against Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the Japanese, looked at each other, concealing their astonishment and amusement, and one said gently: "We call ourselves Communists because we are Communists."

In Yen-an, one had only to read the volumes made of yellow grass paper, containing the writings of Mao



*In an incongruous fusion of old and new, an artisan applies the traditional Chinese art of silk embroidery to a theme more typical of China under the Communists: an irrigation dam, one part of an intensive drive to become agriculturally self-sufficient.*

Tse-tung available in English, to know that these men were Marxist-Leninists bent on a peasant revolution to transform China by stages into a Communist state. Mine was an innocent question, but also there was implicit in it the typical foreign arrogance toward the Chinese. Like the Czarist generals, the British gunboat captains, the Yankee traders, the Comintern agents, and most recently American diplomats mediating in their civil war, I was telling the Chinese to accommodate their society to foreign attitudes. But this, too, was ending in the caves of Yen-an.

But it was not yet clear to me and other Americans what this meant for the relationship of China to the United States. There would be a time in 1949 in a

village hut on a great battlefield in central China, after a confrontation with a Communist commissar who had held me prisoner, when I would rest my head against a sack of grain and weep, when I knew that China and its people would go down a path that would veer sharply away from the United States and its people, and that it would be a generation or more before they could come together again.

And now it was more than two decades and the time of parley and reunion was approaching. After years of isolation and virtually no contact with the United States, Peking was reacting to a shift in the balance of forces in the world. The ideological and national antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union had sharpened, and the Chinese were viewing apprehensively the re-emergence of Japan as a great world power. The United States was withdrawing from Indochina, and a new relationship between Peking and Washington had become feasible. I was consumed with the compulsion to go back to China to see what had transpired in the vastest of experiments in human engineering.

When I left China in 1949, I reported that it was unlikely that the Communists would be able to rescue the country from its economic bog. The problem then essentially was that the fast-expanding population was consuming everything produced by primitive Chinese agriculture, and, in fact, grain was being imported to make up a deficit. I added one qualification to this gloomy prognosis: If the Communists could sustain the momentum of their Revolution and fundamentally transform Chinese society, then the gap between production and consumption might be closed and a surplus to fund industrialization created.

In 1971, my tour of various communes and what data I had gathered on nationwide agricultural performance left me with the impression that China was close to a solution of its central economic problem: the creation of an annual farm surplus. Such a surplus is vital to finance internal development and pay for the imports of raw materials and machines for industrialization. Until China's infant industry can grow large enough to compete strongly on world markets, about three-fourths of her exports must continue to be raw and processed agricultural products.

In the Great Leap Forward the peasant cooperatives were merged by 1959 into 24,000 giant farm units, mobilizing 99 per cent of the peasantry. Each commune, pooling land, houses, agricultural implements, and farm animals, comprised on the average a unit of about 10,000 acres worked by 5,000 households. Each commune is a new, self-contained microcosm of rural China, with its own workshops, primary and middle schools, hospitals, and shops. Family pri-

vate plots, each used mainly to raise vegetables, a few chickens, and a pig, had been reduced to .016 of an acre per person. Private trade or free markets had been abolished. Handicrafts or food raised outside the collective must be bought or sold through a commune Supply and Marketing Cooperative.

Each peasant is assured of the "five guarantees" of food, clothing, medicines, education, and burial. Although the peasant is regimented as a laborer, he is not a robot, nor does he live in an anthill, as is sometimes pictured abroad. In the village, the individual household continues to be the basic social unit and family attachments and affections remain strong. Ancestors' shrines in the homes have been replaced by portraits of Mao. (Under the state constitution there is freedom of religion in China. In practice, religion is frowned upon and attacked in Party propaganda and the schools. Of the foreign missionary movement in China there remained a memory of humanitarian service and evidence of the substantial contribution to education, but the religious heritage of a century's work has virtually disappeared.)

Traveling through China, one gets the impression of a society in which honesty is considered not a virtue but the norm of life. Theft is something foreigners do not worry about in China. Money, documents, or other valuables can be left in an unlocked room or house or car in the streets with the certainty that nothing will be stolen. A foreigner who loses a camera or handbag in a park can be quite sure that it will be turned in to the lost-and-found, then returned on inquiry. Once a taxi driver in Peking knocked on my hotel door and with apologies returned a banknote worth a few cents. He had not noticed it stuck to another bill when I paid a fare the previous day. In every city visited by Audrey and me, we never saw the slightest evidence of being afraid to walk at night in any neighborhood.

If the affluent in expensive garb were absent, so were the beggars, the opium addicts, and the other tattered, emaciated human debris. I looked eagerly at the faces and dress of the men and women of the new China. The Maoist man looked healthy and vigorous, and he marched to command. There is something frightening about the power of the Peking regime to summon within a few hours in any major city a half-million people, with red banners flying and drums beating, to shout tirelessly in unison any given slogan, welcome any friend or denounce any designated enemy.

In dress there was a disappointing dull sameness: white, blue or gray shirts or blouses worn over unpressed blue trousers, and sandals or rubber-soled shoes with blue canvas tops resembling tennis sneak-

ers. The women wore their hair short or in braids and no make-up. Yet what struck me immediately was the obvious good health and fit condition of the people. Gone were the emaciated faces, the trachoma-laden eyes, the facial sores which had once horrified me. The younger people flashed smiles which showed good white teeth instead of gaps and blackened stumps. Not only had a political revolution taken place, but over the past two decades a revolution in health had made the Chinese sturdier and bigger in stature, if more passive, self-contained, and dignified.

To Maoist society frugality is dictated by economic necessity and an ideology that discourages material incentives, unlike the United States, where affluence is feasible and an encouraged aspiration. In my tour of China, I found the people coping with the primary problems of the environment on the farms where more than four-fifths of the now 800 million inhabitants of China live. The very shape of the landscape had been changed by giant water conservancy and land reclamation projects. The magnitude of the afforestation program was staggering. Tens of millions of trees have been planted. Saplings line the roads, are seen in every village and on mountainsides, and in the cities border the streets and stand in every garden and open lot. They beautify, contain the erosion of the earth and draw dust and fumes from the air. The Hangchow region has been transformed into a major industrial complex since the Communist takeover without blighting the central garden city. As in other Chinese cities, planners have sought to restrict factories to the wooded suburbs with surrounding vegetation intensively cultivated as screening and to absorb fumes. In factories all over China extensive use is made of end products usually discarded as waste in the United States. Bits of metal are collected and sawdust is pressed into firewood. In China, with its plentitude of manpower, these practices are economical, whereas costs in the United States make them impractical except as antipollution measures.

Mao has sanctioned some compromises to meet the practical needs of the society in its present stage of development. The system allows a skilled factory worker with long experience to earn more than his department head. The same worker, if his wife also has a job, may have a family income that exceeds that of the head of the factory. The graduated wage scale is in itself a tacit acceptance of a material incentive system and a compromise with the Communist principle: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." The Maoists deplore this broad disparity.

During the Cultural Revolution, a massive purge was carried out of industrial managers who gave pri-

ority to boosting production rather than to ideological considerations. Putting into practice the Maoist rule, "politics in command," officials and economic managers were struck down who "took the capitalist road" by relying on material incentives for workers and peasants rather than "Socialist education" to spur production.

Mao seems to have boundless faith that through ideological indoctrination the ordinary worker can be roused to increase production and through home-made innovation renew much of the antiquated character of Chinese industrial plants. In our tour of the northeast industrial heartland, the central themes had been innovation, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency. Short of the foreign exchange needed for large-scale imports of machinery and technology, determined never again to be dependent on foreign aid, Mao was summoning his industrial workers, in much the same way as he had roused the country's farmers, to leap forward through *people power*. He had obtained a release of creative energy among the industrial workers that had boosted production without the massive investment of capital that might have been required in other countries. But China was still only barely over the threshold of the industrial age, while her competitors, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Western Europe, were making great strides into the postindustrial electronic era. Unless there is a major intake of machinery and technology from the more sophisticated industrial countries, China is more likely to fall further behind than gain, despite the *people power* mobilized by Mao.

Certainly China will steadily increase its imports of modern technology and equipment, but the country will also continue to employ its labor-intensive production methods taking advantage of its large reserves of manpower. These methods, as well as the adaptable and easily manufactured machines that have been developed in China, are suitable for application to the other less-developed economies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For these countries, China will exert an attraction as a society similar to their own, which by its own ingenuity and labor has lifted itself out of poverty, disorder, and dependence.

Since the mid-1960s the Chinese Communists had been plagued by a nightmare of encirclement by the Soviet Union, India, Japan, and the United States. The threat of encirclement had become so firmly rooted in Maoist thinking, particularly as it related to distrust of the Soviet Union, that breaking the ring had become Peking's prime foreign policy concern.

Between June, 1959, and October, 1961, the Chinese-Soviet alliance in effect dissolved, and with it vanished the ideological restraints which had inhib-

ited the re-emergence of the historic national antagonisms between the neighboring giants. One is left with the summary impression that the ideological debate has been, in the main, a facade for the conflict of national interests and the competition for leadership of the Communist world and the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

It is most unlikely that China will achieve anything approaching nuclear parity with the United States and the Soviet Union in this century or that the Chinese will strive to do so. Their current modest program probably is already consuming more of China's limited resources than it can afford. Given the overwhelming superiority of Soviet and American nuclear forces, it is unlikely that Peking would hazard a first strike with its limited nuclear arsenal. Apart from the suicidal character of such a move, Chinese military policy has been essentially cautious. Despite their ideological trumpeting of the virtues of armed revolutionary struggle, the Chinese have shown no inclination to become involved in foreign military adventures. While the Chinese are ready to support national liberation movements politically and with advice and weapons, the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war holds that every insurgency must win its own armed struggle. In relations with other major powers, the Chinese habitually have avoided risking armed conflict except when they have felt their frontiers threatened.

China is not an open society in the Western sense, and there were many sections of it, as well as geographical areas, that would remain closed to most foreigners for some time. Much of the fabric of the society had been unraveled by the Cultural Revolution, and more time was needed for the reweaving. As the Chinese frankly told visitors, some areas of the country remained backward, and there was no desire to expose them to foreign inspection. Other areas were closed for reasons of military security. Facilities for receiving visitors were limited.

The United States and China have much to gain in mutual enrichment through people-to-people contacts. It would be well, however, for Americans who go to China to be aware that judgments on the achievements of the last two decades are more valid in the frame of reference of the improvements in the life of the people than in comparisons between the Chinese and American societies.

The peasant lives in a monolithic state. He has never known parliamentary democracy, or freedom in the Western sense, and he does not know it now. Yet he has more of a voice in the management of his village affairs than ever before. He is freed from the bullying landlord, the usurer, the corrupt official. The woman has won freedom from child marriage, con-

cubinage, and slavery; enjoys equality before the law and in the economy, and the right of divorce and abortion. Illiteracy has been reduced, according to official statements, to about 10 to 15 per cent of the population, mostly the aged or infirm, giving the peasant a new social mobility. When the Communist state was founded in 1949, about 80 per cent of the population was illiterate.

These are the gains, together with greater material well-being on the average, which the peasant weighs against the loss of some of his former individualism. (Yes, there are too many ideological meetings and lectures, everybody agrees.) Someday the peasant may yearn for other freedoms. Someday he may want television sets and refrigerators in addition to bi-



*Premier Chou En-lai greets Topping in Peking after a warming of U.S.-China relations allowed the author to return to the mainland in 1971. During his first sojourn there (1946-49), Topping met every leader on both sides of the bloody Chinese Civil War.*

cycles and sewing machines. Just now, he is obviously content with the balance sheet of past and present.

The dynamics of change in Asia are such that political and social movements and institutions must grow indigenously and that they rarely take permanent root as a consequence of foreign gifts, persuasion, or transplants. Even when the transition from colonial status to independence is fairly orderly, as in the instances of Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, a period of turmoil and change inevitably ensues as the political, social, and economic order, freed of the artificial strictures of the colonizing power, adjusts to native forces.

It has been a long journey between the two Chinas. If we have learned anything in these last two decades, I hope it is the realization that one people cannot impose change upon another. If there is to be a lasting change, it can only come from within a society. ☸

## Glossary

- (1) Peking = Beijing = 北京
- (2) Premier Chou En-lai = Premier Zhou Enlai = 周恩來(中華人民共和國國務院總理)
- (3) Yenan = Yan'an = 延安
- (4) Shensi = Shaanxi = 陝西省
- (5) Chairman Mao Tse-tung = Chairman Mao Zedong = 毛澤東(中國共產黨中央委員會主席)
- (6) Chiang Kai-shek = 蔣中正(蔣介石)
- (7) Great Leap Forward = 大躍進

The Great Leap Forward (Second Five Year Plan) of the People's Republic of China was an economic and social campaign led by the Chinese Communist Party from 1958 to 1962. Chairman Mao Zedong launched the campaign to reconstruct the country from an agrarian economy into a communist society through the formation of people's communes. Mao decreed that efforts to multiply grain yields and bring industry to the countryside should be increased. The major changes which occurred in the lives of rural Chinese people included the incremental introduction of mandatory agricultural collectivization. Private farming was prohibited, and those people who engaged in it were persecuted and labeled counter-revolutionaries. Restrictions on rural people were enforced with public struggle sessions and social pressure, and forced labor was also exacted from people.

- (8) Commune Supply and Marketing Cooperative = 人民公社供銷合作社
- (9) Hangchow = Hangzhou = 杭州
- (10) Cultural Revolution = 無產階級文化大革命

The Cultural Revolution, formally known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a sociopolitical movement in China from 1966 until Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Launched by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, its stated goal was to preserve Chinese communism by purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society, and to re-impose Mao Zedong Thought (known outside China as Maoism) as the dominant ideology in the People's Republic of China. The Revolution marked Mao's return to the central position of power in China after a period of less radical leadership to recover from the failures of the Great Leap Forward, which caused the Great Chinese Famine (1959–61) that killed no less than 30 million lives. However, the Revolution failed to achieve its main goals. The Revolution ended up as a humanitarian crisis. Andrew G. Walder (2014): estimated at least 1.1–1.6 million deaths and 22–30 million persecuted or maybe even more. He reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 county annals in every Chinese county and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. Rudolph J. Rummel (1991): Estimated 7,731,000 death. Rummel

includes his estimate of Laogai camp (勞動改造營) deaths in this figure. He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million. He estimated that another 1.613 million were killed outright, a middle-ground figure he picked between 285,000 and 10,385,000, a range he deemed plausible.

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### Rotarians' comments:

- (1) November 1973 from George Ashmore Fitch (費吳生) (Shanghai Rotary Club 上海扶輪社 President 1930-1931; Chungking Rotary Club 重慶扶輪社 President 1942-1943). Fitch, American missionary, was born in the Ch'ing Empire (大清帝國) and then lived in the Republic of China (中華民國) for 80 years. After 1947, he had been member of Seoul Rotary Club, Korea, and Taipei Rotary Club, Taiwan (臺灣臺北扶輪社) before his retirement in the United States.

Seymour Topping's article, *Journey Between Two Chinas*, omits mention that the Communist China, after taking over the mainland, also invaded the devastated Tibet. Many, including the Dalai Lama, had to flee to India, and many thousands of others were killed. Nor does Topping mention the fact that the United Nations panel of international jurists, after surveying the situation, called it *genocide*. Can a government that did this be called "non-violent"?

Mao's armies also attempted a penetration of north India borders. And what about the support of Hanoi in Indo-China, not to mention the support of revolution in other countries? Violent acts speak louder than words of peaceful penetration or intentions. Both Burma and Thailand are on their list for a takeover, and even their school children are taught "hate America" songs.

But perhaps the most serious criticism of Communist China is that it is strictly atheistic. It is a prison offense to teach one's own children anything of a religious nature. Practically all churches have been either destroyed or have been turned into warehouses. In Peking one Catholic church is permitted to function, but only for the benefit of members of the diplomatic body.

We in my land sing of "freedom's holy light" but there is virtually no freedom in China; it is essentially a slave state. Hence, freedom-loving Chinese are continuing to flee their country by increasing numbers every month. And this is done at the risk of their lives; they face the danger of being shot by border guards or of drowning while swimming the three miles across the bay that separates them from Hong Kong.



Approximately a quarter million have fled Communist China in this manner. Moreover, 14,000 soldiers who had fought with the North Korea Communists chose to be sent to Taiwan rather than to return to their homes in Communist China.

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(2)    October 1973 from Rotarian Jose Ma. Hernandez (college president), Cubao, Quezon City, The Philippines:

### Do China's Ends Justify Means?

The changing of Asia through the full adoption of Western ideology and method is wrong. I heartily agree with Seymour Topping [see *Journey Between Two China* in 《The Rotarian》 for April] and with the mainland Chinese on this point. All over Asia rapid, all-embracing, and revolutionary changes are now taking place, and democracy (American-style) has been found wanting: you cannot make brown or yellow “Americans” with just a stroke of the pen or even with armed violence and bloodshed.

Thus it is not passing strange that mainland China has elected to transform her way of life from feudalism to the so-called “wave of the future”---in her own way.

But this fact, to my mind, lays the Chinese metamorphosis wide open to serious questioning and doubt.

The first question is: “Is Communism an autochthonous idealism in China?” The answer is no, which means that the remedy to the political and economic difficulties of 800 million mainland Chinese cannot be Communism because this system was not born in China and, therefore, is as foreign as, say, British democracy or American freedom of assembly.

Moreover, the impartial observer wants to find out by what method Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai assumed power in China. Was it through the will of the people, now called euphemistically “The People’s Republic of China,” freely expressed in a free election?

We condemn Hitler and Mussolini and other dictators for assuming power without a “by your leave” of their respective electorates. But we praise Mao Tse-tung for the economic progress, military advancement, cleanliness, and sanitation. Is not sauce for the goose also sauce for the gander? Christian philosophy, as well as that of other great religions, teaches us that “the end does not justify the means.”

A deeper and more sustained look at the situation in mainland China suggests that Seymour Topping should answer the following questions:

1. Is it not true that the “good, happy, and pleasant things” that the visitor in Red China sees are stage-managed by the Communist chiefs for purposes of propaganda? Or is the evidence presented by Robert Loh in his book, *Escape From Red China*, completely false?
2. Is not the Communist ideology of Red China completely against any form of religion and, therefore, totally atheistic? How can we live in a world that does not recognize God?
3. Is not the conflict between Chinese and Soviet Communism one based only on *method* rather than final objective? With all the bright, beautiful things that Topping says about Red China, why does he not mention the fact that the ultimate goal of Communism is the domination of the entire world? Is it not true that Khrushchev said, “This objective can only be changed when the shrimps begin to whistle”?
4. If Communist China is the paradise described by Topping, why are thousands of Chinese refugees fleeing to Taiwan? And, by the way, what is the size of the foreign trade of Communist China (800 million people) compared to that of small Taiwan (15 million people)?

It might be good to end this brief commentary by calling attention to the admission of Red China into the United Nations, the recognition of Mao’s regime by many big nations, the opening of trade relations with Communist China. A great many people like Topping say that both Soviet Russia and Red China are mellowing and adopting capitalistic methods. Therefore, we must say today, “What a happy family. The Communists are as human and humane as we are.”

But how can one forget Hungary, Tibet, and Czechoslovakia? How can we erase from our memory the longest armistice in history as it exists in the Korean peninsula today, the Communist perfidy and duplicity in Vietnam, the double-faced treachery of the Castro government to the Cubans as well as to the rest of the world? If there is doubt about these points, please read Eugene Lyons’ *Worker’s Paradise Lost*, Admiral Burke’s various articles on Communist double-dealing and the publications of the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation.

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